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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis assesses the current status of Canadian prescription drug regulation and the 
policy drivers that guide this process. This analysis is accomplished by first providing a 
general survey of the steps, law, and institutional players involved in the full life-cycle of 
a drug. Next the evolution of current clinical trials and the gaps that the present legal 
regime creates in the scientific standards employed in clinical research is reviewed. This 
is followed by a discussion of how commercialization (innovation) and speed of approval 
(market access) are slowly becoming the dominant policy drivers for the Canadian 
regime. Finally a discussion of the proposed Progressive Licensing model, and Bill C-51-
An Act to Amend the Food and Drug Act, raises the concerns with a shift to a system 
largely based on risk assessment and post-market monitoring (pharmacovigilence). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Our inexhaustible supply of fact has 
unexpectedly made everything true and false. 
While the power of expertise has obscured 




 As a society we place a lot of faith in science. In making decisions we rely on it to 
add weight to our choices, and to give them a layer of objective justification. Yet science 
is not truth or absolute; it is merely a tool to aid reasoning. One of its core principles is 
uncertainty, and the continuous need to check and modify the assumptions we draw from 
observation.
2
 Like any tool it has its limits; when employed appropriately it is very 
useful, and when employed improperly, its utility to aid reasoning becomes questionable. 
  
 Too often, science is employed poorly when its outcomes have economic and 
political implications. Too often, observations can be manipulated to justify 
(predetermined) decision-making without maintaining validity.  Under these 
circumstances, the value of science becomes negligible. In those situations where 
potential hazard flows from the decisions we make based on scientific observation, we 
must ensure that these observations do not shade into the meaningless. 
 
                                                 
1
J. R. Saul, Voltaire’s Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) 
at 175. 
2
See K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Rutledge, 2004) [Popper]. 
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Lessons Learned From the VIGOR Study and Vioxx 
(a) The Vioxx Withdrawal 
 
 
 In 1999, Canada and the United States approved for sale the anti-inflammatory 
drug, Vioxx (Rofecoxhib). It was heralded as a breakthrough in the treatment of arthritis, 
as the first in a new generation of drugs (COX-2 inhibitors) that targeted the 
physiological mechanism at the source of arthritic pain. It quickly became one of the 
most widely prescribed drugs in the world. Scarcely five years later in September 2004, 
Merck, the drug‟s manufacturer, announced the worldwide market withdrawal of Vioxx.  
  
 This withdrawal came after years of contradictory reports about the drug‟s safety.
3
 
Not only had it been linked to increased intestinal bleeding, but also to the potential for 
increased heart failure. Several new studies had suggested that Vioxx increases the 
danger of cardiovascular complications.
4
 The FDA‟s own scientists speculated that it may 
have caused as many as 100,000 unexpected heart attacks in the United States alone.
5
 Yet 
despite these warnings, North American drug regulators were slow to act, arguing that the 




                                                 
3
P. Juni, L. Nartey, S. Reichenbach, R. Sterchi, P. A. Dieppe & M. Egger, “Risk of Cardiovascular Events 




J. Lenzer, “FDA is Incapable of Protecting US Against Another Vioxx” (2004) 329 BMJ 1253 [Lenzer]. 
6
H.A. Waxman, “The Lessons of Vioxx – Drug Safety and Sales” (2005) 352(25) NEJM 2576 [Lessons]. 
  3 
(b) The VIGOR Study 
 
 One of the largest studies with the greatest potential to shed light on the effects of 
long-term consumption of Vioxx was the Canadian-led VIGOR (Vioxx Gastrointestinal 
Outcomes Research) study. Sponsored directly by drug manufacturer Merck, it was a 
large, randomized trial designed to assess the incidence of gastrointestinal bleeding from 
two NSAIDs (non-selective non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs), Vioxx and 
Naproxen.
7
 The VIGOR study had the potential to be a very influential piece of research. 
With over 8076 patients at 301 different institutions in 22 countries, it represented large 
investments of time and resources by both researchers and drug manufacturers into the 
long-term consequences of taking Vioxx. The study‟s outcome would have massive 
potential to affect the prescribing behaviour of physicians and the overall safety 
perception of the product.  
 
 As the trial progressed, several expected cases of GI distress were observed, but 
surprising too was a significant increase in the incidence of heart attacks in the group 
taking Vioxx.  When the researchers first published their data in the New England 
Journal of Medicine (NEJM), they focused their findings only on the GI data, 
downplaying any results suggesting Vioxx‟s relationship with increased risk of heart 
                                                 
7
C. Bombardier, L. Laine, A. Reicin, D. Shapiro, R. Burgos-Vargas, B. Davis, R. Day, M. B. Ferraz, C. J. 
Hawkne, M. C. Hochberg, T. K. Kvien, T. J. Schnitzer, “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of 
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis” (2001) 343(21) NEJM 1520 (PUBMED) 
[VIGOR Study]. 
  4 
attack.
8
  The logic of the researchers was that they had only an obligation to report those 
findings that were strictly within their original research protocol, regardless of the 




 When this omission became apparent in 2005, the NEJM editors chastised the 
VIGOR researchers for intentionally withholding adverse event data and other 
inaccuracies in their reporting of results.
10
 In 2006, the NEJM issued a harsher rebuke of 
the authors of the VIGOR study.
11
  On the basis of newly released court documents, they 
asserted that at least two of the study authors knew of Vioxx-induced heart attacks and 
had knowingly withheld adverse event data at the request of Merck, going so far as to 
delete raw data submitted to the journal in support of the article. The NEJM editors 
suggested that, “taken together, these inaccuracies and deletions call into question the 




 As the study‟s underlying conclusions slowly became apparent, Merck directed its 
marketing representatives to “not initiate discussions on...the results of the VIGOR 
                                                 
8
From their final data, the VIGOR researchers intentionally excluded three participants who had 
experienced heart attacks. According to their rationale, these adverse events were excluded because they 
occurred soon after the date set for end of the trial, even if observations continued. See G. D. Curfman, S. 
Morrissey & J. M. Drazen, “Expression of Concern Reaffirmed” (2006) 354(11) NEJM 1193 [Reaffirmed]. 
9
C. Bombardier, L. Laine, A. Reicin, D. Shapiro, R. Burgos-Vargas, B. Davis, R. Day, M. B. Ferraz, C. J. 
Hawkne, M. C. Hochberg, T. K. Kvien, T. J. Schnitzer, “Response to Expression of Concern Regarding 
VIGOR Study” (2006) 354(11) NEJM 1196 at 1198 [Response]. 
10
G. D. Curfman, S. Morrissey & J. M. Drazen, “Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al. „Comparison of 
Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis‟” (2005) 
353(26) NEJM 2813 [Concern]. 
11
Reaffirmed, supra note 8. 
12
Ibid. 
  5 
study”.
13
 Worse, methods were developed to distort the results of the VIGOR study, as 
one author noted:  
On the basis of purely theoretical reasoning, and in the absence of any 
evidence from randomized controlled trials, Merck proposed that the 
explanation for the observed differences in rates of myocardial infarction 





As a result, Vioxx continued to be widely prescribed even after dangers suggested by the 
VIGOR research were becoming known to researchers and industry. 
 
(c) Science and the Law in Regulatory Decision-Making 
 
Law and science often make poor bedfellows. Yet in most regulatory decisions 
involving risk, they walk hand in hand to form the underpinnings of decision-making. 
Science provides the empirical underpinning for inferential comparisons by weighing 
different options with systematic observation. Appropriately applied science should be 
hesitant to assert complete truth; it can be cautious and methodically slow in finding 
solutions to real-world problems, and hesitant in the universal conclusions it draws from 
limited observation.
15
  Law is a medium largely of human reasoning and experience 
designed to address the immediacy of competing concerns, making value judgments, and 
establishing authority
16
 to address broad problems in human affairs.  Good science begins 
with observation and tests reasoning/hypotheses related to that observation. 
                                                 
13
Lessons, supra note 6 at 2577. 
14
P. A. Dieppe, S. Ebrahim & P. Juni, “Lessons from the Withdrawal of Rofecoxhib: Patients Would be 
Safer if Drug Companies Disclosed Adverse Events Before Licensing” (2004) 329 BMJ 867 [Dieppe]. 
15
Popper, supra note 2. 
16
See A. Pecezenik, Law and Philosophy Library 8: On Law and Reason (New York, Springer: 2009). 
  6 
Conventionally, law begins with reasoning (sometimes compassion) and uses logic (often 
doctrinal or jurisprudential analysis) to order observations. Neither is without bias or the 
potential for manipulation.  
 
 In the drug regulatory process, these two systems of knowledge work together to 
inform, change, and guide decisions relating to new drugs.  A full perspective must take 
into account the most accurate scientific data on a drug‟s safety, and value judgments 
about the legal, political, and social impact of the new drug. All drug approvals are based 
on the interpretation of scientific data; the law has attempted to formulate its legal 
requirements based on accepted models of scientific inquiry, and these models and the 
proof generated for approval have in turn adapted to meet those criteria identified as most 
important by the law. Within this system, science informs legal and policy decisions; law, 
in turn, adapts and adjusts its perspective to respond to the implications of science. 
Science may then ask modified questions based upon these conventions established by 
law. The danger in this process is that science may too easily mould itself to meet the 
minimum needs established by law or policy, thereby distorting its veracity and limiting 
its ultimate utility.   
 
 Wherever regulatory decision-making rests on the interpretation of scientific 
evidence, it must employ science properly.
17
 If decision-making is to be based upon 
indices derived from scientific observation, the accuracy of those decisions rests largely 
on the accuracy inherent in our observations. In any regulatory system based on scientific 
                                                 
17
This does not mean that regulatory decisions must rely only upon science; rather that in those cases where 
it employs science, it should be generated and considered using the best possible scientific norms. 
  7 
norms, we must be ever vigilant that distortion or dilution of scientific observation does 
not lead to potential harm.  
 
 In the last decade, we have seen a push for increased speed in regulatory approval 
of new drugs, at the same time as an increase in the number of new products withdrawn 
for safety reasons.
18
 It is likely that many of the difficulties observed in the approval 
process stem from points at which law and science fail to function complementarily.  
When science is lacking, there is no rational basis for making meaningful conclusions 
about a drug‟s value; when law is not effectively used, gaps in applying safeguards arise, 
and only minimal scientific standards will be applied. 
 
 The decision to release potentially dangerous products for public consumption is 
never a simple task.  How much risk to accept in return for benefit when dealing with a 
specific drug is never reducible to an empirical formula. It involves the assessment of 
competing concerns, and predictive judgments often based on unclear or ambiguous data. 
Science can never determine with certainty that a particular drug is absolutely safe. 
Instead it can only provide evidence that must be weighed by decision-makers. Yet, the 
drug approval process is often predicated upon the provision of greater certainty than can 
be gained from science. Placing a high premium on scientific observation, regulatory 
decisions regarding risk often require value judgments that are hardly objective or 
impartial. Instead they require projecting upon clinical data inferences and certainty that 
go far beyond what can actually be observed. In formulating inferences that go beyond 
                                                 
18
J. Lexchin, “Drug Withdrawals from the Canadian Market for Safety Reasons, 1963-2004” (2005) 172(6) 
CMAJ 765 (PUBMED) [Lexchin Withdrawals]. 
  8 
what scientific observations can demonstrate, regulators and law-makers formulate 
mechanisms that have moral and ethical implications. 
 
(d) Setting a Minimal Standard for Research 
 
 There is an assumption among the wider scientific community and the lay public 
that researchers will act conscientiously in generating and reporting research findings. It 
is assumed that the authors of a study submitted to the NEJM would be conscientious in 
reporting their research, ensuring that all available and relevant data are included in the 
study‟s results. The VIGOR study‟s authors argued that they had met their obligations by 
being strictly “in line with basic clinical principles”.
19
 In the eyes of the authors, they had 
adhered to the minimum standards of study design and trial administration.  Any 
inaccuracies that resulted from the following of this widely accepted methodology were 
not their fault or concern. The VIGOR study authors felt no larger ethical or legal 
obligation to report the potentially important adverse event data concerning Vioxx. 
 
 One might ask, where were regulators during this debate? Unfortunately, 
regulators do little to dispel the notion among the drug research community that they 
must meet only minimum standards. While there was mounting evidence that Vioxx was 
potentially dangerous, regulators did little to help clarify the debate by calling for 
research with definitive results.  Instead, as one editorial in the Canadian Medical 
Association Journal (CMAJ) suggests: 
                                                 
19
Response, supra note 9 at 1198. 
  9 
[regulators]  put their emphasis and resources
 
into assessing drug benefits, 
not harms. The bar for approval
 
is low…Pre-marketing approval trials are 
too small to flush
 
out all of the risks of a drug. The built-in bias toward 
approving
 
drugs without adequate assurance of their safety and with only
 
a 
fragmentary and under-funded mechanism for post-approval surveillance
 
based on physician reporting of isolated adverse events is a
 
fundamental and 




Regulators play a largely passive role, relying upon mostly industry sponsored and 
submitted research to form the core basis for their drug approval decisions. Yet, the 
majority of industry-sponsored research on which approval decisions will ultimately be 
based is far more likely to have favourable outcomes (3:1), or remain unpublished if 
unfavourable.
21
  A recent study found that in a survey of 324 large cardiovascular trials 
published in the leading peer review journals, those sponsored by industry were likely to 





 The VIGOR study was hardly an isolated incident.  Current research into the 
effects of drugs has come to be dominated by a strict adherence to established 
methodologies, research protocols, and reduced or weakened scientific standards, even as 
it is acknowledged that these practices may not be fully informative or approximate the 
                                                 
20
Canadian Medical Association, “Editorial: Vioxx - Lessons for Health Canada and the FDA” (2005) 
172(1) CMAJ 5 at 5 [Vioxx Lessons]. 
21
J. Lexchin, L. A. Bero, B. Djulbegovic & O. Clark, “Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research 
Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review” (2003) 326 BMJ 1167 [Outcomes] and M. Bhadari et als., 
“Association Between Industry Funding and Statistically Significant Pro-industry Findings in Medical and 
Surgical Randomized Trials” (2004) 170(4) CMAJ 477 [Bhadari]. 
22
P. M. Ridker & J. Torres, “Reported Outcomes in Major Cardiovascular Clinical Trials Funded by For-
Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 2000-2005” (2006) 295(19) JAMA 2270 (PUBMED). 
  10 
most accurate science to back the ultimate safety and utility of a drug.
23
 As one author 
has noted: 
Researchers and research institutions operate within the narrow confines of the 
regulations and the landscape created by the regulations….[the result] is that 




When the health and safety of Canadians is based upon data generated by poor drug 
research, the erosion of science to suit commercial needs places their safety at risk. 
Allowing this erosion of drug research to proceed represents a “scandal in medical 




 There is a cautionary message here; all is not well in the world of prescription 
drug research and new drug approvals. The past decade has witnessed an increased 
percentage of new drugs pulled from the market after safety concerns came to light.
26
 At 
the same time, we have seen regulatory emphasis shifting toward greater ties with 
industry
27
 and a speedier approval process.
28
 Increasingly, scholars are becoming critical 
of the Canadian drug approval process for being prone to errors due to reliance on poor 
safety data.
29
 Other scholars have gone further, calling into question the very impartiality 
and validity of the scientific research upon which these decisions are based, hinting that 
                                                 
23
See J. Abramson, Overdosed America (New York: Harper Collins, 2004) [Overdosed]. 
24
M. E. Wiktorowicz, “Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Institutions and Interests in 
the United States, Canada, Britain, and France” (2003) 28(4) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 
615 at 618 [Wiktorowicz]. 
25
Overdosed, supra note 23 at xiii. 
26
Lexchin Withdrawals, supra note 18. 
27
Government of Canada, Canada’s Innovation Strategy (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 2002), online: <http://innovation.gc.ca/gol /innovation/site.nsf/en/in04113.html> [Innovation]. 
28
Lexchin Withdrawals, supra note 18. 
29
J. Lexchin, Transparency in Drug Regulation Mirage or Oasis? (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2004), online: <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/bookstore> [Mirage or Oasis]. 
  11 
gaps created in the scientific process have allowed for the health of the general public to 






 In the following thesis, I will investigate the legal and policy standards imposed 
on clinical research used in new drug approvals, and how potentially this has led to some 
science which is less than ideal.  Underlying this thesis is an assertion that in those 
circumstances where science is used as a tool in regulatory decision-making, it must be 
employed correctly. If methodologies or sound scientific design are allowed to degrade as 
a result of low regulatory standards or poor policy, the research observations that flow 
from these studies become weak and their ability to demonstrate a drug‟s safety or utility 
become meaningless. It is my ultimate aim to demonstrate how poor standards of science 
are being permitted by present law and policy, and how this leads to inadequate research 
upon which to base regulatory decisions, which in turn puts the safety of the drug-
consuming public at risk. To fully explore this problem, I will outline the present drug 
regime, describe deficiencies in the law, assess some of the dominant policy motivations 
driving law-makers and regulators, articulate difficulties that are common when 
integrating science and law, and postulate some solutions that might address these 
difficulties.  
 
                                                 
30
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 It was my original research intent to assess the approval decisions and quality of 
science employed by the Therapeutics Products Directorate (TPD) at Health Canada in 
the course of considering applications for new drug approvals.  Unfortunately, analysis of 
this point in the drug life-cycle is hampered by limited and restricted access to industry 
data at Health Canada for external researchers. As a result, it was decided that a more 
useful approach would be to look further back in the process at that point where the 
science for approval decisions is generated. My focus has shifted to the law and policy 
governing the clinical trial process and the generation of research results that are 
ultimately used in approval decisions. It can be assumed that if the research which 
generates data used in the approval process is flawed, then the ultimate approval 
decisions may also be flawed. 
 
 In the first chapter, I will provide some background on the drug regulatory regime 
in Canada.  I will first briefly outline the history of drug regulation in Canada. I will also 
identify many of the important institutional actors and laws which impact on this process. 
Next, I will describe a drug‟s legal life-cycle in detail, to serve as a backdrop for the 
assessment of issues raised. Finally, I will show how science, law, and policy are 
operating throughout this life-cycle to influence the outcome of regulatory decisions. 
 
 In the second chapter, I will look more closely at the law governing the clinical 
trial process. I will first describe the operation of the clinical trial process, and then 
survey some of the criticisms that have been raised regarding the veracity and 
methodology of modern drug research. I will next survey the law which impacts on 
  13 
clinical trials, and identify the breadth and force of these various provisions. I will then 
demonstrate how this law places only the most cursory obligations on researchers to 
employ rigorous scientific methodology.  Instead, emphasis is placed on the rational 
justification of a given methodology regardless of its scientific merit.  
 
 In the third chapter, I examine how misdirected policy considerations have led 
regulators away from the original policy objectives of ensuring that drugs are safe and 
effective. A legitimate drug regulatory system must account for safety, efficacy, 
innovation, and access. I will describe how increasingly, innovation and access are 
coming to dominate the policy behind new drug approvals to the potential detriment of 
safety and efficacy. I will then appraise the modern conceptualizations of innovation as 
economic value, and access as speeding up drug approvals.  I will demonstrate how these 
conceptualizations have the potential to degrade the quality of science used in the 
development and approval of new pharmaceuticals. 
 
 I will next turn my attention to some of the emerging drivers of risk regulation 
and policy in Canada. There has been a shift toward increased use of post-market safety 
measures and the introduction of risk-benefit analysis as a standard for drug approvals.  
Embodied in the Progressive Licensing life-cycle model, these new trends have great 
promise but must be implemented in such a way that they do not detract from the overall 
safety of new drugs. 
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 In my conclusion, I will try to identify some solutions that can help mend the 
cracks that have appeared in the regulatory process.  It will consider the ethos that 
currently drives actors in the drug regime and ask whether we need to consider varying 









 In the following chapter, I will provide a background to the present drug 
regulatory regime.  This will include reviewing the development of drug regulation in 
Canada and abroad, several of the major institutional actors and their relationship to one 
another, the primary laws and statutes which regulate the system, the legal process 
influencing the development of a new drug, and how science, law, and policy overlap 
throughout this process.  
 
A Brief History of Drug Regulation 
 
The history of drug regulation in Canada and elsewhere has followed a very clear legal 
evolution.  It begins with manufacturing standards and laws to ensure the quality and 
composition of products, progresses to include laws overseeing the general safety of 
these products for consumption, and finally pairs that safety with the effectiveness of 
products for intended or advertised uses.  This evolution in the regulatory law, and 
widening concern for oversight in the consumption of these products, often occurs in 
parallel with public health disasters that produce massive public concern.  
 
(a) Early Drug Oversight in Europe 
  
The idea of controlling and testing what humans can or cannot consume to treat 
illness is a relatively new concept.  In pre-classical times, as Erwin Ackernecht notes: 
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The causes of disease and the action of a drug were considered magic [so] 
there was little place for trial and error and even less for experiment to 




The dominant Western model for most of recorded history, flowing from Hippocrates 
(7th century B.C.) and Galen (2nd century A.D.), was that we should “treat the state of 
the sick individual [but] not the disease”
32 
by balancing the body‟s humours.  In this 
conception, treatments needed to be tested “through experience with different patients”.
33 
 
A host of untested practices (bleedings, purges, and remedies) were applied in the hope 
that a patient would become better. Each medical practitioner largely relied upon his or 
her own judgment to develop a collection of treatments and medical techniques. This 
allowed for the dangerous bias that these treatments were “ effective [and] gave 




 A humeral conception of illness dominated medicine until the sixteenth century, 
when a collection of scientists in Europe, largely at the University of Paris, began to 
systematically appraise the value of existing medicines through clinical observations of 
outcomes. These reappraisals lead to the removal of some of the most extreme potions 
from the Paris 1758 edition of the Codex Medicamentarius including “hair, mummy, 
human blood, skull, placenta and urine”.
35
 It was found that many long-held beliefs, 
common practices, and medicinal substances used in the treatment of illness in medieval 
                                                 
31
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33
Ibid. at 55.  
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35
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Public: Historical Aspects of Medicine Drug Control” in J. B. Blake ed., Safeguarding the Public: 
Historical Aspects of Medicine Drug Control, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) at 3 [Berman]. 
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Europe had little value, and in some cases were even more hazardous for patients than the 
illnesses themselves.  
 
 This led some local governments in Europe to pass decrees determining who may 
provide medications and marking specific (often toxic) substances illegal.
36
 Early 
legislation represented only a patchwork of disparate laws, which reflected the caprice of 
local governments and varied from region to region. Wider regulation of medications 




The first was the political evolution that gave governments the authority to 
decide what products could be sold as medicines and how they could be 
promoted.  The second was the scientific evolution that accorded 




Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as science pointed to the merits and 
perils of certain medicines, the sale of drugs slowly came to be legislated at the national 
level in continental Europe.  
 
(b) The British Experience 
  
Britain was slow to adopt drug regulation, remaining for an extended period a 
“stronghold of staunch laissez-faire philosophies”
39
 where market forces determined 
which cures, potions, and elixirs were sold to treat ailments. In 1860, the poisoning of 




Avorn, supra note 34 at 42. 
38
Ibid. at 42-43. 
39
See E. W. Steib, “Drug Control in Britain, 1850-1914” in J. B. Blake ed., Safeguarding the Public: 
Historical Aspects of Medicine Drug Control, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) at 15 [Steib]. 
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several hundred clients by a chemist who accidentally put arsenic in peppermint lozenges 
led to the passage of the Bill for Preventing the Adulteration of Articles of Food and 
Drink
40
 by the British Parliament. The purpose of this regulation was to ensure the purity 
of a product, by requiring that it was “not adulterated with poisonous or unintended 
substances”.
41
 In 1872 further amendments were made that set more basic requirements 
overseeing the fabrication and sale of medications.
42
 However, these regulations 
remained voluntary and “left it up to local authorities whether or not to appoint inspectors 
or [conduct] analysis”.
43
 It was not until 1875, under The Sale of Food and Drugs Act,
44
 
that inspections became mandatory. 
 
(c) Early Canadian Regulation: A Focus on Quality 
 
 Canadian drug regulation had its “roots in English law and arose from a common 
concern about safety and fraud protection”.
45
 As in Britain, initial legislation focused on 
ensuring the product‟s quality by preventing harmful adulteration or modification of 
products sold to the public. The Inland Revenue Act
46
 of 1875 set the first domestic 
standards determining what could be added to new products (specifically prohibiting 
alcohol) before they entered the market. The Adulteration Act of 1884
47
 set additional 
                                                 
40




An Act to Amend the Law for the Prevention of Adulteration of Food and Drink and Drugs (1872) 35 & 
36 Vict., c. 74. 
43
Steib, supra note 39 at 23. 
44
The Sale of Food and Drug Act (1875) 38 & 39 Vict., R-U., c. 63. 
45
Steib, supra note 39 at 216. 
46
Inland Revenue Act of 1875, S.C. 1874, c. 8. 
47
An Act to Amend and to Consolidate as Amended the Several Acts Respecting the Adulteration of Food 
and Drugs S.C. 1884 c. 34 
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standards for strength, quality, and purity of new products to be consumed and made it a 




 In 1919 the federal government established the Food and Drugs Division to 
administer the Adulteration Act.
49
 The following year, in 1920, the Canadian Parliament 
repealed the Adulteration Act and passed the Food and Drug Act
50
 (FDA). This first 
incarnation of the FDA focused on the „misbranding‟ of food and drug products, and 
sought to reduce the hazards posed by false and misleading claims on drug labels. In 
1927 this Act was amended to include supervision of products of animal origin, vaccines 
and serums and allow for the inspection of premises in which the manufacture of these 
products occurs.
51
 In 1939 further amendments to the Food and Drug Act allowed the 
federal government to make regulations related to the sale of drugs which were “likely to 
be injurious to the public”.
52
 The government targeted potentially injurious products with 
especially stringent regulations. In 1946 this power was expanded to allow for the setting 
of regulations that define “the conditions of sale of any drug in the interest of or for the 








Health Canada, Our Science Our Health: A Report from the Health Products and Food Branch – 2003 
(Ottawa: Heath Canada, Health Products and Food Branch, 2003) [Our Science Our Health]. 
50
Food and Drug Act, S.C. 1920 c. 27. 
51







(d) Toward Regulating Safety and Efficacy 
 
  Fears in the United States stemming from the release of several unproven and 
toxic drug formulations led Congress to pass the 1938 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics 
Act.
54
 This legislation gave U.S. regulators the power to require that all new drug 
products be tested to ensure safety. During this period there was no similar testing of all 
drugs for safety in Canada. This led to concerns that “Canada was being used as a 
proving ground for foreign, mostly American, manufacturers to test-market their new 
drugs”.
55
 In 1951 the federal government passed legislation that required the 
demonstration of a drug‟s safety before it could be marketed.
56
 For the first time, drug 
manufacturers were required to submit this information to the Food and Drugs Division 
of the Department of Health and Welfare. 
 
 Canada was slow to implement its own guidelines on testing for safety and 
efficacy until the Thalidomide disaster of the 1960s. Up to that point Thalidomide had 
been given to pregnant mothers to treat morning sickness, causing physical deformities in 
their new born infants.
57
 After the dangers of the drug were identified, governments 
worldwide scrambled to introduce legislation that required drugs to have some 
demonstrated standard of efficacy (useful clinical indication) paired with safety.  In 1963 
Canadian law was changed to require “substantial evidence of the clinical effectiveness 
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of the new drug…under the conditions of use recommended”.
58
 In 1967 the standard was 
enhanced to require the submission of a product monograph, which gave detailed 





 The 1951 and 1963 changes to the law pairing safety with demonstrations of 
efficacy led to the modern clinical trial.
60
  Prior to these legislative initiatives, drugs had 
been tested mainly through case studies and trial and error. The 1963 amendments 
required that systematic tests be conducted in a manner that demonstrates clinical 
effectiveness, a standard that required that new trials provide a comparison with some 
existing treatment or to no treatment at all. These amendments also ushered in the era of 
the modern, large, and multi-phased clinical trial. The resulting research model was the 
randomized control trial, in which participants were randomly assigned to either a 
treatment group administered the new product, a treatment group administered an 
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(e) The Arrival of Clinical Trials and Ethical Guidelines 
 
 Initially there were few coherent standards overseeing how clinical trials were 
conducted.  Early clinical trials were criticized for their organization and administration. 
As Health Canada itself admits: 
The regulatory requirements respecting…clinical trials were originally 
developed in the early 1960s under the Food and Drugs Act (FDA). Over 
time, the Act and attendant regulations became layered with a series of 
policy and guidance documents, which contained some gaps in 
enforcement, scope and process given the changing environment of clinical 




These gaps did little to ensure the quality of the clinical trial conducted or codify the 
research done to establish safety and the rights of participants. 
 
 The 1948 Nuremberg Code
63
 established “the requirement of voluntary informed 
consent of the human subject that protects the right of the individual to control his own 
body”.
64
 This ethical requirement was reinforced by the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki,
65
 
which sought to protect the basic rights of research participants and ensure that science 
was not conducted at the expense of subjects. Still, during much of this early period of 
clinical testing: 




“Permissible Medical Experiments" Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuremberg October 1946 - April 1949, Washington. U.S. Government 









Adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly, Helsinki, 
Finland,
 
June 1964, amended by the 29th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo,
 
Japan, October 1975, and the 
35th World Medical Assembly, Venice,
 
Italy, October 1983, in (1997) 277 JAMA 925 and M. Munden, 




Canadian regulations [were] silent on the question of who can and cannot be 
used as research subjects, and on the necessity of obtaining a subject‟s 




This led to a gap in the rights of those participating in clinical research. 
 
 In 1979, the U.S. Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research released the Belmont Report,
67
 which called for 
recognition of human subjects in research, beneficence (securing of the subject‟s ethical 
and physical well-being), and justice (requiring that the benefits and burdens  of research 
be equitably distributed). This report had a widespread effect on health research 
regulators and ethicists around the world. In Canada, a variety of institutions and 
researchers began to incorporate these ethical recommendations into practice. In 1987 the 
Medical Research Council (MRC) of Canada produced the Guidelines on Research 
Involving Human Subjects.
68
 In 1998 many of these practices were incorporated into the 
Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans 
(TCPS).
69
 One of the major stipulations of the TCPS was to make explicit that all 
research conducted in institutions receiving funding from the three national research 
funding agencies be reviewed by Research Ethics Boards (REB) which oversee the safety 
and consent rights of study participants. 
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 Partially in response to international pressure to harmonize their approval 
process,
70
 and partially in recognition of the remaining gaps, the Food and Drug Act 
Regulations
71
 (FDAR) were amended on September 1, 2001 by the addition of the 
Division 5 - Clinical Trial Regulations.
72
 These changes had the objectives of 
“strengthen[ing] protections for human research participants; and attract[ing] sustained 
investment in research and development in Canada”.
73
 They set out in detail the 
administrative and data submission processes that were required of clinical trial 
researchers, and attempted to standardize the methods for meeting safety and efficacy 
standards.  
 
(f) Present Policy Initiatives and the Future of Drug Regulation 
 
 In 2002 the federal government pledged $190 million over five years to “speed up 
the regulatory process for drug approvals to ensure that Canadians have faster access to 
the safe drugs they need”.
74
 This funding introduced the Therapeutic Access Strategy 
(TAS) as well as a push toward greater integration with international approval standards. 
The majority of the funds that have been allotted toward the TAS have gone to speeding 
up approval times and increasing the availability of new drugs. 
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 In April 2004 Canada and the United States signed a memorandum of 
understanding that pushed for a closer association and a common process of drug 
review.
75
 As one author has noted: 
The agreement is intended to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for manufacturers 
applying to have new drugs approved in both jurisdictions, and to bring new 




The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have limited the ability of Canada to produce approval standards 




 Under the new Government of Canada (the Conservative minority mandate began 
in 2006), several broad health reforms have been initiated which have the potential to 
influence drug regulation.
78
 The Blueprint for Renewal: Modernizing Canada’s 
Regulatory System for Health Products and Food (Blueprint for Renewal) is a broad 
policy mandate that Health Canada has undertaken which seeks to overhaul much of its 
present regulatory oversight.
79
 With over thirty separate initiatives, it touches on a broad 
collection of mandated activities, the core objectives being to modernize and integrate 
these practices with other global partners.  Two of these initiatives have specific 
relevance for the present discussion. The Progressive Licensing Framework
80
 (PLF) is an 
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initiative currently underway to revamp the approval process of new drugs to account for 
“the full life-cycle of a drug, rather than placing the focus primarily upon pre-market 
assessment”.
81
  The Review of the Clinical Trial Regulatory Framework
82
 (CT-Div 5 
Review) is a mandated review to “ensure that the clinical trial regulatory framework is 




 The expectation is that these policy changes will increase the accuracy of the 
safety and efficacy data from clinical trials while enhancing the protections accorded to 
participants, but this is not certain. As the editors of the CMAJ note: 
[Health Canada‟s] current emphasis on partnerships with industry and rapid 
drug approval conflicts with the public‟s expectation that these agencies 
exist to protect them by restricting approval to drugs that have been 




As the VIGOR example shows, there is still a broad capacity for researchers to seek and 




Setting the Stage: The Law and Institutional Players in Drug Approval 
 
 A starting point for any critical analysis of difficulties facing the modern drug 
review procedure is to introduce some of the institutions, laws, and supporting materials 
that create the context in which this process unfolds. From their earliest development, 
pharmaceuticals are subject to a set of rules (laws and policy) and actors (institutional and 
regulatory) that guide how drug science and approvals unfold.  As Dr. Jerry Avorn states 
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in his critical analysis of drug regulation, Powerful Medicines: The Benefits, Risks, and 
Costs of Prescription Drugs:
86
 
…the system shapes decisions for good or for ill – the incentives that drive 
behavior, the culture of expectations about information or standards of practice, 




Government and regulators play a key role in the system by establishing and reinforcing 
the parameters under which this process unfolds. As Wiktorowicz notes: 
… by facilitating some courses of action or making others more difficult, 
government institutions shape the manner and degree to which organized 
interests exert influence and thus determine where the balance lies between 




This structure has been created by rational actors through intentional decision-making, 
and in the process has allowed for the institutionalization of biases that distort the 
assessment of new drugs. 
 
(a) Law Overseeing Drug Regulation 
 
  The law governing pharmaceuticals is a patchwork of provincial and federal 
legislation and regulations.  Provincial governments generally regulate the prescribing 
and pricing of new drugs while federal law oversees the production, approval, and 
marketing of pharmaceuticals. The FDA
89
 is the central piece of federal drug legislation. 
The FDA sets standards for the marketing, production, advertising, and enforcement of 
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safety criteria. The FDA is supplemented by the FDAR.
90
 Part C of the FDAR addresses 
the administration, institutional oversight, classification, and marketing of drug products. 
The Patent Act
91 
outlines the considerable intellectual property rights accorded 
pharmaceutical products. The Notice of Compliance Regulation
92
 (NOCR) tries to 
balance the exclusive marketing period of first-entry patent applicants against the rights 
of generic manufacturers to produce these drugs once patent periods expire. The Patented 
Medicines Regulations
93
 (PMR) give guidance on the reporting of pricing and 
expenditures related to research and development undertaken on drugs in Canada.  
 
(b) Defining a Drug 
 
 A wide variety of products could be considered drugs for the purpose of this 
thesis. The FDA specifies that a drug is:  
Any substance or mixture of substances manufactured, sold or represented 
for use in: 
the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder, 
abnormal physical state, or its symptoms, in human beings or animals, 
restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions in human beings or 
animals, or 





This definition encompasses almost any product that can be introduced into the human 
body for medicinal or therapeutic purposes. For the purpose of my thesis, I will limit the 
definition of „drug‟ to include only pharmaceuticals for which pre-approval clinical trials 
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are required, in order to focus on the difficulties that result from pre-approval research 
into these products.  
 
(c) Law and Supporting Materials Regulating Clinical Trials 
 
 There are several statutes and codes that touch on the administration of clinical 
trials. The Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (1024 – Clinical 
Trials),
95
 also known as Division 5, standardized the format and application requirements 
for researchers conducting clinical trials. Division 5 in turn makes reference to the 
International Covenant on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
96
 (ICH), a set of standardized methodological 
considerations for clinical trials that conform to good clinical practices. The ICH 
guidelines are to be considered „non-binding‟ guidance for industry.
97
 The Tri-Council 
Policy Statement
98
 (TCPS) is a set of procedural and substantive ethical rules that must be 
met to receive funds from one of the three main federal governmental research granting 
agencies.
99
 Added to these guidelines are a host of provincial and institutional rules, 
policies, and practices which are applied to research.
100
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(d) Institutional Actors 
 
 Health Canada is the arm of the federal government that oversees the regulation 
of matters related to public health.
101
  Within Health Canada, the Health Products and 
Food Branch (HPFB) is responsible for overseeing the safety of products consumed by 
the public and meets this responsibility by “managing the health-related risks and benefits 
of health products and food”.
102
 Four branches of the HFPB are concerned directly with 
medicinal products, the Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate (BGTD), the 
Natural Health Products Directorate (NHPD), Medical Devices Directorate (MDD) and 
the Therapeutics Product Directorate (TPD). The TPD is the body that approves new 
drugs and evaluates the quality of pharmaceuticals. The Marketed Health Products 
Directorate (MHPD) is a directorate of the HPFB which oversees the marketing and 
safety of a product once it has been approved. Industry Canada oversees the 
administration of the Patent Act while the Patented Medicines and Price Review Board 
(PMPRB) reports to Industry Canada regarding the appropriate pricing of new drugs. 
Institutional REBs operate at diverse institutions, both private and public, to oversee the 
application of the TCPS and the legislative or institutional ethics guidelines for the 
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From Birth to Death: The Life-Cycle of a Prescription Drug 
 
 Broadly, the release of a new drug can be conceived as occurring in three stages: 
(1) research and development or „pre-approval‟, (2) regulatory assessment or „approval‟, 
and (3) drug release to the market or „post-approval‟. In the initial research or pre-
approval stage, a product is discovered, studied for potential uses, and clinical trials are 
completed in anticipation of its regulatory approval. At the assessment stage, industry-
submitted research data is reviewed before a decision is made to either approve or deny 
the drug‟s release. This process occurs at the TPD.
 
 The final marketing or post-approval 
stage is the extended period in which the product is released for prescription to the 
general public. This phase is overseen by the MHPD, which is responsible for assessing 
the occurrence of adverse events and overseeing the safety of drugs on the market. 
 
(a) Stage 1: Pre-Approval  
(i) Discovery 
 
 A new drug begins with an idea. This entails either the identification of a 
potentially useful new compound (a New Chemical Entity [NCE]) or the recognition that 
a drug is required to address a pressing medical need which leads to a program of 
research. This „need‟ may be driven by attempts to treat a known condition or by 
perceived or created demand for a new treatment.
104
 At this stage, funding into the 
research for developing new drugs is given priority.
105
 Some of the funding for new drug 
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identification comes from private industry but it is estimated that the majority of the 
research into NCE occurs in public institutions.
106
 In Canada the major funding 
institutions relevant to drug development include the Canadian Institute for Health 
Research
 
 (CIHR), the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC), 
and Industry Canada.  
 
 Once a potential NCE has been identified, a decision is made either to develop the 
product or not. Most decisions as to whether or not to proceed with development of a 
NCE into a drug are firmly at the discretion of manufacturers. Industry will usually 
assume control of the product from the original scientist, partnering with researchers or 
purchasing the product outright. Manufacturers will base this decision on the potential 
value, effectiveness, marketability, and usefulness of a new drug.
107
 This has led to a glut 
of drugs similar to those already proven profitable on the market, dubbed „me-too‟ drugs. 
It is at this stage that the initial filing of a patent can occur.
108
 In Canada pharmaceuticals 




(ii) Pre-Clinical Testing 
 
 Once the decision has been made to develop an NCE into a new drug, it is first 
chemically isolated and purified.  It then proceeds into a stage of pre-clinical testing to 
fully determine its chemical properties and toxicity. Studies will be conducted in vitro, 








PMR, supra note 93. 
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comparing the effect of the drug on healthy and unhealthy living cells. With positive 
results, animal testing will be conducted to determine the drug‟s effect on living 
organisms and to further determine potential toxicity. Animal testing will also attempt to 
determine whether the product undergoes any metabolic changes when introduced to a 





 If pre-clinical trials demonstrate the potential viability of a new drug, researchers 
will seek to test the safety and effectiveness of the drug in humans.  Manufacturers will 
submit an Investigational New Drug Submission (IND) to the appropriate branch of the 
TPD (drugs may need to be submitted to the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Assessment, 
Bureau of Biologics, or Bureau of Radiopharmaceuticals). The IND will need to provide 
a detailed description of the intended program of research, and the conditions under 
which it will be conducted.  Normally, this information will include: (i) the results and 
implications of all previous tests, (ii) names of institutions and qualified investigators 
who will be conducting the research, (iii) approvals from institutional ethics boards, (iv) 
description of the nature and design of the research to be conducted, and (v) a host of 
other administrative and manufacturing details.
111
  Typically the TPD will approve or 
reject an IND within 60 days.  If approved, the manufacturers are given the right to 
provide the drug directly to the researchers named in the IND.  
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(iii) Clinical Trials 
 
 Traditionally, clinical trials are conducted in three or occasionally four phases.  
Phase I trials are early research studies on humans that assess the effects of the drug on a 
small sample of healthy volunteers.  This stage seeks to determine the general absorption, 
toxicity, metabolism, tolerance, dosage range, and side effects of the drug in humans. In 
Phase II trials the drug is tested in a larger sample and targeted at specific conditions.  
The primary aim of this phase is to determine whether the drug is effective in treating 
specific illnesses, provide information as to the optimum dosage for treatment, and 
identify any as yet undetermined side effects. Phase III trials are usually large-scale trials 
designed to test the effect of the drug in a wider population with more participants and in 
comparison with existing therapies. Phase III trials also serve as the chief demonstration 
that the drug has some therapeutic value in treating a specific condition in a targeted 
population. Phase IV trials will be discussed later in the post-approval stage. 
 
(b) Stage 2: Approval 
(i) New Drug Submission 
 
 Once researchers feel that they have gathered sufficient data to justify the 
product‟s approval, they will file a New Drug Submission (NDS) with the Therapeutic 
Products Programme‟s Submission and Information Policy Division of the TPD.  
According to Health Canada, this justification is provided through evidence and/or 
studies that “prove the drug has potential therapeutic value that outweigh the risks 
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associated with its use”.
112
 The NDS must include: (i) details about the intended name, 
branding, and claims to be made of the new product, (ii) reports describing the studies 
conducted to establish the product‟s safety and efficacy, (iii) a description of those 
overseeing the research, (iv) methods associated with the product‟s manufacturing and 




 The TPD will then assess submitted data to determine whether the product should 
be approved or not. The mechanics and considerations employed in this process are not 
fully known. Due to intellectual property law, the data submitted by industry towards 
approval is protected as proprietary knowledge and as a result the process is not open to 
the public. Health Canada indicates that the TPD goes through at least four stages in 
considering the industry submissions.
114
 First the TPD reviews all of the submitted 
information, calling on external experts or forming advisory committees if necessary. 
Next, officials at the TPD evaluate the “safety, efficacy and quality data to assess the 
potential benefits and risks of the drug”.
115
 They then look at the information that the 
manufacturer intends to provide to health-care providers including labelling, the product 
monograph, and brochure.  Finally, if “at the completion of the review, the conclusion is 
that the benefits outweigh the risks and that the risks can be mitigated”,
116
 the drug is 
approved.  
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(ii) Drug Identification Number and Notice of Compliance 
 
 Upon a drug‟s approval Health Canada will issue a Drug Identification Number 
(DIN) and Notice of Compliance (NOC) to the manufacturers. Only one DIN can be 
issued per drug and it enables the manufacturer to exclusively sell the product.
117
 The 
NOC provides the additional protection of sole right to market the product in Canada.  
The TPD can approve a drug with specific conditions that will apply to its use, called a 
Notice of Compliance with Conditions (NOCc).  If an application is found to be 
incomplete, a Notice of Deficiency (NOD) will be issued and applicants may amend their 
applications. If the application is rejected outright, a Notice of Non-Compliance (NONC) 
will be issued. In the case of a NONC being issued, drug companies can re-apply for 
approval by submitting an Amended New Drug Submission (ANDS) as many times as 
required until approval is obtained. 
 
(iii) Special Access and Priority Review 
 
 Drugs may be approved without a full review if they are needed to treat an 
immediate or urgent medical need. Under the Priority Review of Drug Submission 
Policy,
118
 a new product may be fast-tracked for approval if it provides treatment for a 
“serious, life-threatening or severely debilitating illness or condition”
119
 for which there 
is no existing treatment in Canada or if it has the potential to be more effective than 
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existing therapies. If a drug is accepted for priority review, it will be assessed for 
approval in 180 days.  
 
 Drugs may also be approved without a full review for a limited and specific use, 
using the Special Access Program (SAP).
120
 Special access to a drug may be allowed for 
patients “with serious or life-threatening conditions on a compassionate or emergency 
basis when conventional therapies have failed, are unsuitable, or are unavailable”.
121
 The 
SAP does not allow for a product to receive general approval beyond its limited use but it 
may serve as a mechanism for introducing specific drug therapies. 
 
(c) Stage 3: Post-Approval Stage 
(i) Drug Pricing 
 
 Before a product is placed on the market, a determination must be made as to its 
price. Pricing is set by the Patented Medicines Price Review Board (PMPRB), a quasi-
judicial body convened under the Patent Act.
122
  The five-member panel is responsible 
for assessing the price at which companies propose to whole-sale drugs to pharmacies. 
Section.85(1) of the Patent Act
123
 outlines a series of factors that the PMPRB can 
consider in making its pricing decisions, including the price of similar products in Canada 
and the price of the product in different countries. If the drug is relatively novel to the 
Canadian market, this may lead to decisions on the basis of “the cost of making and 
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 In theory, the PMPRB will periodically review this pricing 
but seldom will it ask a drug manufacturer to reduce the price at which it is selling its 
product. 
 
(ii) Drug Scheduling 
 
 In Canada there are four different schedules for drugs. Schedule I drugs are 
available only by prescription and must be provided by a pharmacist. Schedule II drugs 
are available from a pharmacist but must be kept in a location without public access. 
Schedule III drugs are available „over the counter‟ or without supervision in any 
pharmacy.
125
 Unscheduled drugs can be sold in any store, without supervision.  The 
National Drug Scheduling Advisory Committee (NDSAC) makes recommendations to 
each province on how to schedule prescription drugs and works with the National 
Association of Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities (NAPRA) to establish national 
standards of drug scheduling.  
 
(iii) Listing in Provincial Formularies 
 
 Provincial governments determine whether drugs will be covered by provincial 
health plans by listing them on provincial formularies. As one author has noted: 
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provincial governments have no jurisdiction over market competitiveness or 





What is included on a provincial formulary varies widely across the country. Many of 
these decisions are guided by a “cost effectiveness analysis”
127
 that determines the 
potential benefit of the drug offset by its cost.  There is a push for drugs to undergo a 
Common Drug Review (CDR) at the federal level to create recommendations as to what 
should be included on provincial formularies.  This process is guided by the Health 
Canada-funded Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technology in Health (CADTH) 
(formerly the Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment 
[CCOHTA]), which in turn relies heavily upon recommendations from the Canadian 
Expert Drug Advisory Committee (CEDAC).  However, adherence is not uniform; 
Quebec does not partake in the CDR process and most provinces pay only partial 




(iv) Monitoring Drug Safety at the Marketed Health Products Directorate 
 
 Once a drug is approved and made available to the public, the MHPD is 
responsible for overseeing its safety. The MHPD is charged with “post-approval safety 
surveillance, assessment of signals and safety trends, and risk communications 
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concerning all regulated marketed health products”.
129
 The MHPD is responsible for 
keeping track of any significant international and domestic adverse drug reports or 
product recalls, and relaying this information to medical practitioners. Additional Phase 
IV Trials may be completed after a product is on the market to confirm its long-term 
safety or to investigate alternative uses than those for which it was approved. Reporting 
of unexpected adverse events is overseen by the Canadian Adverse Drug Reaction 





(v) Prescriptions and the Administration of Release 
 
 The administration of new drug releases and the laws which oversee the 
prescribing and filling of prescriptions are under provincial authority. Most medications 
require a prescription, with the exception of samples which in turn will be filled by a 
qualified pharmacist.
131
 Provincial health Acts and legislation regulating the admission to 
the health professions give some guidance as to who may write and fill prescriptions, but 
there is little oversight of the discretion that doctors use in deciding to prescribe a 
medication.  
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 The prescribing practices of doctors are an intensive focus for the marketing 
activities of drug companies. This marketing is usually done directly by advertising in 
medical journals and to patients, as well as indirectly by educating physicians
132
 and 
sponsoring the publication of favourable studies.  Regulation of advertising is technically 
under the authority of the FDA (s.9) and the TPD, but in the policy document The 
Distinction between Advertising and Other Activities,
133
 Health Canada has limited the 
nature of what it considers advertising to only the most overt forms of commercial 
representation. The oversight of advertising practices is in the hands of three non-
governmental bodies: Advertising Standards Canada (ASC), the Pharmaceutical 
Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB), and the pharmaceutical lobby group Rx & D 




(vi) The Expiry of Patents and Generic Drugs 
 
 A drug‟s patent expires 20 years after its initial filing.  In anticipation, s.97 of the 
Patents Act allows generic companies to begin stockpiling supplies of their drug.  Once 
the patent period has expired, generic companies may file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Submission (ANDS) which establishes the drug‟s bioequivalency to an already existing 
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 The thrust of an ANDS is not additional demonstration of drug safety or 
efficacy but merely the demonstration that the product is chemically equivalent to the 
product whose patent is about to expire. Under s.7(1) of the Patented Medicines 
Regulations, an extension of 24 months may be granted to a patent holder if they object 
to another manufacturer‟s ANDS.  By slightly modifying their original drug (i.e. 
Schering‟s Claritin, ClaritinExtra and Aerius or Wythe‟s Effexor and EffexorXR) or by 
objecting to new NOC applications, drug companies are often able to extend the patent 
life of their drugs by months or even years.
136
 This „evergreening‟ allows a 




 The final question for any pharmaceutical product is the issue of disposal.  As 
pharmaceuticals make their way through the human body, they are metabolized and 
eventually released into the environment.
137
 Similarly, unused drugs expire and must also 
be disposed of in the environment. Recent research has shown that drugs have begun to 
build up in potentially hazardous quantities in the environment.
138
 This is a potential 
problem that we have hardly begun to tackle through either science or legislation. 
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Science and Law in the Regulatory Process 
 
 At each stage indicated above, science, policy, and law overlap to guide and 
establish the reality in which decisions are made. All three are ever present and adapt to 
the other to determine how drugs are developed, approved, and ultimately released to the 
public. Law and policy must look to science to define the parameters of safe practices. 
Science in turn adapts its questions to suit the demands of those creating, interpreting, 
and applying the law. It is impossible to separate this interaction, so we must be vigilant 
that science, policy, or law is not given a position of dominance in guiding the decisions 
about the ultimate approval of new drugs. We must also be mindful of the inherent biases 
of these tools to ensure that they do not distort the drug approval cycle. 
 
(a) Science in the Drug Life-Cycle 
 
 Essential to any decision-making process is the application of clear, bias-reduced 
science. In theory, the only way to justify a potentially harmful drug‟s release is a 
demonstration that it has potential merit that outweighs its risks. This demonstration of 
merit must be based on more than unsystematic human supposition or belief. For 
confidence and certainty in decision-making, we must look to systematic and long-term 
observations that are bound by rules that seek to standardize results and limit the source 
of human error in observation.  It is hoped that these observations will be accurately 
relayed to regulators to help guide and inform the review process. We can see the use of 




(i) Science in Pre-Approval 
 
 At the research stage, decisions about which drugs and research to sponsor are 
continually changed by our understanding of disease and how to treat illness. The AIDS 
drug AZT is a good example.  Initially, it was developed for other purposes (an 
anticancer drug) but was abandoned after initial pre-clinical testing proved too costly and 
showed poor early results. As the AIDS epidemic came to a head in the mid-to-late 
1980s, researchers were scrambling to develop new treatments.  New microbiological, 
metabolic, and genetic techniques in medicine enabled researchers to identify the 
mechanisms of AIDS. Tackling the illness required changing the disease research 
paradigm from isolation and immunization to the reduction of impairment. Medical 
funding models needed to include a much broader range of research into the mechanisms 
of disease.
139
 It was in this environment that many long abandoned NCEs were 
reconsidered, such as the precursor to AZT.  
 
(ii) Science in Approval  
 
 Science is also crucial to establishing the validity of any decision to approve a 
new drug.  In making these decisions, scientists at the TPD conduct a form of risk 
assessment that must be based on data that establishes the drug‟s safety.  When science is 
ignored or undermined in this process, disastrous outcomes can result. Although the 
conditions of Vioxx‟s approval in Canada are not known, in the United States, the Food 
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and Drug Administration (FDA) failed to listen to the pleas of its scientists and 
significant data that hinted at the drug‟s dangers.
140
 In Canada, in one of the few cases 
where researchers have obtained the data upon which an approval decision was made, 
this data was made up of a collection of studies whose methodology and results were 
weak and inconclusive.
141
 The result was that a potentially dangerous drug was too easily 
approved. Without reference to well-conducted science, any form of risk evaluation loses 
its worth.  Decisions become subject to political or economic justifications that have little 
relation to the product‟s merit. 
 
 (iii) Science in Post-Approval 
 
 Once a product is released, it is only through systematic observation and 
evaluation of its long-term safety that it may be judged worthwhile.  That a product has 
been used for years is no proof that it is safe.
142
  This product had been used for decades 
and was only pulled from the market after several deaths demonstrated that the product 
was potentially dangerous. This form of informed systematic observation will drive drug 
availability and restriction in the market. Potentially, research and ideas about the value 
of existing pharmaceuticals are adjusted as new sources of potential harm are recognized. 
No product can ever be proven completely safe, and it is with vigilant observation that 
the potential merits and harms of even long-familiar medications are uncovered.
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 Going hand in hand with the systematic observations guiding the decision-making 
process are the laws and policies that clarify and solidify the rules applied to new drug 
approvals. Law and policy operate at each stage of this process, creating the ways in 
which regulators and law-makers have decided to address the difficulties and benefits of 
new drugs. They embody the decisions, compromises, and mechanisms or institutions 
through which political will is manifest. Law and policy also guide the decisions made by 
those seeking the approval and marketing of new drugs, setting the stage for how science 
is to be considered and which issues are assigned the greatest weight in drug safety. 
Unfortunately, law and policy can often have unintended effects, creating exploitable 
lacuna where it is silent or papering over areas of needed scientific inquiry. 
 
(i) Law and Policy at Pre-Approval 
 
 At the pre-approval research stage, legal rules have served to create both the 
present research environment and guide what companies consider when undertaking 
clinical investigation into new drugs.
144
  Profitability for new drugs is tied to patent life 
and marketability, and legislation guiding research funding has tended to highlight 
                                                 
143
Please note: this thesis will not discuss the civil law as a mechanism for guiding drug approval behavior, 
(i.e. Tort).  Several recent articles have highlighted the ineffectiveness of Tort Law in the circumstances of 
large drug regulatory failures to serve as a sanction/guide to either regulators or drug manufacturers. 
Therefore for the scope of this thesis will focus on the obligations nested in statute. See F. M. McClellan, 
“The Vioxx Litigation: A critical Look at Trial Tactics, The Tort System, and the Roles of Lawyers in 
Mass Tort Litigation” (2008) 57 Depaul Law Review 509 (HEINONLINE) [Vioxx Tactics]. 
144
See Wiktorowicz, supra note 24. 
 
 47 
innovation and pairing new research with private funding.
145
 The sad result is that more 
„me-too‟ drugs than truly novel products may be created.
146
 Similarly, the legal regime 
has favoured increasing the speed with which new products are approved. For example, 
the priority drug-approval initiative was originally designed for the speedier review of 
truly novel and needed emergency treatments such as AZT.
147
 Unfortunately, recent 
policy developments have expanded the definition of „urgent medical need‟ to include a 




(ii) Law and Policy at Approval 
 
 Laws protecting the confidentiality of data submitted for approval have created 
the „black box‟ that operates at the approval stage.
149
  Much of the original approval data 
for the 41 drugs that were withdrawn from the market from 1963 through to 2004 for 
safety reasons still remains veiled.
150
 This has led to criticism of Canada‟s drug 
regulatory process as “unnecessarily opaque”.
151
  Or, as one author has noted, “in 
Canada, decisions to approve a drug are made behind closed doors, without public input 
or access to the information used in decision-making”.
152
 The unconvincing reason for 
this veil is tied to international trade policy protecting manufacturer data against unfair 
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 International trade agreements seek to standardize the criteria that 
host countries can consider when assessing new drugs for approval.
154
 The result is that 
signatories to many international treaties are limited in the discretion that they can 
exercise in developing an approval process.  
 
(iii) Law and Policy at Post-Approval 
 
 The influence of the law is also apparent at the post-approval stage. The law is 
vague about the discretion that a physician should use when prescribing a drug. 
Problematically, a drug can be prescribed for any medically justifiable purpose, 
regardless of whether it was approved for that purpose, in a practice called off-label 
use.
155
 This has spawned the practice of marketing drugs for additional uses to 
physicians, using a host of activities.
156
  Advertising is regulated by the MHPD, but they 
have been slow to enforce advertising standards.
157
  Instead, policy interpretation of the 
law has sought to rely primarily upon adverse event reporting as a barometer of 
dangerous prescribing practice.   
 
 Law, policy, and science overlap continuously throughout the drug approval 
process, in theory working together to put in place mechanisms to heighten the safety of 
products available to consumers.  Yet as will be discussed in the following chapters, there 
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are many gaps in the use of science created by the law and many places where science 
creates ambiguity such that legal and policy judgment must come to bear. It is a very 
delicate balance ensuring that each is judiciously applied and adapted to the larger goal of 











 In the following chapter, I will review the law governing the clinical trial in 
Canada and demonstrate that the mechanisms in place are inadequate to ensure both 
patient safety and the conduct of good, methodologically sound research. I will first 
provide a brief background to the modern clinical trial. Next I will explore some of the 
elements and biases that can occur in clinical research. Finally, I will appraise the law in 
place to ensure that good research with robust methodology is being conducted.  
 
TeGenero (TGN-1412): A Costly Lesson in Clinical Research 
 
 On March 13, 2006, eight healthy volunteers at the Northwick Park Hospital in 
London, England took part in what was to be a routine Phase I clinical trial of a new 
immunoregulatory drug TGN1412 (TeGenero[TeG]). Participants were to be 
administered the first human exposure to TeG after it had previously been tested for 
safety on animals. Six of the participants were given a dose of the drug, while two were 
given the placebo.  Within an hour all six subjects administered the drug were 
experiencing horrific side effects: intense discoloration, sweating, massive swelling of the 
head and neck, and finally, multiple and system-wide organ failure.
158
 TeG had caused an 
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unforeseen physiological reaction in which the immune systems of participants began to 




 Few new drug products prove as lethal a toxin as TeG. It had been tested on a 
variety of animals in pre-clinical trials, but since it was a drug that affected specific 
human immune cells (T-cell receptors) it was difficult to extrapolate these results to 
humans.
160
 Furthermore, researchers should have been more cautious in administering 
high dosages of the drug to multiple patients in the first session without having first used 
more incremental measures (i.e. as for an allergen, by scraping exposed skin).
161
 Yet, the 
spectacular failure of TeG‟s Phase I trial has ensured that the drug will be restricted from 
further development and administration to the public.
162
 The intended purpose of a Phase 
I trial has been fulfilled, but at what cost?
 
There are at least two lessons that can be drawn 
from the TeG clinical trials.  The first is that clinical testing can in fact work to detect 




 It would be surprising to most Canadians to learn how little is actually known 
about new drugs by the time they reach their medicine cabinets. In fact, “when a new 
drug is first marketed, little is [absolutely] proven about its safety and effectiveness 
compared to existing alternatives”.
164
 We approve drugs knowing that there is a certain 
degree of risk. There is no way to ensure with absolute certainty that a drug is completely 
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safe. Instead, regulators must try to balance harm and benefit based on the best data that 
is available. Even the best approval decisions must be made on a sampling of clinical 
observations and, if available, data from other countries where the drug is already on the 
market.
165
 It is impossible to capture a complete „real-world‟ picture of the effects of a 
drug before it is marketed. Even accurate observations are no guarantee against isolated 





 Obtaining the best data implies that we have the best methodology for accurately 
observing the effects of drugs to approximate the conditions under which they will 
ultimately be used. As Karl Popper notes in The Logic of Scientific Discovery: 
There is only one way to make sure the validity of a chain of logical 
reasoning. This is to put it into a form in which it is easily testable: we break 
it up into many small steps, each easy to check by anybody who has learned 




Making approval decisions as accurate as possible supposes regulatory decisions are 
based on good science (i.e. making claims on safety and efficacy that are objective and 
well tested, and ensuring that human reasoning is tempered by objective and systematic 
observation). 
 
                                                 
165
Reviewed, supra note 111. 
166
J. LeLorier, “The Science of Health Technology Assessment – Clinical Effectiveness of Therapeutic 
Interventions” (2001) 8 Can. J. Clin. Pharmacol. 21A (PUBMED). 
167
Popper, supra note 2 at 81. 
 
 53 
Toward a Science of Experience and Good Experimental Design 
 
(a) The Early Evolution of Experimental Medicine  
 
 So, what are the standards for scientific validity? Even one hundred years ago a 
product such as TeG might have been sold without any systematic testing for its 
medicinal value or toxicity.  For thousands of years, decisions about which drugs and 
remedies were applied to illness came from untested experience.
168
 Galanic methods 
relied upon the use of “bleeding, purging and drugs, often in the particularly undesirable 
form of mixed drugs”
169
 to balance the body‟s misaligned humours. As Avorn notes: 
An apprentice physician was not expected to understand data from 
experiments, but to memorize concepts and recipes based on arcane humeral 
relationships, regurgitating the same wrong ideas that had been passed down 




Under this method,  there were many useless products and treatments dangerously 
administered and there was little attempt to separate effective remedies from those that 
might have been toxic. 
  
 Beginning with Francis Bacon in Novum Organum
171
 there was a “rediscovery of 
the necessity of repeated experience and reporting negative facts”.
172
 Other theorists, 
such as Locke,
173
 began to assert that medical practice and the administration of drugs 
should be based on “actual clinical experience…a theory of experience and animal 
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 The validity of claims made for treatments needed 
some justification rooted in systematically repeated observations.  As one author notes 
during early drug use: 
What was missing was a systematic way to evaluate a given treatment – not 
to determine whether it makes sense, since most ineffective treatments make 




Researchers needed an easily repeatable and sound method for determining how different 
treatments compared to one another.  
  
 In 1747 a Scottish naval surgeon named James Lind conducted the first recorded 
comparative experiment of different treatments.
176
 Seeking a solution to the age-old 
difficulty of scurvy (a dietary deficiency of vitamin C on long sea voyages), he decided to 
try varying the diets of 12 stricken seamen. He placed two patients on six different 
treatments: cider, elixir vitriol, seawater, vinegar, oranges, and lemons. In reporting his 
results he observed: 
The most sudden and visible good effects were perceived from the use of the 
oranges and lemons, one of those who had taken them being at the end of 




The result was the discovery of a simple, effective, and inexpensive treatment for scurvy: 
the carrying of lemons on long sea voyages.
178
 The genius of Lind‟s experiment was not 
that he merely sought to determine the utility of a cure, but to demonstrate that it was 
more useful than other existing treatments
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(b) Refining the Clinical Trial 
 
 It took some time for Lind‟s methods to take root. Throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries there was a slow refinement of techniques used for comparing 
various methods of treatment and the gradual introduction of statistics as a mathematical 
method for quantifying these differences.
179
 In 1820, Lois introduced his influential 
“métode numérique” that suggested comparisons be made between treatments to validate 
their use, which codified Lind‟s methodology.
180
 In 1865, Claude Bernard introduced the 
idea that researchers should try to hold all conditions equal and control between those 
receiving different treatments, with the exception of those being tested.
181
 In 1923, Fisher 
and Mackenzie introduced the idea that conditions being observed should be assigned 
randomly to one‟s object of observation, in their case potato crops.
182
 In 1931, the first 
wide-scale observation of varying treatments was completed using the now familiar 
clinical trial format.
183
 Following the Second World War, it was observed that treatments 
also needed to be tested against the absence of treatments (i.e., a placebo) to guard 
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(c) Tuskegee and the Limits of Unfettered Scientific Experimentation 
 
 While the science of clinical trials was becoming the dominant research model, a 
troubling incident emerged to highlight the dangers of unfettered clinical observation. In 
1932 the U.S Public Health Service (USPHS) began a clinical trial in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, to determine the long-term course of untreated syphilis on black males.
185
  For 
approximately 40 years, researchers tracked the lives of over 400 poor sharecroppers who 
were suffering from the disease without providing any intervention.  By the 1950s, 
penicillin had become widely available and accepted as an effective treatment for 
syphilis, yet researchers still did not tell subjects “they had syphilis, and [they were] not 
given counselling on avoiding spread of the disease or given treatment”.
186
 It was only 
after the press began to highlight the racist and moral exploitation of the study that it was 




 The course of this research suggests that unfettered scientific research on humans 
cannot be justified and that “the notion that science is a value-free discipline must be 
rejected”.
188
 Researchers had intentionally decided to observe the course of this disease in 
a poor African-American population. This decision was partially based on: 
speculation in the scientific literature at that time on racial differences in the 
natural history of syphilis, including theories suggesting that syphilis 
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affected the neurologic functions of whites and that latent syphilis impaired 




This rationale was contrary to the prevalent scientific literature of the day. What the 
Tuskegee experiment did highlight was that sound methodology must be tempered by 
moral and ethical consideration; the recognition and incorporation of these concerns into 
sound experimental administration that protects participants is the second pillar upon 
which good research must be based.  
 
(d) The Modern Clinical Trial  
 
 Legislative changes in the United States and Canada requiring the demonstration 
of both safety and efficacy introduced the modern era of the large drug trial.
190
 A clinical 
trial can be defined as “a prospective study, comparing the effect and value of 
intervention(s) against a control in human beings”.
191
 A more detailed definition is 
provided by the FDAR: 
a research study in respect of a drug for use in humans that involves human 
subjects and that is intended to discover or verify the clinical, 
pharmacological or pharmacodynamic effects of the drug,  identify any 
adverse events in respect of the drug, study the absorption, distribution, 
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There are a variety of different methods for completing a clinical trial, but well designed 
research shares certain qualities. As Stuart Pocock suggests: 
The essence of a good clinical trial is that it provides truthful and precise 
information which is relevant to the treatment of future patients…. Methods 





In formulating a clinical trial, a researcher must consider a host of factors, including but 
not limited to: 
(i) A written protocol 
(ii) Controlled trials 
(iii) Randomization 
(iv) Size of trial 
(v) Double blind trials 
(vi) Definition of patients 
(vii) Definition of treatments 
(viii) End-point evaluation 
(ix) Crossover trials 
(x) Forms and data management 
(xi) Statistical analysis 
(xii) Protocols 
(xiii) Monitoring of trial progress 
(xiv) Ethical considerations 
(xv) Multicentre trials 
(xvi) Staff, responsibilities and funding 
(xvii) Publication  





The extent to which a clinical trial considers and addresses these requirements is 
generally a measure of the quality of the study‟s design and the value of the conclusions 
that can be drawn from its observations. 
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(e) Randomized Control Trials 
 
 The most common form of clinical research used for the evaluation of new drugs 
is the Randomized Control Trial (RCT). The RCT has been defined as a: 
carefully and ethically designed experiment which includes the provision of 
adequate and appropriate controls, by a process of randomization so that 




The RCT is seen as a good measure of a drug‟s efficacy since it enables comparisons of a 
drug‟s effect with other treatments. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into great 
detail cataloguing the variety of different methodologies employed in drug trials (i.e. case 
studies, longitudinal studies, comparison group studies),
196
 but it will be useful to review 
some of the elements of a methodologically sound RCT. Before discussing these 
elements, it is essential to acknowledge that the best designed RCT usually focuses on 
testing “one major objective”.
197
 As Pocock notes: 
Of paramount importance is the need for a good idea for potential 
improvement in therapy and to be able to achieve an honest and accurate 




The RCT has at least three essential elements of design: randomization, blinding, and 
operational variables.  
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 In an RCT treatment is allocated to participants by  random (chance) 
procedure“.
199
 To ensure accurate results, researchers must limit the bias that might result 
from assigning participants unequally to treatments. Randomization can avoid “subjective 
assignment of patients who participate in clinical trials [or limit] inequalities [in 
characteristics] between treatment groups (e.g. demographic details or prognostic 
variables)”.
200
 As Friedman notes: 
Randomization tends to produce study groups comparable with respect to 
known and unknown risk factors, removes investigator bias in the allocation 





Randomization is based on the concept that “no judgmental or systematic bias should 
affect the way that patients are assigned to treatment”.
202
 It is based on the concept of 
appropriate population sampling, where study groups are expected to encapsulate as 







 Normally an RCT should be conducted as a double-blind procedure.  This means 
that neither participants nor researchers are aware of the treatments that participants are 
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receiving. This is done to reduce the “bias caused by subjective judgements in reporting, 
evaluation, data processing and statistical analysis due to the knowledge of the identity of 
the treatments”.
204
 The expectation that a treatment will work can influence whether it is 
perceived to be working by both researchers and participants. Allowing participants to 
know that they are on a placebo or new treatment may affect their perception of its 
efficacy and change measured behaviours. For some trials, such as in the case of treating 
terminally ill patients, random assignment would not be ethical, and double blinding of 
treatment not possible. In these instances, it may be possible to partially blind the study 
by limiting the knowledge of researchers or those making clinical observations as to the 




 Tested control groups should be “sufficiently similar in relevant respects to the 
intervention group so that differences in outcomes may reasonably be attributed to the 
action of the intervention”.
205
 This control enables comparisons of the known to the 
unknown and provides a “well-defined point, which becomes the zero or baseline of the 
study”.
206
 It is only by including such control measures that observations can be made to 
determine whether a treatment is better or equal to other treatments.  For new drugs, 
ideally such clinical testing should be against proven existing treatments; it is in this way 
only that we can say new drugs are better than existing ones.  Unfortunately, many 
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clinical trials will use only a placebo (no treatment) as the control group, proving that 




(iv) Measurable Variables or End Point Variables 
 
 In order to determine the usefulness of a treatment it must be measured.  This is 
done by identifying “properties that can differentiate members of a group or set”
208
 and 
observing how these change by varying treatment. Independent variables (IV) are 
manipulated by the experimenters through assignment of participants to different drug 
groups and dependent variables (DV) are measured for signs of change. When measuring 
the outcome of treatment on behaviour, physiology, or illness, it is often difficult to 
directly assign them a value.  In these cases, a secondary measure, an end point or clinical 
surrogate measure will often be used. These observations can either be qualitative (based 
on observation of qualities) or quantitative (based on some measurable amount) and must 
be defined before the study begins.
209
 End points can be a wide variety of measures 
which are taken as indicators of a drug‟s effect  (e.g., mobility for arthritis, blood levels 
of certain hormones, or even changes in morbidity).  
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(f) A Note on Hypothesis Testing and Valid Sampling 
 
 Ignoring ethical considerations for the moment, there are at least two other 
qualities that characterize good clinical drug research that I would like to introduce: the 
formulation of a valid hypothesis (using valid research questions) and accurate sampling. 
Conducting worthwhile research means asking useful and purposeful questions. As one 
author suggests: 
In a concise format, the research question specifies which factors or 
behaviors will be examined and what types of data will be collected…. they 
must be defined objectively, so that their meaning within the context of the 
study is clear….[the] hypothesis suggests how the variables are expected to 





The hypothesis and intended analysis must be defined before the commencement of the 
study qualitative or exploratory research may supplement the refinement of data.
211
  As 
Anderson notes: 
the classifications of research projects into hypothesis testing and 
hypothetico-deductive is of crucial importance in evaluating the reliability 
of conclusions….medical investigators need to be warned against re-use of 
observations.  Whenever data through inductive reasoning have been used to 
propose a hypothesis, new and independent observations are necessary to 
test it. If data through statistical analyses are re-used to test the very 





Science requires this form of inferential hypotheses testing; merely tailoring 
interpretation after the fact does not meet a basic threshold for inductive scientific 
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  Even worse, conducting research which addresses no hypothesis, or is so 
methodologically flawed that it generates a predetermined result, is pointless and 




 Valid sampling can best be conceived as ensuring that the subjects being observed 
approximate those in the real world. As Portney notes, “an important goal of clinical 
research is to make generalizations beyond the individuals studied to others with similar 
conditions or characteristics”.
215
 Every experiment is “based on limited experience and 
measurements”
216
 so it can only generalize its conclusion to the real world. The greater 
extent to which subjects are drawn from diverse and representative populations who will 
consume a drug, the more accurate the conclusions drawn regarding that drug‟s efficacy 
in a given population.
217
  Testing an arthritis medication on healthy young volunteers 
does not approximate the vast majority of those who will ultimately use the product.
218
 
Sampling is also affected greatly by the size of a representative sample that is observed, 
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(g) A Note on Ethical Refinement of Research 
 
 At this time I would like to caution the reader that the above described 
methodologies do not operate in an ethical vacuum. All of the approaches described 
above need to be modified if they are likely to produce undue harm for participants.
220
  
Justifying a Phase I TeG trial merely because it stops a dangerous product from reaching 
the larger public does not validate the harm done. Instead, it hints to the need for 
refinement of elements in the research‟s design, perhaps by incremental testing.
221
 
Likewise, randomization, blinding, end points, and tested hypotheses may also need to be 
adjusted to meet ethical considerations. Randomization will often need to be modified if 
over the course of a trial it is observed that some treatments represent vastly inferior or 
superior treatments, or induce irreversible harm.
222
 Blinding may not be practical if it 
unduly places psychological or emotional distress on research participants, improper 
consent is not obtained or explained, or a serious adverse event is observed. End point 
measures need to take into account the health of participants and be as minimally 
intrusive as possible; using morbidity as an end point is not always acceptable.  
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(h) Sources of Research Bias 
 
 Even with these tools of research available, there are still a host of methodological 
errors that can occur during clinical research. Researchers must be ever vigilant against 
bias in the generation of research models. Bias can basically be explained as “any effect 
at any stage of investigation or inference tending to produce results that depart 
systematically from the true values”.
223
  It is any factor which “deprives a result of 
representative [accuracy] through systematic distortion”.
224
 Bias can be both positive and 
negative (favouring or hindering the proof of a certain hypothesis) and skewing 
observation toward specific conclusions. In designing a clinical trial, researchers must 
develop a strategy for each study‟s particular design to limit bias. As Murray notes: 
The investigator must look at each study carefully, consider which potential 
sources of bias might apply, and then develop strategies to defend against 




Generally the tools described above are designed to limit the occurrence of bias, but if 
they are not appropriately and conscientiously employed they lead to poor research.  
 
(i) Common Sources of Research Error 
 
 There are several common errors that may occur during clinical research.
226
  I 
have already mentioned sampling errors and hypothesis testing above. Subjects must be 
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recruited to represent the populations who will receive a treatment. Hypotheses must be 
defined and executed by predetermined rules, as one author notes: 
If even the briefest glance at a study‟s results moves the investigator to 
consider a hypothesis not formulated before the study was started, that 




 Researchers must be careful in selecting variables (end points indicating therapeutic 
change) beyond one-time or limited measures, and not assume that significant statistical 
changes always equate significant biological or therapeutic changes.
228
 Researchers must 
ensure that if end point measures are qualitative (observational), then there is uniformity 
among researchers taking the measurements.
229
 Beyond randomized assignment, 
researchers must be careful to avoid any other factors (historical, demographic, 




 There is also a host of more intentional errors that researchers may induce by 
favouring certain approaches to clinical research. As one author has noted: 
Several kinds of widely accepted practices should be recognized as 
potentially deceptive and harmful. Some of these practices also have much 
value, but at times they are inappropriate and improper and, to the extent 




Researchers have identified a wide number of errors that seem to plague drug research.
232
 
Drug studies may compare different treatments (drugs) at varying doses that are not truly 
equivalent.
233
  They may conduct research over time frames that are not long enough to 
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observe anything but short-term effects.
234
 They may abort research mid-trial that looks 
as if it is going to disprove a desired hypothesis, while sponsoring those experiments 
which seem to support a desired hypothesis.  Researchers may analyze and report only 
that data which supports their hypothesis, or test only for certain variables (e.g. not doing 





(j) Error in the Data used in the Approval Process 
 
 
 One could argue that poor methodological research is not occurring in those 
studies that the TPD uses for approval; but because the approval process and industry-
submitted data is not generally available for scrutiny, the truth is that we simply do not 
know. In 2002, via a freedom of information request, the CBC obtained the research data 
upon which the withdrawn drug Diane-35 had originally received Health Canada 
approval.
236 
 In reviewing this data, Barbra Mintzes observed: 
Health Canada approved Diane-35 although it was not tested in the patient 
population it was approved to treat. Nor was it tested against a placebo on 
any other [comparable] treatments. Thus studies submitted … did not 




Of the five studies submitted for approval, only three were double blinded and two were 
open label.  Of the open label studies, one was merely observational of a group of 
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patients on the drug, while the other was an RCT without blinding procedures. Of the 
three studies conducted using double-blind procedures, two compared Diane to a control 
group at an incomparable dose, while the third compared it to a contraceptive drug (not 
the use for which it was seeking approval). None of these three trials included a placebo 
group, tested the treatment on a group comparable to one whom the medication was 
intended for, or reported outcomes for patients who withdrew early (12%-33%).
238
 All of 
these methodological flaws weaken the conclusions that could be drawn about the drug‟s 
safety and efficacy. 
 
 In 1966, JAMA ran a simple experiment.  Drawing 149 articles from the most 
respected medical journals, it asked statisticians to review the studies based on whether 
“the conclusions drawn were valid in terms of the design of the experiment, the type of 
analysis performed, and the applicability of the statistical tests used”.
239
 Only 44 studies 
passed (28%).
240
 A similar study conducted 20 years later found the same result, with 
only 24% of the studies surveyed passing.
241
  A similar study a decade later found that 




 Trying to limit this error is one of the essential elements of conducting ethical and 
worthwhile research.  As one author notes: 
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No amount of statistical analysis or interpretation can overcome a design 
flaw, data that results from flawed design are virtually useless, and using 
them can be unethical. Obtaining useless data wastes time, money, and 





Just as problematic is the effect that poor research may have on treatment practice and 
decisions about whether a drug should be available to the consuming public. As 
Anderson suggests, “with methodologically flawed studies there is always the risk that 
conclusions will not hold for future patients”.
244
 To the extent that approval decisions are 
based on this flawed methodology, they cannot effectively be predictive of a drug‟s 
safety when released to the public.  Without robust scientific inquiry backing up 
decisions related to risk, these decisions become meaningless. 
 
 
The Law and the Regulation of the Clinical Trial 
 
 While we cannot assess the criteria and science that the TPD applies to the data it 
receives with an NDS, we can look back in the process at the point where rules are 
applied in governing clinical trials. Having established some of the criteria of good 
research design, we can now look at those legal standards imposed on researchers to meet 
these criteria in designing and implementing drug research in Canada. There is the 
potential that if these rules are weak, they will allow for the creation of poor quality 
research. The result would be the production of research studies for the approval process 
that are not methodologically sound and are poorly indicative of a drug‟s safety or 
efficacy. 
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 As noted in Chapter 1, there are several legal instruments that guide the design 
and administration of clinical research in Canada (i.e. the FDA, FDAR, TCPS, ICH 
Guidelines, and Declaration of Helsinki). A host of institutional and a few provincial 
regulations and guidelines are also in operation
245
 as well as some international 
guidelines.
246
 Two basic sentiments drawn from the Declaration of Helsinki underlie 
much of this guidance: 
Section 5. In medical research on human subjects, considerations related to 
the well being of the human subject should take precedence over the 
interests of science and society. 
 
Section 11. Medical research involving human subjects must conform to 
generally accepted scientific principles, be based on a thorough knowledge 
of the scientific literature, other relevant sources of information and on 
adequate laboratory and, where appropriate, animal experimentation.
247
   
 
Section 5 implies that research cannot be justified when it abrogates the right of subjects 
simply to meet the demands of science or society. Section 6 asks researchers to be 
informed and design research that “conforms to generally accepted scientific 
principles”.
248
 The concepts that human subject rights are paramount and that research 
must meet current standards of scientific convention are essential to the integrity and 
value of drug research. 
  
                                                 
245










(a) Statutory Authority to Legislate Clinical Trials 
 
 Parliament does not directly indicate that testing of new drugs is required in the 
body of the FDA. Instead it restricts the right to market the product unless certain 
conditions are met. Under section 9 of the Food and Drug Act it is prohibited to: 
label, package, treat, process, sell or advertise any drug in a manner that is 
false, misleading or deceptive or is likely to create an erroneous impression 




Determining the nature of a drug requires some form of objective testing as to its 
“character, value, quantity, composition, merit or safety”.
250
 Character (chemical 
qualities), quantity, and composition of a drug will be determined by toxicology and 
quality studies that are submitted with an NDS. Character (medicinal), value, merit, and 
safety will be met by the submission of studies that prove the therapeutic worth (e.g., 
safety and efficacy) of the drug. 
 
 The FDA method for ensuring compliance is to limit market access for drugs 
unless certain standards are met. Under section 10(1) of the FDA: 
Where a standard has been prescribed for a drug, no person shall label, 
package, sell or advertise any substance….unless the substance complies 




In establishing this standard under s.30, the Governor in Council gives broad powers to 
make regulations respecting the “sale or conditions of sale of any food, drug, cosmetic or 
device”.
252
 It specifically allows for the setting of regulations related to “the sale or the 
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conditions of sale of any new drug”.
253
 This includes regulation to prevent the public 
(purchaser or consumer) from: 
being deceived or misled in respect of the design, construction, 
performance, intended use, quantity, character, value, composition, merit or 





Under s. 30(1) (l.1) this also includes regulations: 
respecting the assessment of the effect on the environment or on human life 
and health of the release into the environment of any food, drug, cosmetic or 





(b) The Food and Drug Regulations 
  
 From these provisions flow the Food and Drug Regulations.  Division 5 of the 
Food and Drug Regulations (Drugs for Clinical Trials Involving Human Subjects) 
provides the following three key features: 
(ci) Clear and transparent requirements of application, information, 
amendments, notification, labelling, record keeping and adverse drug reaction 
reporting 
(cii) Introduction of an inspection system against internationally accepted good 
clinical practice principles, and 
(ciii) Give clear authority to refuse an application, suspend or cancel the sale of 





The FDAR‟s  main mode of action was to “introduce regulatory requirements for the sale 
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(c) The Clinical Trial Application 
  
 Before a clinical trail can commence for a drug not approved for use in Canada, 
the trial‟s sponsor
258
 must file a Clinical Trial Application (CTA).
259
 The CTA is a 
request for an “authorization to sell or import a drug for the purposes of a clinical trial” 
and must include: 
(a) A copy of the protocol for the clinical trial 
(b) A copy of the informed consent form that will be given to participants  
(c) The clinical trial attestation 
(d) The name and contact information of any REB that has previously refused 
to sanction  the study 
(e) A copy of the investigator‟s brochure 
(f) Proposed date for the commencement of the trial.260 
 
The details of what is to be included within the CTA are elaborated in the policy 
document Guidance for Clinical Trial Sponsors: Clinical Trial Applications,
261
 which 
more clearly identifies administrative and clinical information, chemistry and 
manufacturing details, and quality data that must be submitted. The Minister or his/her 
designate has 30 days to reject the application if: 
(i) the use of the drug for the purposes of the clinical trial endangers the 
health of a clinical trial subject or other person 
(ii) the clinical trial is contrary to the best interests of a clinical trial subject, or 
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(i) Investigator’s Brochure 
  
 The investigator‟s brochure is a description of the information obtained regarding 
a drug to date, or “a document containing the pre-clinical and clinical data on the 
drug”.
263
 This will include: physical and chemical properties of the drug, 
pharmacological aspects from animal testing, pharmacokinetic properties from animal 
testing, toxicological effects from animal testing, carcinogenicity from animal testing, 
and information obtained from previous clinical trials (safety, efficacy, dose response, 
etc.). The brochure is intended to provide all pre-clinical tests (including animal tests and 
chemical tests) and details of previously conducted clinical trials. 
 
(ii) Clinical Trial Attestation 
 
 The clinical trail attestation provides administrative details regarding the drug and 
execution of the clinical trial. These details include: title of the protocol, chemical and 
brand names of the drug, therapeutic classification of the drug, medicinal ingredients of 
the drug, dosage form, contact information for the sponsor (or Canadian representatives), 
contact information for qualified investigators, contact information for REBs which have 
given the study approval, and a statement from the sponsor. The qualified investigator 
(QI), normally a physician or dentist, is: 
the person responsible to the sponsor for the conduct of the clinical trial at a 
clinical trial site, who is entitled to provide health care under the law of the 
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The attestation statement includes undertakings that “the clinical trial will be conducted 




(iii) The Protocol 
 
 The protocol is a description of the study‟s scientific rationale and intended 
organization.  The Act defines a protocol as “a document that describes the objectives, 
design, methodology, statistical considerations and organization of a clinical trial”.
266
 
A protocol is described in the medical literature as: 
a plan that details how a clinical trial is to be carried out and how data are to 
be collected and analyzed. It is an extremely critical and most important 
document, since it ensures the quality and integrity of the clinical 
investigation in terms of its planning, execution, and conduct of the trial as 




It is intended to be a description of the research hypothesis, variables (measures), design 
and methods, results analysis, and administrative details of the trial. As Friedman 
suggests, it can be considered “as a written agreement between the investigator, the 
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(d) Good Clinical Practices 
 
 The FDAR requires that clinical trials are completed “in accordance with good 
clinical practices (GCP)”.
269
 The Act defines good clinical practices as:  
generally accepted clinical practices that are designed to ensure the 
protection of the rights, safety and well-being of clinical trial subjects and 





In defining appropriate methodology, section C.05.010 merely requires that the “trial is 
scientifically sound and clearly described in a protocol”
271
 and conducted in accordance 
with the protocol. Section C.05.010 provides some guidance as to what these acceptable 
clinical practices must include. It requires written informed consent, protection of 
records, REB approval, and good manufacturing and handling procedures.
272
 It also 
requires that “medical care and medical decisions”
273
 are made by a qualified 
investigator and that “each individual involved in the conduct of the trial is qualified by 




(e) Scientifically Sound and the Provision of a Protocol 
 
 Defining something as scientifically sound does not ensure that the best or even 
appropriate methodology is employed. Instead it allows for a wide collection of 
accepted practices that may or may not be scientifically robust.  Many studies can be 
                                                 
269
FDAR, supra note 71. at C.05.010. 
270
Ibid., s. C.05.001. 
271
Ibid., s. C.05.010(a)(b) 
272
Ibid., s. C.05.010(h)(i)(d) & (j) respectively. 
273
Ibid., s. C05.010(f). 
274
Ibid., s. C.05.010(g). 
 
 78 
argued as sound, without taking into account the fact that the quality of clinical trials 
can vary substantially. What is to be included in a protocol is delineated by Health 
Canada in the Pre-Clinical and Evaluation Report Template (PCERT). Also known as 
the protocol synopsis, the main thrust of this document is “a submission rationale and a 
brief summary”
 275
 of the study‟s design and administration. The protocol must identify 
such topics as trial objectives, study design, list of investigators, statistical analysis, but 
does not require that sponsors demonstrate they have chosen those criteria that are most 
likely to minimize bias and errors. 
 
 The main thrust of the contents of the protocol is the identification of a 
justifiable methodology, rather than adherence to the most sound or accurate 
methodologies in research design.
276
 Sponsors are asked to demonstrate that the “design 
of the study should be able to support any claims related to the proposed study”.
277
 This 
includes “the method of randomization, blinding, and the comparative agents, if 
applicable”.
278
 It also includes identifying a sample size to be used, patient populations, 
inclusion/exclusion criteria and efficacy variables (end points), but asks for little more 
than a “description and validation”
279
 of selected criteria. Studies may appear to contain 
all the properties and elements of a good protocol and still be “tainted by dubious 
premises, invalid designs, unreliable data, violated assumptions, bias, erroneous 
methods or faulty reasoning…. [and] faulty logic”.
280
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(f) Study Protocol, Good Clinical Practices and the ICH Guidelines 
(i) ICH Guidelines 
 
 Instead of specifying which methodologies are most appropriate for researchers, 
Health Canada directs sponsors to the International Conference on Harmonization 
(ICH) Guidelines to: 
define parameters of the design, conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing, 
recording analysis, and reporting of clinical trials [as a set of] 
recommendations on ways to achieve greater harmonization in the 





 There are three sections of the ICH guidelines which bear directly on the appropriate 
methods that should be employed in clinical trials: ICH Topic E6: Good Clinical 
Practices,
282
 ICH Topic E8: General Considerations for Clinical Trials,
283
 and ICH 




 The ICH guidelines are not law. Instead, they have been „adopted‟ by Health 
Canada but are not formally incorporated into statute or regulations. They are guidance 
documents meant to: 
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Provide assistance to industry and health care professionals on how to 
comply with the policies and governing statues and regulation. They also 
serve to provide review and compliance guidance to staff, thereby ensuring 




As noted in the foreword to the ICH guidelines provided by Health Canada: 
Guidance documents are administrative instruments not having force of law 
and, as such, allow for flexibility in approach.  Alternative approaches to the 
principles and practices described in this document may be acceptable 




In effect the ICH guidelines are merely suggested practices that industry should adopt. 
While investigators may be reviewed for compliance against these standards by the 
Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate (HPFBI), the ICH guidelines must be 
followed only to the extent that „adequate scientific justification‟ cannot allow different 
standards. 
 
(ii) Defining Good Clinical Practices in the ICH Guidelines 
 
 The ICH guidelines provide a more detailed description of what is considered 
good clinical practice. According to ICH E6, good clinical practices can be described 
as: 
A standard for the design, conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing, 
recording, analysis, and reporting of clinical trials that provides assurance 
that the data and reported results are credible and accurate, and that the 




Good clinical practices within the ICH have two components: (1) measures to assure 
that the design of a study produces valuable data, and (2) measures to protect the rights 
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of study participants. In formulating study design, researchers are reminded that the 
“integrity of the trial and the credibility of the data from the trial depend substantially 
on the trial design”.
288
 As such, in designing a study, researchers should provide 
detailed „descriptions‟ of methods used to minimize or avoid bias, type or design of 
trial to be conducted, descriptions of trial treatments, duration of treatments, 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, assessments of efficacy and safety, and statistical methods 
to be employed. 
 
(iii) ICH Topic E8: General Considerations for Clinical Trials 
 
 ICH Topic E8 provides more specific detail about what should be included in 
the completion of good clinical trials.  It suggests that several “important principles 
should be followed in planning the objectives, design, conduct, analysis and reporting 
of a clinical trial”.
289
 Underlying these principles is a valid scientific approach in design 
and analysis of studies, where: 
Clinical trials should be designed, conducted and analyzed according to 
sound scientific principles to achieve their objectives; and should be 
reported appropriately.  The essence of rational drug development is to ask 




ICH E8 asks that “the appropriate design should be chosen to provide desired 
information”.
291
 It also provides more detailed considerations to be employed to ensure 
accurate results. Subjects should be selected to represent target patient populations 
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using selection criteria that are accurate.
292
 In designing studies, there needs to be “an 
adequate control group…to minimize the likelihood of erroneous inference”.
293
 
Selecting a sample size should account for the “the expected magnitude of the 
treatment, the variability of the data, and the specified probability of error”.
294
 
Response variables (end points) “should be defined prospectively [and] objective 
methods of observation should be used”.
295
 These guidelines also specifically state that 




(iv) ICH Topic E9: Appropriate Statistical Principles 
  
 ICH Topic E9 is very specific in defining appropriate statistical measures to be 
incorporated into study design and analysis to ensure the statistical veracity of the 
study. It catalogues the variety of different designs possible and the statistical 
consideration that must be considered with each form of design and methodology. For 
instance, it notes that global assessment variables (investigators‟ overall impressions) 
are ultimately subjective in nature and can “lead to the results of two products being 
declared equivalent despite having very different profiles of beneficial and adverse 
effects”.
297
 Similarly, E9 cautions that “redefinition of the primary variable after 
unbinding will almost always be unacceptable”.
298
 Yet in describing its scope and 
direction, E9 states: 
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The focus of guidance is on statistical principles. It does not address the use 
of specific statistical procedures or methods. Specific procedural steps to 





E9 is not to be considered an endorsement or value judgment regarding various 
statistical methodologies that can possibly be employed; it simply provides a catalogue 
of considerations that must be addressed in formulating the trial. Accounting for the 
methods and design of the study, and the „procedural steps‟ necessary, are still the 
responsibility and potential discretion of trial sponsors. 
 
(v) The Protocol under the ICH guidelines 
 
 Under the ICH guidelines, the main method for ensuring that these methods are 
met is still the existence of a protocol. The ICH E6 suggests that a protocol “usually 
gives the background and rationale for the trial”.
300
 The ICH E6 also reinforces the 
requirement that “the investigator should conduct the trial in compliance with the 
protocol”,
301
 and cautions that “the investigator, or person designated by the 
investigator, should document and explain any deviation from the approved 
protocol”.
302
 The content of a protocol should reflect those considerations which will 
ultimately appear in the Clinical Study Report provided with a new drug submission. 
This report should draw on the study‟s original protocol to provide: 
a clear explanation of how the critical design features of the study were 
chosen and enough information on the plan, methods and conduct of the 
study so that there is no ambiguity in how the study was carried 
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out…[enough] to allow replication of the critical analyses when authorities 




Again, researchers are given freedom in formulating the parameters under which 
methodological considerations are addressed.  In discussing randomization procedures, 
ICH E6 indicates: 
The investigator should follow the trial‟s randomization procedure, if any, 





Similarly, in defining the contents of a protocol, in section 6 the major requirement is 
that researchers provide a description of the methods employed. 
 
(vi) The ICH Guidelines in Perspective 
 
 Given that the ICH guidelines are only „guidance‟ which may be varied 
“provided they are supported by adequate scientific justification”,
305
 it is difficult to 
judge the extent to which they ensure good study design. ICH Topics E6, E8, and E9 do 
suggest a series of „considerations‟ that research must take into account in designing 
and implementing studies, but nowhere do these recommendations weigh the relative 
scientific merit of various trial designs or suggest the most appropriate forms of 
research. What they do is suggest once again that research should be conducted in 
accordance with good clinical practices.  Good clinical practices in turn call for the 
adherence to a specified protocol and the protection of research participants. The 
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protocol is a description of prospective research, justifying chosen criteria on existing 
scientific principles. As will be described, sound scientific principles may allow for the 
introduction of a wide collection of research which is weak yet maintains the 
appearance and norms of accurate research. 
 
(g) Further Guidance from the Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS)? 
 
 A third document which may give guidance regarding the employment of 
appropriate methodologies in research is the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS).
306
 As noted in Chapter 1, the TCPS is 
a set of ethical guidelines that provide direction for “the conduct of research involving 
human subjects”.
307
 They are binding on any researcher or institution with researchers 
who receives grants from one of the major federal research funding bodies (CIHR, 
NSERCH, or SSHRC).
308
 Organizations which do not receive funding from any of the 
councils, such as private Contract Research Organizations (CRO), may not be subject 
to the TCPS.  
 
(i) A Patient-Centred Perspective 
 
 The TCPS is based on a “subject-centered perspective” that places an emphasis 
on “active involvement by research subjects, and ensuring that their interests are central 
                                                 
306
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to the project or study, and that they will not be treated simply as objects”.
309
 As such, 
the TCPS embodies such principles as respect for human dignity, respect for free and 
informed consent, respect for vulnerable persons, respect for privacy and 
confidentiality, respect for justice and inclusiveness, balancing harms and benefits, 
minimizing harm, and maximizing benefit.
310
In achieving these goals the TCPS 
introduces a host of procedural and administrative requirements placed upon 
researchers to protect the rights of the subject; these include obtaining free and 
informed consent, ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of patient records, including 




 As noted above, science cannot operate free of ethical restraint. Working hand 
in hand with sound statistical and methodological study design is the requirement that 
special consideration be given to participants when following standard research 
practices will cause undue harm. Research in emergency health situations should only 
be conducted “if it addresses the emergency needs of individuals involved”.
312
 Women 
are not to be excluded from research “solely on the basis of sex or reproductive 
capacity”.
313
 Embodied in each of these concepts is the fact that “modern research 
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(ii) Clinical Equipoise and Accurate Study Design 
 
 The TCPS does acknowledge that changing research design for other reasons 
than ethical considerations is not easily justified.  The TCPS calls on researchers to 
employ clinical equipoise in conducting research, requiring that: 
…at the start of the trial, there must be a state of clinical equipoise regarding 
the merits of regimen to be tested, and the trial must be designed in such a 
way as to make it reasonable to expect that, if it is successfully conducted, 




The TCPS defines equipoise as: 
…a genuine uncertainty on the part of the expert medical community about 
the comparative therapeutic merits of a clinical trial. The tenet of clinical 
equipoise provides a clear foundation to the requirement that the health care 




Equipoise reinforces the concept that research should not be conducted needlessly, 
without valid doubt as to outcome or without accurate methods in ascertaining one‟s 
hypothesis.
  
Conducting research to produce desired outcomes by tailoring variables, or 
conducting research that does not take into account the scientific norms of medicine, 
likely violates clinical equipoise. 
 
(iii) The TCPS and Administration of Trials 
 
 While the TCPS does provide detailed instructions for review of the ethical 
elements of a clinical trial, it does not provide direct instruction on trial 
                                                 
315







 The thrust of the TCPS is in the details of how a trial should be 
administered and those protections that must be in place to ensure the safety, privacy, 
and consent of participants. The TCPS patient-centered perspective is focused mainly 
on protecting the rights of participants in research rather then ensuring the 
demonstrated scientific merit of research.  The TCPS looks to REBs to ensure that the 
rights of research participants are not violated, to oversee the research merits of new 
studies, and to a lesser extent to assess the validity of research. Yet it is arguable that 
the quality and content of this research is less likely to be appraised than the 
administrative measures in place to protect participant rights. 
 
(h) The Assessment of Sound Scientific Methodologies 
(i) Qualified Investigators 
 
 We are left with the question, who is in fact reviewing the quality of clinical 
research conducted in Canada? The FDAR does require that research is overseen by a 
qualified investigator.  A qualified investigator is defined in the FDAR as 
The person responsible to the sponsor for the conduct of the clinical trial at a 
clinical trial site, who is entitled to provide health care under the laws of the 




The FDAR further suggests that “each individual involved in the conduct of the clinical 
trial should be qualified by education, training, and experience to perform his or her 
                                                 
317
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 Yet the qualified investigator is not in a position to oversee the 
study‟s design; instead their role is to “assume responsibility for the proper conduct of 
the trial [and make] medical care and medical decisions”
320
 at the trial site; basically, to 
ensure the safety and health of the participants taking part in the trial. Their main role, 
as suggested in the ICH guidelines, is to ensure that the trial is completed “in 
compliance with the protocol agreed to by the sponsor”
321
 and to monitor for adverse 
events. 
 
 Yet qualified investigators are often pressured to not be impartial. As was 
shown by the Nancy Olivieri case, there is potential for qualified investigators to be 
improperly pressured by trial sponsors.
322
 In those situations where sponsors have a 
significant financial stake in research outcomes, pressure will exist
323
 on qualified 
investigators to generate studies that provide findings which reflect their interests. This 
may include ignoring flaws in methodology, adjusting observations during the course 
of a study, and even excluding data that runs contrary to desired conclusions.  Even 
more problematic are the financial links that often exist between qualified investigators 
and sponsors. Many qualified investigators have direct or indirect links with industry 
                                                 
319
Ibid. at C.05.010(g). 
320




See Canadian Association of University Teachers, The Olivieri Report: The Complete Text of the Report 
of the Independent Inquiry Commissioned by the Canadian Association of University Teachers (Toronto: 
James Lorimer & Company Ltd: 2001) & J. Downie, P. Baird & J. Thompson, “Industry and the Academy: 
Conflicts of Interest in Contemporary Health Research” (2002) 10 Health L. J. 103. 
323
For an excellent discussion of the pressures on researchers to generate industry positive data see R. 
DeVries & T. Lemmens, “The Social and Cultural Shaping of Medical Evidence: Case Studies from 
Pharmaceutical Research and Obstetric Science” (2005) 62(11) Social Science & Medicine 2694.  
 
 90 
sponsors who pay for studies.
324
 As was noted in Chapter 2, such industry links can be 
problematic because they tend to: 
redirect the orientation of research towards multiple ends, impede the 
sharing of research results, lead to early termination of trials, suppress or 
delay publication, produce publication bias that overemphasizes the positive 





In these situations, qualified investigators‟ motives, incentives, and impartiality can 
become questionable. 
  
(ii) Health Canada 
 
 Health Canada has the capacity and expertise to review clinical trials, yet they 
have largely ceased to provide critical appraisals of trial design, and have come to focus 
on the existence of a protocol rather than sound design before approving a new clinical 
trial. Health Canada can provide a pre-CTA consultation meeting with trial sponsors in 
which they can “provide guidance on the acceptability of the proposed trial(s)”.
326
 Part 
of the CTA that they will review in advance includes sponsors‟: 
(1) statement of trial design 
(2) parameters, values, ranges or limits for indication(s) and clinical 
use(s), patient study population(s) and routes of administration 
(3) parameters, values, ranges or limits for dosage form(s), dosage 
regimen(s) and formulation(s) 
(4) proposed procedures and/or criteria for patient monitoring, clinical 
efficacy and safety assessments, alternative treatments, premature 
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This allows for a thorough review of a sponsor‟s design and protocol by experts at 
Health Canada before a clinical trial application is submitted. 
 
 Increasingly, however, Health Canada has started to conduct fewer pre-
submission evaluations of clinical trial design.  Health Canada has moved away from 
willingly assessing complete pre-clinical reports because of the volume of data to 
review.
328
 Instead the regulator must look retroactively at study design at the time of 
drug approval, and only at that data provided by manufacturers. Sound scientific 
research has come to be equated with justified research, defendable selection of 
methods, as articulated in an existing protocol. The protocol has come to be more a 
listing of accepted common practices rather than application or quality assessment of 
those practices. 
 
(iii) Research Ethics Boards  
 
 According to the FADR, “for each clinical trial site, the sponsor [must] obtain 
the approval of the research ethics board in respect of the protocol”.
329
 Under the 
FDAR, an REB is a body “not affiliated with the sponsor”,
330
 whose: 
principal mandate…is to approve the initiation of, and conduct periodic 
reviews of, biomedical research involving human subjects in order to ensure 
the protection of their rights, safety and well-being.
331
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The composition of the REB is to include a range of experts in medicine, ethics, law, 
external disciplines, a community member, and: 
two members whose primary experience and expertise are in a scientific 





The main thrust of this review is the rejection or approval of a researcher‟s (clinical-
trial-qualified investigator‟s) protocol and consent materials.  As part of this mandate, 
the REB will generally review the proposed study design as well as the safeguards in 
place to protect participants. Yet we are left asking how completely REBs assess the 




 Unfortunately, REBs in effect become the main point at which study design is 
expected to be evaluated.  We must ask how effective it is that a body chiefly charged 
with “safeguarding the rights, safety, and well-being of all trial subjects”
334
 is the 
primary body also evaluating the validity, soundness, and accuracy of study design. As 
the TCPS notes, “the review is undertaken in local research institutions by independent, 




REBs are not in fact positioned to provide unbiased (or independent) reviews of 
study methodology.  Often REBs do not have the expertise to assess methods nor the 
processes for getting external help with design methodology review.
336
  As Hadskis has 
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noted, “the regulatory framework for human research is marred by complexity and 
inefficiency”.
337
  In fact, the extent to which an REB will exercise their responsibilities 
depends upon: 
the particular country or countries, province or provinces, and institution 
or institutions that will host the research; the type of research being 
conducted; the professional and institutional affiliations of the researchers, 
the age and mental status of the participants; the type of information and 





This means that ultimately there is no uniform way in which REBs assess the scientific 
soundness of a protocol. There is even debate as to whether REBs should be assessing 
the scientific rigour or merit of study design or whether their main role is as a 




It does not suffice to ask REBs to fulfill the role of determining if clinical 
research design has sufficient validity. Ultimately the responsibility for ensuring good 
design must fall on the regulator and/or the manufacturer. The SEQ standard is only as 
good as the science that is provided to support it, demonstrating the value and safety of 
each new drug. This is only accomplished by ensuring the appropriate scientific standards 
are required by law and policy, or by monitoring more closely the quality of scientific 
methodology employed by drug manufacturers. 
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 For the past 20 years, the dominant theme of policy and regulatory activities for 
drug regulation has been limited to the safety, efficacy, and quality of the product, or the 
SEQ standard. Before a drug could be approved, it had to be demonstrated to be “safe, 
effective and of high quality”.
340
 Safety was assured by the prevention of human toxicity, 
efficacy was assured by the demonstration of the drug‟s relative merit in treating 
conditions, and quality was assured by following the standards of good manufacturing 
practices. 
 
 The historical development of drug science and regulation has paralleled a 
recognition that each of these standards must be met: first, by imposing quality standards 
to prevent adulteration, secondly by imposing safety standards to ensure the safety of the 
product in humans, and finally by imposing efficacy standards  to ensure the product‟s 
utility or relative merit. Under the current Food and Drug Regulations
341
 all new drugs 
must demonstrate: 
(e) details of the method of manufacture and the controls to be used in the 
manufacture, preparation and packaging of the new drug; 
(f) details of the tests to be applied to control the potency, purity, stability 
and safety of the new drug; 
(g) detailed reports of the tests made to establish the safety of the new 
drug for the purpose and under the conditions of use recommended; 
(h) substantial evidence of the clinical effectiveness of the new drug for 
the purpose and under the conditions of use recommended.
342
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In addition to these goals, we might include ensuring that Canadians have access to the 
drugs they need and that the drugs being brought to market meet the most urgent needs. 
 
 Increasingly, policy considerations have begun to add on to the traditional drivers 
guiding the approval process for new drugs. The process is becoming dominated by new 
concerns for „access‟, „innovation‟ and „regulation proportional to risk‟. While not 
inherently negative goals, unchecked these policy considerations have the potential for 
undermining the overall SEQ standard and the scientific scrutiny applied to new drug 
approvals. Even more drastically, they represent a shift away from a fear that we may be 
approving unsafe drugs, in favour of a fear that we may not be approving enough 
necessary drugs. 
 
 In the following chapter, I hope to describe the skewed policy goals that have 
come to dominate regulatory concerns relating to new pharmaceutical products. Far from 
a concentration on the safety and ultimate efficacy of the product, the drug regime has 
come to be dominated by a drive for early access at all costs and a concentration on the 
economic and commercial merit of new discoveries. By re-aligning policy goals to focus 
on these new priorities, many regulatory actors may be moving away from their broader 
mandate of protecting the health and safety of Canadians. Similarly, by making these 
other elements the dominant policy concerns in drug regulation, we also potentially 





 In brief, a slanted conception of innovation has meant a focus on sponsoring 
realizable commercial discoveries and an emphasis on not „stifling innovation‟, rather 
than sponsoring truly worthwhile or novel drug discoveries. A focus on  increased market 
access has meant that speed of approval has become the performance indicator rather 
than thorough scientific review. By speeding up the time involved in review to assure 
market access and qualifying new discoveries by their economic potential, we may erode 
the ultimate value and safety of the products which reach the market.  
 
A Relative Standard of Safe: The Faustian Bargain in the Use of Any Drug 
 
 Using any drug involves a number of trade offs. As Jerry Avorn suggests, “every 
drug-use decision is a small Faustian Bargain, with risks and benefits”.
343
 In fact, 
Faustian bargains must be made at each stage in the process that guides a drug to the 
consumer.  As Avorn describes: 
A pharmaceutical manufacturer must decide whether to proceed with the 
costly and cumbersome development of a new molecule that could be a 
blockbuster product or dead end…An experimental subject must decide 
whether to volunteer for a trial of a drug that could improve her health or 
cause unknown hazard. A regulator must decide whether the new product 
should then be allowed on the market.  A physician must decide whether its 
promised therapeutic value will outweigh its potential for harm. Ultimately, 
the patient must decide (sometimes several times each day) whether it‟s 




Making these trade offs is difficult for all involved and often requires judgments where 
absolute certainty is impossible. Balancing the unknown is always a “search for a way to 
structure these trade offs so decisions [can] be made scientifically rather than….by 
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  Yet this balancing of concerns is always an imperfect process which is 
predicated upon the priorities set and the questions asked. 
 
 Every medication has the potential for great good and great harm, and any drug 
taken at too high a dosage or for too long will invariably prove toxic.  Conversely, there 
are many drugs which, when used correctly, contribute greatly to the lives of Canadians. 
Antibiotics save thousands of lives each year.
346
 Developments in treatments for AIDS 
have enabled us to enhance the lives of those suffering from the disease by decades.
347
 
Diseases such as polio, malaria, and small pox have been suppressed (though not 
eradicated) in the Northern Hemispheres by public health policies and the judicious 
administration of medications and vaccines.
348
 A common perception is that there is a 
never-ending need for new pharmaceuticals, and as one author notes: 
people will always need medicine, and the demographic tilt of the population 
promises even faster growth as more and more…reach the age of arthritis, 




Drugs have the potential to treat a dizzying number of conditions and potentially address 
many of the discomforts that come with being ill. 
 
 It must be remembered that drugs are foreign substances usually not naturally 
found in the body in the quantities and concentrations at which they are often 
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administered. Drugs can be described by their selective toxicity, hopefully targeting one 
condition while minimally affecting normal functioning.
350
 There is great danger in 
lightly tinkering with the body‟s delicate homeostasis, even when that homeostasis is out 
of balance. Predicting harm can be problematic and danger may result from “an 
exaggeration of the very effect the drug was intended to have, but sometimes the harm 
seems to come from out of the blue”.
351
 There will always be a level of uncertainty 
associated with the administration of a medication. It is only with caution that a 
potentially toxic substance should be approved for wide-scale consumption.  
 
 In Canada it is assumed that the role of a drug regulator is to help make these 
Faustian decisions more informed, based on considerations of a product‟s SEQ. Initial 
activities of the regulator, rooted in the criminal power to prevent false and misleading 
advertising
352
, have expanded (through regulation and policy guidance) to include a 
broader health promotion and health protection role.
353
 As a trade off against immediate 
access to all products, it is assumed that products available on the market have been 
conscientiously reviewed for their ultimate safety and utility. It is also assumed that this 
review in effect mitigates the toxicity of new drugs, by weighing their overall merit for 
treatment and mitigation of disease. Without this mitigating role, the regulator‟s oversight 
of new drugs becomes diminished if not meaningless. 
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 Traditionally the drug approval process has balanced four competing concerns: 
(1) ensuring that products reaching the market are safe for consumption (safety), (2) 
proving that these products have the effect claimed (efficacy), (3) sponsoring the 
development of new drugs (innovation), and (4) allowing for the distribution of these 
drug discoveries to the widest number of needy patients as soon as is practicable 
(access).
355
 Safety and efficacy are generally achieved under the aegis of clinical 
investigation of new products.   Innovation and access should be achieved by sponsoring 
valuable or needed drug discoveries and ensuring that drugs get to patients without undue 
delay. Ensuring that these criteria are balanced appropriately can be very precarious. 
Often efficacy and innovation will pull toward quicker access and fewer market 
restrictions, while safety and efficacy will pull toward more rigorous oversight and 
market restriction. While these goals may lead to different priorities, we must be careful 
that no one aim comes to dominate the others. If regulators afford one of these concerns 
too much importance, the approval process becomes skewed.  
 
 At its most basic, safety means demonstrating that a drug is not toxic. Regulators 
must ensure that new products entering the market are not inherently noxious substances 
that will overly harm the majority of those who consume them.
356
 In practical terms, this 
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means identifying “a level of risk judged so small as to be insignificant or [at] a level of 
risk deemed acceptable in a specified situation”.
357
 Early phase clinical trials are the 
intended mechanisms for identifying the most hazardous potential outcomes for a drug 
trial.  Pre-clinical testing on animals will generally identify products which are outright 
poisonous. Phase I studies in volunteers will help identify negative unforeseen effects the 
drugs might have in humans, while Phase II and Phase III studies will demonstrate the 
effects of the drug on representative populations. These studies generate surrogate end 
points, or measures of the drug‟s effect over a short time, which are used to extrapolate 
the long-term effects of the drug. Latent toxicity, subtle impairments, or effects which 
take a longer time to manifest often will not become evident until the drug has been 
consumed by a larger population.  
 
 Efficacy is the demonstration that a drug has the effects that it purports to have. It 
is important that a drug not only be shown safe to consume, but also that it be shown as 
effective.
358
 In order to show that a drug is useful it should demonstrate: “the benefit to 
be achieved, a medical problem giving rise to the use of the drug, the population affected, 
and conditions under which the technology is used”.
359
 As Henry Waxman has noted, 
“safety and effectiveness are related inextricably, it is meaningless to say that a drug is 
„safe‟ except in relation to a specific demonstrated benefit”.
360
 Safety and toxicity must 
be measured partially by the justification for introducing a foreign substance to a subject. 
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The later stage clinical trials, Phase II and Phase III, are designed to determine the 
relative effectiveness of new drugs, compared to existing or no therapies. In the case of 
many non-life threatening illnesses, patients receiving a new medication are simply 
compared to those receiving no treatment at all, in a placebo trial.
361
 Demonstrations of 
efficacy have also been criticized for focusing on “measures of morbidity and mortality, 





 As Perrin notes, “sick people need to have access to effective drugs”.
363
  Access 
can best be described as the concern that administrative processes for new drug approvals 
not be so overly convoluted or lengthy as to prevent drugs from reaching the patients who 
need them. Access is a double-edged sword because it “embodies the often conflicting 
interests of personal autonomy and the need to protect or promote the general good”.
364
 
The Therapeutics Access Strategy (TAS) is a set of internal changes at the TPD designed 
to streamline the approval process, by harmonizing with international standards and 
placing a limit on the time that reviewers may take in evaluating NDS.
365
 Using the Cost 
Recovery Initiative (CRI),
366
 industry now pays for half of the cost of new drug 
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 which in theory allows for greater investments into the infrastructure at the 
TPD and speeds up approvals. 
 
 Equally important is that drug regimes sponsor the development of innovative and 
needed new drugs. This requires the prioritizing of projects, sponsorship of worthwhile 
research, funding for developing this work, and incentives for researchers to undertake 
these tasks. Funding innovative drug research has increasingly come to be equated with 
the commercial viability of the final product.
368
 CIHR‟s „cycle of innovation‟ seeks to 
sponsor:   
[a] journey from the laboratory to the marketplace, a journey that enhances 





The incentive for innovation is found in intellectual property law which “guarantees 
innovator companies ample periods of market exclusivity to recover R&D costs”.
370
 In 
the end, innovation is seen as a mechanism that uses the market to direct researchers to 
the most lucrative drugs, rather than a process for sponsoring research into the most 
valued or needed new drugs.  
 
 To all of these elements we might add an additional and often overlooked goal 
that binds them all together: the greater social good. In order for government to justify its 
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intervention, it aims to demonstrate that it is serving those in whose interest it is 
regulating. Regulators should make decisions on the basis of the safety, efficacy, and the 
public interest.  Presently this is not always the case.  Innovation and access have come to 
be played off against safety and efficacy; the drivers behind the first two are often 
economic, while the drivers for the second are commonly public safety. In the following 
section, I will discuss how an innovation policy that focuses purely on sponsoring 
economic development is eroding drug science and public safety. Next, I will discuss 
how access has come to equate less the provision of useful new drugs than the allowance 
of industry and private interests to push for decreased scrutiny of new products. I will 
reserve a wider discussion of safety and efficacy standards until the next chapter. 
 
Weakening Science by Over-Emphasizing Access 
 
 Arguments around access fall along a continuum, with speed of approval traded 
off against safety and efficacy assurance. At one extreme of this argument is the 
libertarian, market-access belief that there should be no state-imposed intervention on the 
availability of new drugs to consumers. Under this conception, free markets will 
determine the success or failure, and consequently, safety, of new drugs. At the other 
extreme is a full precautionary prohibition against all new drugs until it has been 
conclusively demonstrated that they are safe and efficacious. It is a precarious balance 
that regulators must strike, ensuring that a drug‟s safety and efficacy are adequately 
reviewed while not unduly restricting access. Regardless, regulators must always be 





Increasingly, the focus of access in the drug approval process means less and less 
the provision of fully assessed products for SEQ; instead, it simply means speedy 
approval for all drugs.
371
 The result is that traditional prudence in safety standards is 
being pre-empted to meet targeted approval times.
372
  The result is a reduction in the 
amount of time and scrutiny that is applied to research for approval.
373
 Plunging headlong 
into the promise of new treatments, we may fail to ask: What exactly are the risks of 
these new drugs? In exchange for what added benefit? And how do we know?
 
 How do 
we judge patient need and treatment value or utility? Inherent in these questions is the 
conflict of “safeguarding the consumer from potential harm against the freedom to 




(a) Conceptualizing the Problems Underlying Access – A Drug Lag? 
 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the approval process for new drugs in Canada is a closed 
process. New drug approvals are usually made “without public input or access to the 
information used in decision-making”.
375
  This has led to criticisms that approvals are 
“unnecessarily opaque….[and] should set new standards of access to information at all 
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stages of the drug review process, enhancing transparency and public confidence”.
376
  
Joel Lexchin has further criticized this poor access to information: 
deprived of any independent access to information, health professionals and 





It is difficult to determine which factors regulators are using in determining the needs of 
patients to access new drugs.  
 
Critics argue that increasingly this limited public openness means new drugs are 
often approved on the basis of weak scientific evidence and less than thorough 
investigation. One investigation which assessed the studies used to approve a withdrawn 
product found that: 
[the drug] was not tested in the patient population it was approved to treat, 
nor was it tested against placebos or any other [comparable] treatment. Thus 
the studies submitted to Health Canada did not establish [the drug‟s] 




Instead of focusing on science, a skewed concept of access is shifting the way in which 
Health Canada reviews new drugs.  As Lexchin has noted: 
The organization [TD] has accepted the language and, more importantly, 
the ideology of the private sector and has tailored its activities to ensure 
that, in the language of its own Business Transformation Strategy „it 
reduce[s] the administration burden on business‟. We need new and better 
drugs to improve the treatment that people receive, but not at the expense 
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What are the potential implications when a health regulator‟s policy begins to formulate 
approaches to drug review and access based on the administrative burdens placed on 
business? 
 
 Increasingly, business conceives of drug access in terms of the lag that occurs as a 
result of the approval process. They argue that the “drug lag [represents a virtual] ban on 
new drugs” 
380
 in Canada that prejudices the patient.  At its extreme, this conception of 
access involves the assertion that there should be no government barriers to patients using 
those medications that they voluntarily decide to consume. Any delay in access is 
inappropriate. They suggest that “manufacturers [should] have the sole responsibility of 
convincing physicians and patients that they should use any new drug”.
381
 These 
proponents of drug lag assert that the true solutions to access involve privatizing review, 
speeding up approval, relying upon user fees (industry paying for approvals), and 
increasing reliance on the U.S. approval process.
382
 Under this conceptualization, safety 
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(b) Letting the Market Decide 
 
 From the perspective of many pro-industry lobbyists, “expeditious approval of 
useful and safe new products…can be as important as preventing the marketing of 
harmful or ineffective products”.
384
  John Graham of the Fraser Institute argues that post-
market approval is a virtual ban to consumers and that “lengthening the time new 
medicines are automatically banned only reduces the timelines of new information about 
their possible adverse effects”.
385
 According to this argument, the best way to determine 
the safety and efficacy of new drugs is by testing them on the consuming public. 
According to Graham, “informed patients could then use the drug while patients who 
were ignorant or more averse to risk would veer away from it”.
386
 Reducing approval 
times ensures that the market can make the appropriate adjustments to the demand for a 
drug, based on patients‟ awareness of the drug‟s safety. 
 
 Letting the market determine drug safety and efficacy is ethically problematic for 
at least three reasons. The first is the expectation that a degree of harm should be inflicted 
on the consuming public to determine a drug‟s effects. If there is an opportunity to 
prevent such harm a priori, there is an obligation on government to minimize it. 
Secondly, there is an assumption that post-release adverse event reporting is effective in 
determining the dangers of drugs on the market. Organizations such as the MHPD (the 
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agency in Canada which monitors ADR) are consistently underfunded
387
 and adverse 
events are chronically underreported.
388
 Finally, there is an assumption that consumers 
have the capacity to inform themselves of the merits of new drugs.  Aside from the host 
of intentional misinformation regarding the true merits of pharmaceuticals,
389
 this 
assertion fails to take note of the disparity in knowledge related to drug use between 
those who provide medicines (physicians) and those who consume them (patients). 
 
(c) The Government’s Strategy: Equating Access with Speedy Approval 
  
 The government has adopted a strategy which favours a definition of access 
conceived in terms of a perceived drug lag. In the 2002 Speech from the Throne, the 
Government of Canada pledged $190 million to help: 
speed up the regulatory process for drug approvals to ensure that Canadians 
have faster access to the safe drugs they need, creating a better climate for 





According to Health Canada: 
improving access to therapeutics in Canada is a high priority … that 
includes not only getting them to market, but also removing barriers that 
affect public access to health products once they make it to the 
marketplace.
391
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Yet we are left wondering whether improving access can preserve the principle that 
safety is paramount. No longer is access being associated with getting safe, effective and 
promising drugs to market; it is now conceived as getting all new drugs quickly to 
market,
392
 regardless of therapeutic merit.   
 
As articulated in the recent policy document Access to Therapeutic Products: The 
Regulatory Process in Canada, it seems that policy-makers accept that rapid access is 
necessary: 
From a public policy perspective, the rationale for rapid access…. is simple.  
Good health benefits everyone.  In opinion polls, individuals say it 
contributes significantly to their quality of life.  And governments value it 
because the nation as a whole benefits socially and economically when 




Does speedier access truly equate greater health benefits? Is it possible that seeking to 
accelerate the rate of approval might erode the scientific scrutiny of new drugs and place 
the health of Canadians at risk? 
 
 The average time for new drug approvals in Canada over the past decade has been 
just under 22 months or 642 days.
394
 This is slightly longer than most other G8 countries 
(except Italy and Japan), including the United States.
395
  Pro-industry lobbyists argue that 
this is evidence which “shows that the policy of automatically banning new medicines 
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harms Canadians far more than it helps them”.
396
 In their eyes, this delay in approval 
times prevents patients “from getting medicines that are invented as quickly as they 
would prefer”.
397
 Yet, this perspective must be tempered by a healthy scepticism, as 
Lexchin notes: 
From the point of view of return on investment, industry preoccupation with 
time lines makes perfect sense; whether that preoccupation is warranted 




Recognizing that it takes longer to approve a drug does not equate acknowledgment that 
this delay is a health crisis. It is only in the most severe cases and with the most 
therapeutically meritorious new discoveries that restricting the public from immediate 
access causes extensive harm, and there are mechanisms for rapid release (SAP). 
 
(i) The Therapeutic Access Strategy (TAS) 
  
 In 2003, the federal government enacted the Therapeutic Access Strategy (TAS) 
to help achieve the goal of greater public access to new drugs.  The original aim of the 
TAS was twofold:  
(1) to ensure that human drugs and other therapeutic products are as safe 
as possible, accessible, of high quality, therapeutically effective, and used 
properly; and,  
(2) to make access both timely and cost-effective.
399
 
In articulating a vision for the final outcome of this process, much weight was placed 
upon re-orienting the whole regulatory process toward efficiency and speed in approvals: 
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In a shrinking world, the pace of scientific and technological change, and 
the speed of innovation mean that the regulatory system must be ready to 
keep up -- to ensure that Canadians have timely access to new advances in 
health products, foods, therapies and health technologies, both from Canada 
and around the world. 
This means taking a close look at how we regulate…In the short term, we 
need to focus on how to move submissions through the review process 
faster, while still maintaining high standards of safety. The goal is a review 
system that is timely, consistent, predictable and of the highest quality.
400
 
These goals were gradually morphed into the concrete policy outcomes of: 
(1) …improving the timelines and transparency of the review process for 
therapeutic products…(2) enhancing post-market surveillance… (3) 




These guidelines seem to indicate a policy shift toward quick approval followed 
by determination of long-term safety on the consuming public, despite the fact 
that “availability and wide use are not guarantees of a drug‟s safety”.
402
 
 Under TAS, a host of new initiatives have been introduced, such as the Drug 
Products Database (DPD),
403
 Summary Basis of Decisions (SBD) Database,
404
 and ADR 
Med Effects Database,
405
 which have the potential for increasing access to the details of 
new drug discovery. Still, these efforts have been partial and incomplete. Instead the 
focus of TPD‟s short term strategy has been “beating the backlog…reduce[ing] the 
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backlog of new drug submissions”.
406
 At the same time it is readily admitted that there 
are “remaining gaps” in achieving the long-term goals of “accelerating access to 





 Under the TAS, “product submissions are now managed as „projects‟… that are 
planned, coordinated, and managed, to meet performance targets”.
408
 The main barometer 
by which the success of meeting these targets is measured is speed of approval. The 
Regulatory Review of Pharmaceutical, Biologics and Medical Devices 2005 Annual 
Summary of Performance
409
 conceives of performance strictly as “significant progress 
made in eliminating the review blockage and towards issuing review decisions within 
performance targets”.
410
 Nowhere is safety mentioned. The TPD now sets a performance 
target for review, including processing, screening, and review, at 180 days for standard 
drug reviews.
411
 As noted in the introduction to the report: 
Compared with the year 2003, median authorization times have improved 
for new pharmaceuticals drugs, dropping by 33% and 29% respectively, for 




This means that the average time to approve brand name standard pharmaceuticals in 
2005 was 18.3 months compared with 28.8 months the year before, which represents a 
                                                 
406






Health Canada, Regulatory Review of Pharmaceutical, Biologics and Medical Devices 2005 Annual 
Summary of Performance (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2004), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-






Rawson II, supra note 395. 
 
 113 
drastic drop of 10 months. One is left wondering what potential accuracy in the review 
process is lost, given such a sharp drop in the time spent reviewing new drugs. 
 
 It is interesting to note that in order for the TPD to achieve its goals of reducing 
the drug approval backlog, “the number of interim decisions issued increased by 53% 
since 2003”.
413
 Interim decisions represent a form of approval with the condition that 
manufacturers provide additional information at a later time.  The usual reasons for 
interim decisions are “deficiencies with respect to the regulatory requirements for market 
authorization”.
414
 Still, regardless of these deficiencies, the TPD is increasingly willing to 
issue approvals for incomplete applications in order to meet timelines. The ultimate 
question is whether these deficiencies in product applications might represent gaps in the 
proof or quality of information submitted for approval. 
 
 Part of conceiving of drug approval as a project or deliverable involves placing 
part of the cost for approval on industry. In 1995, the federal government introduced 
regulations to charge industry a portion of the cost for new drug approvals.
415
 It was 
believed that these would offset labour, operations, program, and administrative overhead 
costs.
416
 In 2004, the User Fees Act
417
 (UFA) was passed, which “establish[ed] a link 
                                                 
413
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between performance and new fees”.
418
 Section 1(f) of UFA
419
 required approval times 
to: 
establish standards which are comparable to those established by other 
countries with which a comparison is relevant and against which the 




In the case of drug approval times at TPD, this means comparison with international 
standards, mainly those of the United States. Government bodies charging user fees were 
also required to report “performance standards in accordance with 1(f) as well as the 
actual performance levels that have been reached”. In 2005, 66% of regulatory decisions 
were issued within targets, compared to 39% in 2004, and 13% in 2003.
422
 Under UFA, 
the TPD is functionally trying to exponentially increase the pace of new drug approvals. 
 
 In 1999-2000, the Therapeutic Product Program Cost Recovery Initiative 
accounted for over 50% to 70% ($34.7 million) of the TPD‟s cost for reviewing new 
drugs.
423
  Under the current Drug and Medical Devices Cost Recovery Program, this 
figure still accounts for a full third of TPD‟s operating costs.
424
 When so much of internal 
revenue comes from industry, there is a temptation to view them as your clients or 
stakeholders, and to forget that your true client is the public whose safety has to be 
ensured.
425
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 If we look to the U.S., whose standards Canada is often trying to replicate,
426
 we 
might be wary of the potential dangers of cost recovery. At the FDA, cost recovery has: 
impaired reviewers‟ ability to assess drug safety impartially by fostering a 
frenetic atmosphere in which the pharmaceutical industry is viewed as the 
customer and scientific debate is discouraged.
427
   
 
David J. Graham, the scientist who eventually exposed the dangers of Vioxx , reported 
that he was repeatedly told to consider “the industry our client”
428
 and keep his concerns 
silent.  He went on to suggest that a common perspective at the regulator is to consider 
themselves “not there to serve the public...[instead] an institution that has become a 




 The drive at the TPD to reduce drug approval times seems quixotic, since there 
already exist two programs, the Priority Drug Review (PDR) and the Special Access 
Program (SAP), whose purposes in theory are to ensure that those drugs which are most 
needed or have significant therapeutic merit can reach patients quickly.  Under PDR, 
there is to be a fast-tracking of reviews for drugs that meet the criteria of being: 
Effective treatment, prevention or diagnosis of a disease or condition for 
which no drug is presently marketed in Canada; or, 
A significant increase in efficacy and/or significant decrease in risk …over 
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Priority review of NDS is to take a maximum of 215 days, including processing, 
screening, and review. The SAP is designed to ensure that specific patients can gain 
quick access to drugs unavailable in Canada.  As Health Canada indicates: 
The Special Access Programme (SAP) allows practitioners to request access 
to drugs that are unavailable for sale in Canada [for] patients with serious or 
life-threatening conditions on a compassionate or emergency basis when 




The SAP is intended as patient specific, case by case approval, and does not equate a 
wider release of a drug. The PDR and SAP programs administered correctly should in 
theory deal with specific cases of drug lag. 
 
 Unfortunately, neither the PDR nor SAP is being administered to meet their 
original objectives. A host of new drugs which hardly represent “significant increases” 
over existing therapies or valuable new managements for diseases are being approved 
using the PDR.  Vioxx was approved using a priority review, even though it was 
demonstrated to not be a significant improvement over existing arthritis therapies.
432 
 At 
the same time, the SAP is also being exploited. In 2006 a CMAJ letter indicated that 67% 
of all SAP requests are for silicon breast implants unavailable in Canada.
433
 At the same 
time, six of the article writers‟ applications and appeals for novel HIV drug therapies 
treating end-stage AIDS patients were denied. This has led the authors of this article to 
plead: 
                                                 
431
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Without disparaging the difficulties experienced by women needing breast 
implants, we cannot contain our moral outrage at the ineffectiveness of the 
SAP in dealing with truly life-threatening matter[s].
434
 
   
 
(ii) Is there a Drug Lag in Canada? 
 
 How great is the Canadian drug lag in the approval of essential new drug 
discoveries? A 2003 study comparing drug approval times for 268 drugs in both Canada 
and the U.S. from 1992 to 2002, found an average difference of a little over six months 
(642 days in Canada versus 454 days in the United States).
435
 For those drugs which 
underwent priority review in both countries (28 in total), there was a little less than three 
months difference (Canada at 256 days and the US at 182 days). For those drugs that the 
PMPRB would have labelled as breakthroughs or substantial improvements (26 in total), 
there was a little over five months difference (Canada at 476 days and the U.S. at 318 
days). While three months and five months respectively do represent a delay for essential 
new discoveries, it is dubious that they truly represent a “ban on prescription drugs”.
436
  
In fact, for four of the most prescribed classes of drugs, there was little difference in 
approval times at all; for cardiovascular drugs, it was 760 days in Canada versus 722 days 
in the U.S., for psychiatric drugs, 1058 days in Canada versus 1024 days in the U.S., for 
central nervous system drugs, 567 days in Canada versus 554 days in the U.S., and for 
anti-cancer drugs, 427 days in Canada versus 385 days in the U.S.. 
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(iii) Speed at the Expense of Safety? 
 
 At the same time, the U.S. withdrew twice as many of its approved drugs (12 in 
total) for safety reasons as Canada (6 in total). A difference of only six drugs may seem 
small, but as Lexchin reminds us: 
It is necessary to look beyond the raw numbers to judge the magnitude of 
the problem of unsafe drugs. Large numbers of people, including vulnerable 




In Canada, if only 0.1 per cent of the population used a dangerous drug, then roughly 
over 400,000 patients may have been exposed to potential harm. Lexchin has also noted 
that as Canada has increased the speed of its approval times over the past forty years in 
general, it has witnessed an increasing number of drugs withdrawn for safety reasons (41 
from 1964 to 2004, with 16 since 1993).
438
  Other studies have shown that “shortened 
review times were associated with increases in adverse drug reaction[s], hospitalizations 
and death[s]”.
439
 This is occurring at the same time as the number of new or truly novel 
products entering the market is decreasing.
440
 A recent study by Lexchin, has shown that 
increased speed of approval at TPD, especially for those approved near the end of the 
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(d) True Access for Patients 
  
 The best approach to new prescription drugs is ensuring that scientific and safety 
standards are not sacrificed in the pursuit of speedier access. According to Health 
Canada‟s own website: 
Health Canada plays an active role in ensuring that you have access to safe 
and effective drugs and health products. The Department strives to maintain 
a balance between the potential health benefits and risks posed by all drugs 
and health products. Our highest priority in determining the balance is 




Purposeful access also requires “rigid standards...to protect against serious harms”.
443
 As 
Perrin notes, this is because “terminally or seriously ill patients are particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation, especially in the absence of alternative therapies”.
444
  Making 
determinations as to the relative value of new products involves delving deeper into the 
benefits that drugs are likely to provide.  Simply assuming that our regulatory structure 
should allow for all drugs to be offered more expediently may skew the balance between 
potential benefits and risks toward questionable benefits in favour of unnecessary risks. 
Part of the access discussion should require determining the relative need and value of 
new drugs. 
 
 Conceptually, the rationale behind faster approval times is to ensure that 
necessary drugs reach the patients who need them. It does little good to speed up the time 
in which new drugs reach the market if they do not ultimately improve the lives of 
patients. Regulatory mechanisms in place (throughout Health Canada) should ensure that 
                                                 
442
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necessary drugs are being produced, that they are not prohibitively expensive or 
inaccessible, and that patients are given a voice to influence policy-makers‟ decisions 
about which drugs are important. Upon closer inspection, it is apparent that many of these 
goals are not being achieved.  New drugs are far more synonymous with „me-too‟ 




(i) ‘Necessary’ or Me-Too for New Drugs 
 
 Defining necessary drugs has become a difficult task. Currently, there is a culture 
in which great efforts are made “to convince health-care professionals that their products 
should be used for an ever-expanding range of symptoms”.
446
 As Goozner notes: 
Physicians prescribe medicines at a breakneck pace to an aging, overweight, and 
out of-shape American people suffering from (to judge from prescription patterns) 
in near epidemic proportions high cholesterol, high blood pressure, allergies, 




Manufacturers strive to “change the way people think about their common ailments to 
make natural processes need medical treatment”.
448
  This is occurring along with 
additional evidence that “more care doesn‟t necessarily mean better care”.
449
 On the 
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contrary, research suggests that “there is strong evidence that behavior and environment 
are responsible”
450
 for most preventable illness. 
 
 
 There is little incentive for drug manufactures to produce drugs that treat rare 
illnesses, affect only limited numbers of people, are politically controversial, or are 
targeted at poor populations. A recent study looking at tropical infectious diseases, the 
diseases which kill the largest numbers of people, found that of 1393 drugs developed 
from 1975 to 1999, only 16 targeted these diseases.
451
 
As the study‟s authors note: 
Despite impressive advances in science, technology, and medicine, society 
has failed to allocate sufficient resources to fight the diseases that 
particularly affect the poor… Market prospects and return on investment 





In those jurisdictions where Orphan Drug regulations have been introduced to sponsor the 
development of needed pharmaceuticals, drug manufacturers have tended to exploit gaps 





 In the case of drugs for which there is little political or financial desire to seek 
approval, little can be done to force a manufacturer to introduce the drug to market. The 
case of RU-486 is a good example. Listed on the WHO‟s Model List of Essential 
                                                 
450
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Medicines, RU-486 (Mifepristone) is an early term abortion pill that can be taken orally. 
It often represents the least intrusive and safest method by which an abortion can be 
completed.  Unfortunately, it is unavailable in Canada simply because no drug 
manufacturer is willing to submit a NDS for its use, due to fear of political and economic 
reprisal.  In fact, manufacturers have stated that they “won‟t apply to market the drug in 
Canada until they are invited to do so by Health Canada to ensure they won‟t face a 
hostile government”.
454
 Without a willingness from manufacturers to submit the product 





 The struggle over how to define a serious illness that warrants special attention or 
drugs is subject to a host of external pressures.  If policy-makers are to appropriately 
apply priority review or sponsor faster approval times, they must identify those drugs 
which patients are actually asking for.  The main groups through which these voices are 
heard are Patient Advocacy Groups (PAG) or Health Advocacy Groups (HAG). 
Unfortunately, it is difficult for policy-makers to determine which of these organizations 
are expressing legitimate patient concerns and which are simply mirroring the desires of 
industry. As Sharon Batt suggests, untangling the interests which influence the PAG and 
HAG can be difficult: 
The close correspondence of advocacy groups views with those of their 
industry sponsors suggests this empowerment is more illusory than real…. 
Is it coincidental that pharma-funded groups focus their criticisms of 
government on issues like „drug-lag‟, access to new drugs …while groups 
independent of the industry critique government partnerships with industry 
                                                 
454











Drugs like RU-486 are unlikely to receive funded patient advocacy, compared to new 
treatments for arthritis or dementia.
457
 This presents an uneven voice to regulators, who 
may come to conceive of need purely in terms of those lobbies which are most active 
and, ultimately, well-funded. 
 
 The truth is that understanding access in terms of true need means “having 
independent information about diseases and their treatments, and tools to critically 
analyze a problem”.
458
 A focus purely on the speed of approval has the potential to 
reduce the quality of scrutiny that is brought to bear on new drug approvals and, 
ultimately, to imperil patient safety.  As Sharon Batt notes: 
the push to speedy drug approvals detracts attention and resources from the 





Conceiving of access in terms of speed is particularly problematic when we fail to 
distinguish between “„breakthrough‟ drugs and those that offer little or no therapeutic 
advantage over existing drugs”
460
 or when we are continually substituting “newer, more 
expensive medications for older, less expensive ones”
461
 with little increase in therapeutic 
merit. 
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 The erosion of access into a frenetic race to increase approval times for new 
pharmaceuticals also means that safety potentially suffers.  While it is possible that 
increased approval times may be accomplished without a decrease in the scrutiny applied 
to new drug approvals, the U.S. example indicates that this is unlikely.  Instead, 
emphasizing speed of approval and relying upon industry funding places pressures on the 
TPD to favour new drug approvals. It behoves us to remember that: 
All medicines can cause harm as well as benefit.  Without systematic 





Access that is narrowly defined in terms of speed of approval loses sight of this key 
principle, and potentially favours weak science over good science.  
 
Weakening Science by Emphasizing Innovation? 
 
 Sponsoring new drug development is essential to ensuring that the 
potential benefits of prescription drugs are achieved. In principle, this means that 
incentives and sponsorship should serve to encourage the research and 
development of drugs that are truly novel and useful. The extent to which any 
regulatory regime sponsors the development of such drugs can often be a measure 
of its success at addressing pressing health and societal needs. It can also be a 
measure of the degree to which it sponsors truly useful scientific discoveries and 
the advancement of medicine. Yet we must be cautious about conceiving of the 
value of new discoveries too narrowly; in doing so, we lose sight of the true value 
of new drugs, weaken science, and imperil the safety of the public.  
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(a) Defining Innovation 
 
 Much of our modern regulatory framework and the rationale for current 
drug policy is predicated upon sponsoring „innovation.‟
463
 Yet it is not with ease 
that we define this amorphous term in the policy context. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines innovation as: 
the action of innovating; the introduction of novelties; the 
alteration of what is established by the introduction of new 
elements or forms; and, 
the action of introducing a new product into the market; a product 




Increasingly, the conceptualization of innovation that policy- and law-makers 
have adopted has come to reflect the second definition, which reflects a narrowing 
of the value of discovery to its economic and financial impact on the Canadian 
economy.
465
 As Pazderka and Stegemann suggest, this favours a: 
„linear model‟ of innovation postulat[ing] a sequence running from 





Such a conceptualization may erode the public interest, with “the subordination of 
science to the economy”.
467
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 On February 12, 2002, the federal government introduced Canada’s 
Innovation Strategy
468
 with two policy documents: Achieving Excellence: 
Investing in People, Knowledge and Opportunity
469
 and Knowledge Matters: 
Skills and Learning for Canadians.
470
 These were the result of a policy which for 
decades had been moving toward equating the value of scientific developments 
with the economic product of research
471
 and achieving excellence focused on 
“strengthen[ing] our science and research capacity…to ensure that knowledge 
contributes to building an innovative economy”.
472
 Through the lens of this 
policy, innovation became how: 
knowledge is applied to the development of new products and services 
or to new ways of designing, producing or marketing an existing 
product or service for public and private markets. The term 
“innovation” refers to both the creative process of applying knowledge 
and the outcome of that process… [and] has always been a driving 




Innovation in health research and development was now designed to “contribute 
to the economic competitiveness, effectiveness of public services and policy, and 
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 How is innovation to be measured in the development of new 
pharmaceutical products? Not, as one might expect, in the novelty and utility of 
the medicines produced, but rather, in the extent to which they have the capacity 
to generate economic enterprise (usually new patents or commercially viable 
products).
475
 The result has been a push for pairing funding with 
commercialization of research and the belief that extensive patent terms are 
required to ensure the motivation for new innovation. The commercialization 
strategy is embodied in an “effort to move research from an academic setting to 
the marketplace”,
476
 while the patent term (20 years at present) is conceived as the 





(b) Patent Protections and the Incentives to Innovate? 
 
 Under this conception of innovation, patent protections are predicated 
upon the incentive to innovate theory. According to this theory, by “conferring an 
artificial and limited monopoly”
478
 for long periods, one is likely to encourage the 
greatest incentive for new drug development. This theory holds that: 
too few inventions will be made in the absence of the patent 
protections because inventions once made are easily appropriated by 
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This monopoly is a trade-off that allows “the patent holder to profit from the sale 
of the drug, so as to serve the public interest of having life-improving drugs 
developed”.
480
 Pharmaceuticals are especially subject to this form of exploitation, 
since the products can easily be chemically duplicated once they are on the 
market.  
 
 The theory guiding the creation of incentive to innovate operates on two 
core assumptions.  The first is that the patenting of drugs is the best way to 
encourage worthwhile drug discoveries and innovation; the second is that lengthy 
patent periods are required to allow drug companies to recoup the massive cost 
they incur in research and development of new drugs. These assumptions in turn 
beg at least three questions. How innovative is the drug industry as a developer of 
essential and needed drugs? How innovative is the Canadian pharmaceutical 
industry as a driver of economic growth? Finally, how extensive are the research 
expenditures that drug companies must make to develop a new drug? 
 
 How effective is the Canadian pharmaceutical industry as a driver of 
valuable and novel discoveries? The PMPRB places newly patented drugs into 
three categories for determining pricing. Category 1 drugs are line extensions of 
existing drugs, usually measured by changes in dosage. Category 2 drugs are 
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substantial improvements or „breakthrough‟ drugs classified as “the first to 
effectively treat a particular illness or which provides a substantial improvement 
over existing drug products”.
481
 Category 3 drugs are modified drugs or new 
dosage forms of existing drugs that “provide moderate, little or no improvements 
over existing medicines”.
482
 In the period from 2000 to 2005, information was 
available for 342 new patented drugs reviewed by the PMPRB, out of which 179 
(52%) were line extensions, 153 (45%) were category 3 modified drugs, and only 
10 (3%) were category 2 breakthrough drugs.
483
 In fact, from the years 2002 to 
2004, the PMPRB reported only one drug that they classified as a category 2 
substantial innovation. 
 
 Approximately 79% of the drugs prescribed in Canada in 2005 were 
introduced in the last decade. Only 35 of these drugs would be classified as 
significant innovations by the PMPRB.
484
 Over the same period (1996-2005), 
drug profits have risen from $6.6 billion to well over $11.6 billion.
485
 The vast 
majority of these drugs have been very expensive while providing questionable 
increases in therapeutic benefit.
486
 We are seeing the “prescribing of newer, more 
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 The majority of these newer drugs are not novel discoveries, but rather 
replications or modifications of already existing drugs. These „me-too‟ drugs 
often afford drug manufacturers the opportunity to gain a market share or profit 
from a product that has already proven successful.
488
 Conversely, there is little 
incentive to develop drugs which treat rare diseases affecting poor or under-
represented groups, which are not frequently found in rich, Westernized countries 
or which are unlikely to turn a profit.
489
 Such „orphan drugs‟ may be more ethical 
and needed based on the harm they can prevent, but they cannot be justified on 




 How much economic innovation does Canadian drug development 
sponsor? Drug-makers employ approximately 28,000 individuals in Canada, but 
the majority of these positions are in the manufacturing sector (19,000) and 
administration (6000).
491
 Canada spends the least of all G8 countries on the 
                                                 
487
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research and development of new drugs.
492
 The majority of the $1.12 billion 
dollars spent on research in Canada in 2005 went toward applied research (mainly 
clinical trials for approval), with only 19.7% or $221.7 million going toward basic 
(chemical or biological) research. This figure has not risen significantly in the 
past decade. The percentage of total profits returned to R&D in Canada (8.3%) is 
the lowest of all G8 countries.
493
 These amounts do appear to be a significant 
investment, but represent only a fraction of the funds generated in profits ($11.6 
billion) as a result of patent rights. In 2005, Canada‟s foreign drug sales 
accounted for only 3.2% of the international drug market.
494
 Conversely, we are 
one of the greatest importers of drugs for our domestic market; in 2000, this 
imbalance accounted for 75.5% of drug purchases in Canada. Rather than acting 
as a driver of economic growth, drug expenditures suggest a drawing of capital 
out of Canada‟s economy. 
 
 In fact there is little patent innovation that remains in Canada. The 
moderate size of Canada‟s role as an innovator means that most new and viable 
discoveries are likely to be shipped off-shore. The majority of new patents drugs, 
even those developed in Canada, are filed first in larger markets such as the 
United States or European Economic Union.
495
 As one author notes, “Canadian 
inventors remain motivated to invent by obtaining patents in large foreign 
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 Most major drug manufacturers are in dire need of new 
discoveries. The R&D to sales ratio of pharmaceutical patentees peaked in the 
mid 1990s.
497
 Pharmaceutical companies are relying more frequently upon profits 
and revenues from discoveries made almost twenty years ago, and whose patents 
are on the verge of expiring.
498
 As one author has suggested: 
It would be difficult to rationalize strong patent protection in Canada 
on the grounds of the motivation of innovation function because the 
Canadian market is too small to affect more than marginally the R&D 
policies of pharmaceutical producers who invent new drugs with a 




Any truly profitable innovations made in Canada are likely to be taken abroad to 
countries with larger markets and larger research infrastructures. 
 
 What of the exorbitant R&D costs that are used by industry to justify extended 
patent provisions? Industry estimates place the cost to bring a new chemical entity (NCE) 
to market at $802 million USD.
500
 Rx & D Canada projects this figure to even more at 
$1.3 billion.
501
 Commonly quoted by both industry and policy-makers, these figures are 
highly inflated by the inclusion of costs for development that would normally be 
considered marketing and advertising,
502
 including losses due to capitalization (i.e., 
speculative revenue that could have been made investing in equity markets instead of 
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 and failing to account for tax deductions. Furthermore, the majority of new 
drug patents are not novel, but rather reformulations of older existing drugs for which 
scientific research costs are far lower. It is estimated that the actual out-of-pocket cash 





 In recovering these costs, Canada is only a minor contributor to total international 
drug sales (approximately 2% of total sales),
505
 suggesting that our share of costs that 
must be recouped amounts to approximately $20 million at most, or possibly as little as 
$2.2 million per new drug. As one author notes: 
when developing global R&D plans, it is unlikely that either investors or 





In 2010, Canadians spent $24.5 billion on drugs,
 507
 far more than the losses that industry 
could conceivable have sunk into developing new drugs for the Canadian marketplace. 
 
(c) Commercialization, Innovation and the Degradation of Academic Science 
(i) Commercialization of Research 
 
 A second consequence of conceiving of innovation purely in economic terms has 
been a drive toward increased commercialization of drug research.  Downie has defined 
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commercialization as “the converting of research results into products, services, and 
processes that can be the object of commercial transactions”.
508
 This has been marked by 
both a push for the development of commercially viable products and an emphasis on 
public-private partnerships in drug research. The beginning of global commercialization 
of research occurred in 1980, when the U.S. passed the Bayh-Dole Act,
509
 which allowed 
discoveries made in public institutions and universities to be patented by private industry. 
Canada has taken much more of a hands-off approach to legislating commercialization, 
advancing a policy that emphasizes that “partnerships [are] key to expanding innovation 
opportunities and mitigating risk”.
510
   
 
 Much of the innovation that occurs in the development of drugs begins with 
public researchers.
511
 As one author has noted, “innovation in the drug industry – more so 
than in most other industries – depends heavily on the diffusion of knowledge from 
universities and government laboratories”.
512
 In the U.S., the largest drug development 
market in the world, only 15 per cent of new discoveries come from industry, 55 per cent 
come from National Institute of Health (NIH)-funded institutions, and 30 per cent from 
academic institutions.
513
 Similarly, in a study which assessed the number of articles cited 
in new patent applications, it was found that: 
                                                 
508
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only 15 percent came from industry, while 54 percent came from academic 





In many cases it may be difficult to separate institutional funding from industry, but 
regardless the majority of the initial cost are born by public institutions, until a discovery 
demonstrates market potential. 
 
 In Canada, 50 per cent of drug R&D sponsorship, or approximately $1 billion per 
year, is spent on research. The majority of this funding goes to applied research (clinical 
trials) sponsored in public institutions (hospitals or academia).
515
  This is a broad trend; in 
a survey of 122 top U.S. medical schools, the NEJM reported that on average, there were 
103 public-private drug review partnerships.
516
   
 
 Over the past three decades, there has been a slow repositioning of universities 
and their research as a “component of the national system of innovation”
517
 along with 
the entrenchment of academic science as a commodity that should “contribute to national 
prosperity”.
518
 Commercialization has two potentially limiting effects on science: (i) it 
binds research closely to industry funding, and in turn, industry objectives and 
motivations may come to dominate the research agenda; (ii) it operates upon the 
assumption that the most fruitful scientific research has an apparent and readily realizable 
market potential.  In considering these two outcomes, we must ask what potential 
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outcomes in relation to safety and access might result from passing drug research into the 
hands of industry. Even more compelling is the danger that as researchers have to 
commercialize their research, they will focus on marketable products (such as new drugs) 
and little research will be done into areas of medicine that have no intrinsic market value 
(such as health promotion).  
 
(ii) Denigrating the Quality of Drug Research 
 
 As increased amounts of research funding comes from industry, private interests 
may come to believe that their financial stake “buys them the right to set the research 
agenda”.
519
 Critics assert that these partnerships have the potential to denigrate the 
quality of academic research, discourse, freedom, and science used in drug trials.  As 
Sheldon Krimsky notes, one of the perils of these partnerships is that: 
secrecy has replaced openness; privatization of knowledge has replaced 
communitarian values, commodification of discovery has replaced the idea that 
university-generated knowledge is a free good, a part of the social 
commons…[and] an unprecedented rise in conflicts of interest… As universities 
turn their scientific laboratories into commercial enterprise zones and as they 
select their faculty to realize these goals, fewer opportunities will exist in 




This degradation in the ethos underlying scientific pursuit not only erodes the quality of 
science which is pursued, but also limits the questions that researchers are able to ask. It 
also leaves open the potential for skewing conclusions researchers may draw from 
research related to safety and efficacy. 
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  Most clinical trials are performed to “facilitate regulatory approval of a device or 
drug rather than to test a specific novel scientific hypothesis”.
521
  As the recent case of 
Canadian researcher Nancy Olivieri shows, with increased financial and contractual ties 
researchers may lose the freedom to express concerns or meet ethical obligations when 
these interests conflict with those of sponsors.
522
 Several widely published reports have 
demonstrated that studies sponsored by industry are far more likely to have favourable 
outcomes (almost 4 to 1).
523
  Likewise, sponsored research which is unfavourable is far 
more likely to remain unpublished or to not appear in peer-reviewed journals.
524
  These 
biases led the editors of several major medical journals to issue the following statement in 
2002: 
Scientists have ethical obligations to submit creditable research results for 
publication.  As the person directly responsible for their work, researchers 
therefore should not enter into agreements that interfere with their access to the 
data or their ability to analyze the data independently, to prepare manuscripts, 
and to publish them.  Authors should describe the role of the study sponsor(s), if 
any, in the study design; in the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data; in 





Yet as researchers increasingly become dependent upon industry funding, there are 
concerns that “economic considerations have become more important than the real 
purpose of clinical trial[s]”.
526
 Clinical trials must be careful to not slip into the world of 
pseudo-science where they are developed merely to meet the minimum requirements of 
regulatory approval and serve the profit-maximization goals of the private sector. 
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(iii) Commercialization and the Denigration of Drug Research 
 
 If we conceive of science in terms of drugs that can be commercialized, an 
overemphasis on economic models will move us toward the use of mechanisms of 
discovery that are the most cost-effective and provide the greatest return on investment. 
This means that more costly and time-consuming discoveries will be ignored, even if they 
are likely to prove more useful.  The blending of commercial and academic research into 
new drug discoveries has meant that NCEC research often adopts efficiency models from 
business.  According to one author: 
This new concept [means] the critical discourse between chemists and 
biologists and the quality of scientific reasoning are sometimes replaced by 




The development of new drugs has seen a shift in emphasis on innovation from 
developing products for specific illnesses, to developing drugs that modify specific 
physiological or molecular mechanisms, or modes of action (MoA). It is easy to test a 
NCE‟s effect on an MoA, since large numbers of compounds can be reviewed quickly 




 This has the result of pushing industry-funded drug research toward “focusing on 
known targets [MoA] and using existing drugs in new indications”
529
 rather than into 
novel drug development. As one author notes, this approach to drug discovery further 
limits: 
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the possibility of letting biology and chemistry deliver serendipitous 
discoveries ... because [observation] is restricted to known mechanisms and 
biological processes for which we can provide a theoretical framework for 




Understanding that a compound has the capacity to manipulate a mechanism does not 
equate to a fulsome understanding of the global effect that substance has on the body. 
Drugs that target mechanisms are far more likely to be “symptomatic [treat symptoms] 
rather than disease modifying treatments”.
531
 Such drugs might be demonstrated as 
effective, but may not represent optimal or even worthwhile treatments, and certainly lose 
a degree of tailoring to the specific illnesses from which patients are suffering. 
 
 The reliance of drug discovery on the research into MoA has also had the effect of 
decreasing research that uses other methods of drug discovery. Other approaches such as 
function-based and physiology-based approaches,
532
 seek to identify drugs based on their 
therapeutic effect and merit, and then isolate their mechanisms of action. Both of these 
approaches are adaptive strategies that “allow researchers to capture rapid changes in 
health care provision and their implications more quickly”.
533
 They are also far more 
likely to generate novel drugs. Unfortunately, they are far more expensive and resource-




 It is dangerous to believe that all worthwhile discoveries will result from the 
pursuit of commercially viable products. Epistemologically, it has been suggested that 
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there is “no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical 
reconstruction of the process”.
535
 It is difficult to identify a priori the method most likely 
to generate new discoveries. Commercial „innovation‟ into drug research is often 
retrospective.  As George Hitchings, winner of the 1988 Nobel Prize for Physiology and 
Medicines, notes: 
Much of the basic research supported by industry is, in a sense, 
retrospective. A semi-empirical discovery of a useful drug provides the 
stimulus for deeper probing into how and why it works, and thus deeper 




According to this view, “basic science [is] more often the result than the cause of drug 
discovery”.
537
 This explains the permeation of the market with „me-too‟ drugs, as initial 
discoveries fuel a host of parallel discoveries that further enhance, refine, or even mimic 
the initial discovery. Truly innovative discoveries are rare, and seldom the fastest way to 
return investment on R&D dollars. They are also often simply harder and involve a 
greater long-term investment in a broad variety of research, with many dead ends. 
 
 Discoveries may also be subject to what I call innovative lag, a period during 
which the recognition of a discovery‟s value therapeutically or commercially does not 
occur contemporaneously with its initial development. Often the recognition of a 
discovery‟s value takes time, and comes about after the occurrence of an event such as a 
new disease, or the development of new technology. This lag may cause a gap before the 
new idea is disseminated or put to use by the academic community; AZT is an example. 
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The pursuit of an immediate financial gain or deliverable from research ignores the 
possibility that this lag may occur.  Instead, research concentrates efforts into discoveries 
whose applicability is immediately apparent.  Not acknowledging innovative lag, and 
focusing on the immediacy of gain, is far more likely to produce the refinement of a 
technology rather that the discovery of a new technology. In this way, innovation ceases 
to be innovative. 
 
 The reduction of drug development to economic innovation has the potential to 
compromise the safety and value of drug research.  As Atkinson-Grosjean has noted, “the 
„social contract‟ between science and society is being rewritten around economistic 
goals”.
538
 The search for new drugs now equates the economic impact of new discoveries 
rather than their inherent therapeutic or scientific worth.  This may erode both the quality 
of scientific research and the quality of products that reach the market. It has also 
institutionalized a paradigm of research that favours defined research which produces 
immediately assessable results over exploratory drug research. As a result of this model, 
safety and efficacy research that operates without the purpose of confirming drug 
approvals becomes increasingly rare.
539
 Little funding exists for research into drug safety 




 Falling prey to such a limited notion of innovation brings the peril that 
important research questions will not be asked or funded. As Kuhn notes in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, dwelling too closely on one conception of 
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scientific advancement means that only limited questions will be asked. Research 
that fits the dominant paradigm, in this case economic innovation, represents “the 





 The result is that “other problems, including many that had previously 
been standard, are rejected as metaphysical…as just too problematic to be worth 
the time”.
542
  Safety and efficacy do not easily translate into economic gain. 
Under present circumstances, clinging to a narrow conception of innovation: 
insulates the community from those socially important problems that 
are not reducible to the [dominant] norm, because they cannot be 





Where general research into safety and efficacy cannot be translated into 
economic terms, it may be valued less by those in industry and government who 
hold the funding purse strings.  
                                                 
541














On April 8, 2008, the Conservative Government of Canada introduced Bill C-51, 
An Act to Amend the Food and Drug Act and to make Consequential Amendments to 
Other Acts.
544
 The goal of C-51 was to update the 40-year-old Food and Drug Act
545
 
while at the same time enhancing consumer safety.  As the government indicated at the 
time the Bill was introduced: 
Bill C-51 seeks to modernize the dated provisions of the Food and Drugs 
Act and other Acts concerning the safety quality of food, 
drugs...especially to strengthen compliance and enforcement measures 




Generally, C-51 provided for expanded inspection, enforcement powers, and broader 
regulatory-making powers, actively tried to address previous regulatory gaps, and shifted 




The preamble to C-51 highlighted that the “objective of protecting, promoting and 
improving human health”
548
 was still paramount and to be achieved through “a 
commitment to the health and safety of the public”.
549
 Yet the preamble also hinted at two 
additional considerations that were underlying the changes proposed by the new Act. The 
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first was a shift to a life-cycle model of risk mitigation, recognition that: 
Ongoing assessment of information about a therapeutic product over its 
life-cycle is required both before and after it reaches the market in order 




The other is a shift to approval based on a product‟s risk-benefit profile where “the 
assessment of benefit and risks”
551
 is “based on scientific and objective evidence”.
552
 Yet 
inherent in this new risk-benefit standard is a belief that lack of scientific certainty should 
not restrain approval in the case of serious or irreversible conditions: 
The [government] recognizes that a lack of full scientific certainty is not 
to be used as a reason for postponing measures that prevent adverse 





 Underlying these changes is a shift away from Safety Efficacy and Quality (SEQ) 
standards based strictly on precautionary certainty and a „point in time‟ approach to a life-




This new risk-benefit life-cycle model will rely on a host of new regulatory and 
scientific tools, risk-benefit assessment, pharmacovigilence planning, risk mitigation 
planning, risk management plans, surrogate end points, and enhanced adverse event 
reporting. Central to all of these tools is the concept of „pharmacovigilence‟. 
Pharmacovigilence has been defined as a set of tools that are used to oversee a product‟s 
safety throughout its development, regulatory approval and introduction, and on into use 
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  Competing models in the U.S. and EU have meant that the 
application of pharmacovigilence can have very different implications for safety and the 
level of regulatory scrutiny applied to products before they are approved. How these tools 
will be applied and affect product safety still remains to be determined in Canada. 
 
The other essential new element of the proposed new model is risk-benefit 
assessment, which would supersede the traditional onus to establish certainty of SEQ.  
Defining exactly what is meant by a „risk-benefit‟ analysis is a little more difficult. Health 
Canada defined a risk-benefit analysis as: 
A method of evaluating the usefulness of a drug for a specific indication, 
taking into account the benefits and risks associated with that drug under 




Defining the variables to be considered in a risk-benefit analysis (what is a benefit; what 
is a risk) and how they are to be weighed is no simple process, and both bias and the 
value assigned to variables must continually be re-evaluated and assessed. There are 
methods for conducting risk-benefit analysis well, poorly, and some which will always be 
prone to bias. In the case of new drug approvals, any models adopted must be careful to 
rely upon clear science and SEQ concerns, rather than allowing bias or external (non-
safety-related) factors to dominate the process. 
 
The ultimate impact of these proposed changes on the drug approval and safety 
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monitoring process is unclear.  What is clear is that these models should be adopted in 
such a way as to not compromise safety or allow questionable products onto the market.  
As the Progressive Licensing Project has acknowledged: 
The scientific and regulatory ability to establish whether or not a drug 
works and to identify risks has become complicated to the point where it 
has become a field of its own, as have the instruments and methods for 




Ingrained in these tools is a shift for regulators from “the traditional gatekeeper role of 
the past to [one] as information provider and risk manager”.
558
 Both pharmacovigilence 
and risk-benefit models are new tools for drug regulators.  There is much to appreciate in 
the proposed model; at the same time, poorly designed and applied pharmacovigilence 
and risk-benefit models could be disastrous. If these changes are going to underlie the 
new life-cycle approach, it must be ensured that they are developed and explored by 
regulators in such a way as to enhance the safety of new drugs. 
 
The purpose of this chapter will be to explore the emerging trends in drug 
regulation in Canada and to comment on the appropriate application of these new tools. 
Used correctly, these tools hold promise; used poorly, they could severely hamper the role 
of the federal drug regulator and ultimately, the safety of Canadians. This exploration will 
begin with a brief look at the policy initiatives which have led to the development of the 
proposed new drug regime. Secondly, the concrete proposals to change the Food and 
Drug Act proposed by Bill C-51 will be explored. The new life-cycle drug approval 
model will then be described. Next, risk-benefit assessment and pharmacovigilence as the 
two key elements of the proposed new regime will be explored. The core principles 
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underlying these models will be described, and their benefits and risks as new regulatory 
tools will be analyzed. Finally, some general conclusions will be provided.  
 
The Pull Towards a Life-Cycle Model 
 
Bill C-51 was the final outcome of several policy initiatives that had come 
together to reformulate and modernize the regulation of drugs, most notably the Health 





, and the Food and Consumer Safety Action Plan.
561 
The language of 
each of these initiatives has moved toward increased post-market surveillance, 
modernization, a life-cycle approach and empowering the consumer.  The general trends 
encompassed by these initiatives include a slow movement away from precautionary 
principles of scientific proof toward risk-benefit analysis, and from our present point in 
time model of drug approval toward a life-cycle model of drug approval. 
 
 (a) Health Canada’s Blueprint for Renewal  
 
The Health Products and Food Branch (HPFB) began an overall review of its 
regulatory structure and practices in 2006.  The Blueprint for Renewal, announced 
October 2006, was Health Canada‟s “approach to modernizing the regulatory system for 
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health products and food[s]”.
562
 The Blueprint‟s objective is to: 
Transform our legislative, regulatory, and policy frameworks [to] make 
the Branch more efficient, effective, and responsive to help us meet the 




With over 20 separate initiatives within its ambit,
564
 the Blueprint represents the single 
largest shift in policy initiatives for the regulation of health products in the past 30 years.  
 
 As part of this initiative, the Blueprint initially identified seven objectives directly 
related to drug regulation. These included:  
1. developing a life-cycle regulatory approach to health products that would 
encompass all stages of product development and use; 
2. developing a more transparent and consistent system of categorizing products 
and assessing their risks;  
3. moving away from a reactive waiting for events regulatory system and 
developing a more proactive approach;  
4. better generat[ing], disseminat[ing] and respond[ing] to safety and 
effectiveness data for health products and food and develop[ing] a more 
proactive, post-market evaluation strategy;  
5. strengthening leadership on a range of health and safety issues affecting 
specific populations;  
6. promoting a more open and transparent regulatory system; and  
7. better synchroniz[ing] the regulatory system with the objectives, policies and 




Overall, the initial proposed objectives centered around the life-cycle approach, 
improving regulatory efficiencies, increasing the effectual use and dissemination of 
information, and employing measures which categorize and assess their risks. 
 
 Consultations on these initial proposals led to a second document, Blueprint for 
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Renewal II:  Modernizing Canada’s Regulatory System for Health Products and Food,
566
 
with the inclusion of two additional objectives: 
(a) putting in place better legislative, regulatory and policy tools to better support 
compliance and enforcement; and,  
(b) work[ing] with partners in the health care system to make available more and 
better information about health products and food to enable Canadians to 




These additional considerations introduced the ideas of informed consumer choice and 
increased compliance and enforcement powers and penalties. 
 
 Underlying these assumptions are several key policy changes in relation to the 
way that drugs are currently regulated.  The Blueprint is the first document to introduce 
the concept that drugs should be assessed throughout their life-cycle, which would allow 
for the “continuous evaluation of safety and effectiveness and quality of products before 
and after their introduction to the Canadian market”
568
 and the removal of “traditional 
regulatory process as a barrier to access”
569
 for urgently needed products. The second is a 
shift based on risk where “regulatory interventions are proportional to risk and program 
investments are focused on higher-risk products”.
570
 Third is a move toward a regulatory 
system that “adapts to new science and technology [in achieving internal and] 
international benchmarked performance targets for regulated products”.
571
 Fourth is the 
concept that a key part of the drug regulatory process is ensuring that consumers have 
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increased capacity to make “informed consumer decisions about their health”.
572
  
Encouragingly, the Blueprint also outlines provisions for increasing openness and 
transparency in regulatory decision-making and the dissemination of health information 
learned to practitioners and regulators during a drug‟s life-cycle. 
 
 In articulating the objective of the Blueprint, several key critical success factors 
were identified by Health Canada.  These include: 
(a) A 21st century toolkit of legislation, regulatory frameworks and instruments  
(b) Internationally benchmarked regulatory practices, processes and risk 
management 
(c) A sustainable, high performance, science-based organization 
(d) Strategic international regulatory cooperation 
(e) Enhanced partnerships and stakeholder involvement.573 
 
These objectives are centered on regulatory modernization through selectively applied 
regulatory instruments and improved regulatory efficiencies by “meet[ing] performance 
targets for all regulatory products by increasing regulatory science and foresight 
capacity”.
574
 These measures involve increasing the degrees of regulatory cooperation, 
adopting tools and standards, and increasing coordination between domestic and 
international partners. In effect, this means modernizing Canada‟s regulatory system to be 
reflective of international trends and norms for drug approvals and the adoption of risk 
management and assessment methodologies. 
 




Ibid. at page 26.  
574




(b) The Canadian Food and Consumer Safety Action Plan (CSAP) 
 
  
A second document integral to understanding the future development of the 
Canadian drug regulatory regime is the Canadian Food and Consumer Safety Action 
Plan
575
 (CSAP). The CSAP was released in 2008 as part of the Conservative 
Government‟s pledge to “introduce measures on food and product safety to ensure that 
families have confidence in the quality and safety of what they buy”,
576
 as articulated in 
the 2007 Speech from the Throne. Overall, the CSAP has three principles: 
(a) industry has a responsibility for the safety of products it brings onto the 
market;  
(b) consumers and health professionals need access to accurate information to 
make informed decisions; 










Underlying this language is the approach that “oversight should be placed where risks are 
greatest over the life-cycle of a product”.
579
 Targeted oversight shifts the focus from “pre-
market review to one that continuously assesses a product‟s risks and benefits”
580
 with 
the distribution of responsibility between government, industry, health professionals, and 
the consumer, and with government intervention at those points perceived to pose the 
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The CSAP content related to drugs has much in common with the Blueprint, articulating 
six specific goals related to the health products or drugs.  These include:  
(a) Taking a life-cycle approach through Progressive Licensing 
(b) Increasing the reporting requirements on industry and health professionals 
related to ADRs 
(c) Improving compliance and enforcement powers in legislation 
(d) Making fines and penalties more effective 





Again, the life-cycle model takes precedence, along with increased enforcement powers 
for regulators. The focus is on enabling consumer choice and spreading oversight 
throughout the life-cycle. As the report indicates: 
The Action Plan aims to prevent safety problems by giving consumers and 
health professionals more and better information to make informed 
decisions about the safety and safe use of products and by enabling safety 
planning at an early stage. Enhanced targeted oversight will be achieved 
by new measures to support the ongoing assessment of the risks and 
benefits of a product over its life-cycle through a progressive licensing 




Increased enforcement powers will be tied to applying regulatory interventions 
proportional to risks: 
Risk-based decision-making requires that the regulator have a wide array of 
compliance and enforcement tools at its disposal, so that it may choose the 




Again, the intention is that there will be an increase in regulation where risks have been 
defined as highest and potentially a pull back in regulation where risks are low. 
 









(c) Progressive Licensing 
 
Flowing from the Blueprint for Renewal, the Progressive Licensing Project (now 
the Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization [OLRM]), was established in 
2006 to “develop a drug regulatory system for the future (to) ensure that Health Canada is 
capable of maintaining and enhancing its reputation as a science-based and reliable 
regulator”.
584
 The need for this new regulatory system was identified because of the 
“rapid worldwide change in response to the advances in pharmaceutical sciences, drug 
development, and changes in public expectations”.
585
 As PL has acknowledged: 
The repercussions from large-scale drug withdrawals indicate potential 
gaps between what the public expects of the regulatory system and what 




To achieve these objectives, PL will move review from “a focus on the pre-market 
review...to a life-cycle approach that takes into account the entire suite of knowledge 
gained throughout a drug‟s life”.
587
 The proposed model will rely on increased risk 
management and pharmacovigilence, as well as “anticipate and accommodate changing 
technologies and methodologies”
588
 for clinical proof of safety and efficacy.  
 
Instead of a point in time approach, the knowledge and clinical information 
gained about a product‟s safety will continue throughout the regulatory process.  New 
drug applicants will be expected to provide commitments for the monitoring and 
evaluation of their products that will enable continuous evaluation of safety and efficacy 
                                                 
584











throughout the drug‟s life-cycle. Approval will be dependant upon the overall risk and 
benefit associated with a product, including the product‟s capacity to provide promising 
therapies and the mitigation measures in place to address risks or unknowns associated 
with a product. As more information is gained about the product, its risk-benefit profile 
will be modified and the product‟s license and commitments placed on the manufacturer 
will be re-evaluated. If, over time and with increased knowledge the risk-benefit profile 
comes to weigh on the negative, the product will be removed from the market. 
 





Underlying PL is the concept that improved information related to risk will 
enhance access by increasing informed consumer choice where “patients are requesting 





greater autonomy in making drug choices, including choosing their acceptable levels of 
risk”.
590
  Approval now shifts from a point in time approach to one in which real-world 
experience is essential: 
rather than placing the focus primarily upon pre-market assessment, this 
represents a fundamental shift from the idea that the pre-market testing 
of a drug assures safety and efficacy. The new proposed model is that a 





Essential to the model is establishment of “expectations for identifying and managing 
drug benefits and risks…ahead of marketing for each drug”.
592
 The life-cycle then better 
mirrors the actual considerations for licensing a drug, in order: 
that a favorable benefit-risk profile has been established on the basis of 
sufficient evidence, a high quality has been demonstrated, and a 
sufficient life-cycle management plan [pharmacovigilence] has been 





This represents a significant movement away from the point in time SEQ onus on 
industry to prove drug safety, to ongoing risk-benefit analysis as the basis for a drug‟s 
market authorization.  This model has great potential to provide real-world safety and 
efficacy evidence, but its success or failure will depend upon how risks and benefits are 
weighed, and the tools in place to ensure the ongoing collection of safety data. 
 
Bill C-51 and the Progressive Licensing Model 
 
The first hint at how the life-cycle model will manifest itself, at least in law, was 
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provided when the Conservative Government tabled Bill C-51.
594
 Bill C-51 focused on 
increasing legislative authorities for those regulating drugs, now called „therapeutic 
products‟, shifting assessment criteria to a risk-benefit analysis, and putting in place 
measures which require the continuous provision of health information.
595
 While not 
encompassing all of the provisions of the life-cycle model which would eventually be 
found in a modernized Food and Drug Regulation, it did structure the legislative 
authorities that would be in place for enacting this regime. 
 
The stated objectives of the proposed new Food and Drug Act were “protecting, 
promoting and improving human health” through “a continued commitment to the health 
and safety of the public”.
596
  This will require the “ongoing assessment of information 
about a therapeutic product over its life-cycle... both before and after it reaches the 
market in order to support its safe use”
597
 through “the assessment of benefits and 
risks...based on sound scientific and objective evidence”.
598
  That said, the preamble is 
also careful to indicate that “a lack of full scientific certainty is not to be used as a reason 
for postponing measures that prevent adverse effects on human health if those effects 
could be serious or irreversible”.
599
 It is presumed that these measures would include both 
the approval of a therapeutic product and its removal from the market. 
 
The most substantial changes to drug approvals proposed by Bill C-51 are located 
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in sections 18.7 through 20.3, related to authorizations and licenses. Rather than seeking 
a notice of compliance (NOC), applicants now must seek a market authorization.
600
 
Approval of the market authorization will be provided when, on application: 
the Minister is of the opinion that the person has established that the 





Additional to the issuance of a market authorization, the Minister may deem a new 
market authorization to be “subject to terms and conditions that are prescribed from time 
to time”
602
 and “issue the market authorization subject to the additional terms and 
conditions that he or she considers appropriate”.
603
  Unlike the conditions imposed on 
applicants currently receiving a Notice of Compliance with Conditions (NOCc), 
applicants now have a statutory obligation to meet the imposed condition.  Under s.18.7 





Incorporated within these sections are the powers for conducting a risk-benefit 
analysis of new drugs (therapeutic products) superseding the regulatory provisions 
currently captured in Division 8 of the Food and Drug Regulations.
605
 Likewise, the 
provisions of s.18.7 that allow for the approval of a market authorization with conditions 
and the obligation to meet these conditions, allow for the licensing of products with 
continued obligation to provide safety and efficacy data (i.e., pharmacovigilence). Under 
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s.18.9, the Minister may on his or her own initiative “amend a market authorization or the 




 Section 19(1)(c) would allow for the suspension or revocation of a market 
authorization where the applicant violates the Act, a term, or condition, or “the risks that 
are associated with the therapeutic product to which the authorization relates [or are later 
identified to] outweigh the benefits”.
607
 The Minister is expected to first give the market 
authorization holder an opportunity to „make representations‟ in response to the planned 
revocation or suspension. Yet in the case of a suspension it should not be delayed “to 
respond to a serious and imminent risk of injury to health”.
608
 Section 24(1), similarly, 
allows for compelling a manufacturer to recall a product which “presents a serious or 




These provisions are given a little more weight because applicants can now be 
compelled to “provide the Minister with the information that is in their control and that 
the Minister considers necessary for the administration of this Act”. 
610
This includes 
“information that is in the person‟s control and that is necessary for the Minister to 
determine whether it presents that risk”.
611
 This would include information related to 
ongoing or discontinued clinical trials,
612
 which would enable managers to reassess 
clinical evidence related to the product‟s safety and efficacy. Linked to these provisions 
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are increased powers for Health Canada inspectors to enforce the provisions of the Bill
613
 




Bill C-51 did not become law before the 30th Parliament was prorogued on 
September 7, 2008.
615
  Prior to the Bill falling off the order table, the Conservative 
Government announced several proposed changes that they intended to introduce.  In 
response to a high level of criticism that was received in relation to how the Bill would 
impact natural health products, it was announced that all measures within the Act would 
now “depend on the nature of the product and its intended use”.
616
 The proposed new 
prologue would include a statement to the effect that: 
the information required to demonstrate that a therapeutic product‟s 
benefits outweigh its risks depends on the nature of the product and its 
intended use; and that the risk of injury to health is a factor to taking 




Risk and the Life-Cycle Model 
 
Whatever form the new Food and Drug Act adopts, it is clear that central to the 
underlying life-cycle model will be the concept of risk, conceived in terms of the 
counterbalance in risk-benefit analysis, and in terms of the regulatory intervention that is 
required based on the nature of the product.
618
 Yet quantifying this risk and giving it 
                                                 
613
Ibid. at s. 23 to s. 28 
614
Ibid. at s. 31 to s. 36. 
615
Although, no legislative activity has been undertaken in relation to a revised Food and Drug Act since 
September 2008, the Health Canada - Report on Plans and Priorities indicates that modernization of the 
drug regulatory system and corresponding Act continue apace, see Health Canada, Health Canada - Report 
on Plans and Priorities (2010-11) (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2009), online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-
cpr/so-rs-eng.aspx?Rt=1041&Pa=0&Gc=0&So=8231&Dt=4> [2010 RPP] 
616







formal meaning is no easy task, and the form and measure that Health Canada gives to 
risk (and benefits for that matter) will have far-reaching implications for health and 
safety. As with any regulatory tool, risk-benefit analysis and risk measurement can be 
adopted appropriately or inappropriately.  Employed correctly, it is an effectual measure 
for quantifying and documenting those criteria upon which decisions are based; 
employed incorrectly, it can allow for questionable decision-making. 
 
An essential element of the progressive licensing model will be flexible departure 
from the standard requirements of approval when an urgent need is identified.  PL has 
defined flexible departure as: 
Deviation from the standard baseline requirement for evidence supporting a drug‟s 
efficacy and safety that is necessary for the drug to attain initial market 




In effect, this would allow the granting of a license when there are extraordinary 
circumstances. How a compelling reason will be determined and how the risk-benefit 
assessment for products will vary during flexible departure remains to be determined. As 
one author has suggested: 
To „depart‟ from the baseline means that while a positive benefit-risk 
profile for the particular pharmaceutical product constitutes an 
important element of the standard for approval, other important 
„contextual‟ evidence may counterbalance and offset the requirements 




What other contextual factors will play a role in risk assessment leading to flexible 
departure remains a very large question. Some authors have already raised the potential 
fear that: 
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Health Canada is proposing to lower the threshold for initial market authorization 
licenses in exchange for additional safety and efficacy studies as a condition for 




Other authors argue that the inclusion of reasonable health and safety 
considerations (in particular, increased access to urgently needed drugs) is a path down 
which Health Canada has already started
622
 and that regulators are unlikely to use benefit-
risk assessment or flexible departure for “regulatory risk-taking”
623
 with new products. 
Teasing out the intent and implications of shifting to a risk-benefit model is an essential 
step in evaluating the proposed new life-cycle model. 
 
(a) Whither Risk-Benefit Analysis 
 
The shift to connecting regulatory activity and regulatory interventions to 
measurements and interventions based on risk is part of a general trend in Canadian 
governance which is shifting toward “advancing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation by ascertaining that the benefits of regulation justify the costs”.
624
 In the health 
context this has meant a shift toward ensuring that regulatory interventions are based on 
sound risk-assessment principles and “focusing human and financial resources where 
they can do the most good, and by demonstrating tangible results”.
625
 This is to be done 
by assuring that decisions are made “based on evidence and the best available knowledge 
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  Decisions are to be based on quantifiable measures of cost and benefit, 
or in the case of health, on particular assessments about potential risk and benefit. 
 
(b) Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Risk assessment is a branch of a wider field of regulatory-economic valuation 
called cost-benefit analysis. Traditionally, cost-benefit analysis is an analytic procedure 
which estimates the net economic value of a given policy or project. It converts all costs 
and benefits into a monetary metric and measures whether the benefits outweigh the 
costs.
627
 Under cost-benefit analysis, all regulatory procedures should be subject to a 
quantified analysis of the benefits and cost that flow from their implementation. Those 
regulations that do not pass a cost-benefit analysis “should be struck down, not enacted, 




Cost-benefit analysis first emerged as a regulatory tool in dealing with large 
environmental projects in the United States and United Kingdom.
629
 It was adopted from 
investment modeling, where before any investment could be undertaken, its benefits (in 
monetary terms) should exceed its costs (in monetary terms).  For environmental projects, 
it became a decision that any long-term benefits (in terms of government expenditures) 
should outweigh the costs (in terms of government expenditures).
630
 Initially, this was 














related to the allocation of scarce resources, but gradually it began to be quantified in 
terms of the value and cost that these projects could have to long-term human health and 
environmental safety.
631
  This required an increase in methods for quantifying the value 
and costs to human health. 
 
In the 1980s, under Ronald Reagan in the United States and under Margaret 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom, cost-benefit modeling for regulatory activity became 
tied into concepts of “eliminating waste and promoting efficiency in government [and] 
reducing [perceived] overregulation”.
 632
 The basic idea was that all government activity 
should be measured in quantifiable activities such that it “is well managed and 
accountable and that resources [should be] allocated to achieve results”.
633 
As one author 
has noted: 
Before the 1980s, public health and environmental policies were 
debated primarily on scientific, ethical and legal grounds, with less 
emphasis on costs – let alone monetized benefits.  More recently, it has 
become the norm to assume the need for cost-benefit analysis of new 
policies, comparing monetary costs and estimates of the monetary value 
of benefits.  Just as business should only make an investment if the 
expected revenues exceed costs, the new approach suggests that 
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(c) Risk-Benefit Assessment 
 
Traditional risk assessment is a subset of cost-benefit analysis focused on 
evaluating the health or environmental risks that are associated with a particular hazard. 
635
More specifically, it is a “set of techniques for quantifying the morbidity, fatalities or 
fatality risks resulting from various hazards”. 
636
 It is a method for identifying the 
potential dangers associated with a given hazard and in turn identifying those benefits 
(and methods for mitigation) which would result from exposing the public to that hazard. 
As one author suggests: 
Estimating the benefits and costs of risk-reducing regulations (requires, 
inter alia) a risk assessment that ...characterizes the probabilities of 
occurrences and outcomes of interest ...[T]he risk assessment should 
generate a credible, objective, realistic, and scientifically balanced 
analysis; present information on hazard, dose-response, and exposure (or 
analogous materials for non-health assessments), and explain the 




For drugs this means balancing the health and social benefits that would result from 
access, versus the dangers that may result from access.  As with all hazards, this will 
involve detailed characterization and projection as to the nature and structure of these 
hazards. 
 
The keynote publication for government risk assessment was the 1983 Red Book 
published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assist in toxic risk 
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The model proposed in the Red Book envisioned four stages in a toxic risk 
assessment:  (i) hazard assessment, (ii) dose-response assessment, (iii) exposure 
assessment and (iv) risk characterization. The first involves the establishment of toxicity 
and a causal link to harm. The second seeks to quantify that toxicity in relation to human 
physiological harm. The third quantifies the likely extent of that harm‟s impact on the 
population. The final stage involves characterizing the effect of the combined toxicity and 
likely exposure as an overall impact against “the result[s] of various regulatory 
interventions”.
639
  While the Red Book model is no longer commonly employed, its 
methodological steps of identifying a risk, measuring and evaluating the risk, gauging the 
extent of impact of that risk and then weighing them against various options still forms 
the basis of most risk assessment. 
 
(i) The Health Canada Decision-Making Framework (DMF) 
 
Health Canada has incorporated many of the elements of risk-benefit analysis and 
cost-benefit analysis into its own core policy for dealing with health risks. The Health 
Canada Decision-Making Framework for Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Health 
Risks
640
 (DMF) is a tool to “improve the effectiveness of the risk management decision-
making process”.
641
 It serves as a cohesive “tool which formalizes decision-making as a 
consistent process with identifiable steps...to [assure] important principles and 
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organizational values of decision-making”.
642
  Initially adopted as a tool for assessing the 
health hazards of specific agents, the DMF has become a central tool to guide all Health 




Evolved from the simple Red Book model, the DMF follows the same steps of 
issue identification, quantification, priority setting, and strategy selection. The first stage 
of the DMF is identifying the issue and the context, which basically involves collecting 
and analyzing information on “the agent(s) underlying the issue; the adverse 
consequences associated with the agent(s); susceptible populations; exposure to the 
agent(s); and the scientific uncertainties that exist”.
644 
Next is the formal assessment of 
risks and benefits, which involves assessing, quantifying, and characterizing the risks and 
benefits (discussed in greater detail below). The next step is identifying and analyzing 
options, based on “a range of risk management options”.
645
  Next is the selection of the 
most appropriate mitigation strategy.  The final step is implementing the strategy and 
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It is more than coincidental that the DMF model can easily be mapped onto the 
Progressive Licensing model. Both are basically a feedback loop based on initial issue 
characterization and health risk assessment, selection of an option, and modification of 
practice based on increased knowledge.  The Progressive Licensing model is likely an 
attempt to adapt the DMF to drug licensing, employing many of the same risk and benefit 
considerations with the addition of pharmacovigilence as the monitoring and evaluation 
tool. Yet a crucial question still remains: what criteria will be considered in formulating 
the risk and benefit of any new drug? 
 
(ii) Defining Risks 
 
Looking at the DMF, we gain insight into many of the risk assessment practices 
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and tools that are likely to be used by Health Canada (TPD) in formulating any risk 
assessment of a new drug. At its most basic, risk will be established by (1) identifying the 
potential hazards, (2) characterizing these hazards and (3) assessing the likely effect on 
the population (size of the exposure to the hazards).  
 
Taking the DMF as a starting point, we can identify some elements that are likely 
to considered in formulating risks for a cost-benefit analysis of a health issue. The first 
consideration is that any harm will be weighed by the severity of the potential harms 
(how harmful it is) and the extent to which the harm affects the population (extent of 
exposure).
647
 Under the DMF, the first consideration is called characterizing the hazards 
and involves “qualitatively and/or quantitatively evaluating the adverse health effect(s) 
that humans may experience under expected levels of exposure to the agent(s) under 
study”.
648
 The second consideration is called exposure assessment, which is “a process 
used to develop a qualitative and/or quantitative estimate of the magnitude, frequency, 




Under the DMF, hazard or risk characterization is focused on “physical health effects, 
and have relied on data from toxicology and epidemiology studies and in some cases, 
from surveillance”. The first phase of risk characterization involves identifying hazards 
and under the DMF includes a very specific collection of steps: 
1. identifying the agent(s) causing the adverse health effect(s); collecting 
relevant scientific data; determining the relative weight of studies having 
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different results; determining the relative weight of different types of studies 
(e.g. epidemiology, toxicology); 
2. examination of the scientific data for evidence of a relationship between the 
agent(s) and the adverse health effect(s); 
3. identifying the mode and mechanism of action of the agent(s); 
4. identifying those dose levels that are, and are not, associated with adverse 
health effects (e.g. for toxicology studies, No Observed Adverse Effect Levels 
[NOAELs] or Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Levels [LOAELs]); 
5. determining the critical effects associated with exposure to the agent; 
6. determining the significance of a positive finding in studies having different 
routes of exposure compared to the population(s) at risk; 
7. deciding if the studies have any data limitations that might affect their 
interpretation or invalidate their results; 
8. for nonhuman studies, ensuring that adequate protocols, a sufficient number of 
animals, and appropriate dose levels have been used, and determining how 
different metabolic pathways or rates should be considered; 
9. considering sources of uncertainty and other limitations, and how may these 
impact upon the hazard identification; 
10. deciding the overall weight of evidence taking into account the quality of the 
data; and 
11. identifying the hazard(s) of concern.650 
 
For new drugs, this would involve focusing on the industry-submitted monograph 
data on safety, efficacy, and quality, and identifying any potential risks that are identified 
or implied in this data. It likely involves a degree of speculation and/or extrapolation by 
drug reviewers to identify the various elements of risk that a drug could hypothetically 
pose.  According to the TPD‟s own Standing Operating Procedure: Using the 
Pharmaceutical Safety and Efficacy Assessment Templates (PSEATs) to Prepare Reports 
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on Submissions for Marketing Authorizations,
651
 presently the following factors will be 
taken into consideration by reviewers when estimating a product‟s risk: 
1. pre-clinical toxic dose levels relative to proposed maximum human dose, taking 
into account toxic kinetic differences  
2. adverse events in target population  
3. adverse events in subpopulations  
4. potential for drug interactions  
5. other potential safety concerns (e.g. QT interval prolongation)  
6. risk of abuse or misuse  
7. information outside the submitted dossier (e.g. expert advice, medical literature, 




According to the DMF, considering these factors “requires judgment [and] depends upon 
conducting a systematic analysis that.... carefully considers scientific uncertainties, 




In formulating this risk characterization, the DMF indicates a very set series of 
steps.  The first is a quantitative estimation of the risk. This begins with a review of all 
relevant information available related to the specific hazard. This will involve 
“examining, summarizing, and integrating”
654
 available information and considering “the 
quality, completeness and relevance of [available] information”.
655
 The PSEAT guideline 
outlines very detailed steps for reviewing the technical information in clinical and non-
clinical studies. Next is the generation of a quantitative estimation of risk, to ensure that 
decisions are “based on careful analysis of the weight of scientific evidence that supports 
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conclusions about the risks”.
656
 Again, the PSEAT guideline provides detailed guidance 
on how studies should be weighed and quantified for their evidential merit.  The next step 
is a qualitative estimation of the uncertainties that involves a description of “major 
sources of uncertainty and alternative views”.
657
  Risks are then prioritized or compared 
to “determine priority for action”
658
 and to “estimate the significance (or severity) of the 
health effects”.
659
 Finally, there is a weighing of the “scientific evidence, in a qualitative 
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(iii) Uncertainty and Risk 
 
The process for risk characterization above shows a gradual shift from empirical 
and quantitative risk identification to a more qualitative risk measurement. What starts off 
as a rather quantified exercise of risk measurement becomes a qualitative estimation of 
the uncertainties of risks. As the DMF identifies, these sources of uncertainty may result 
from many sources:  
Uncertainties may result from: the limited availability of scientific data on 
for example, exposure or intake rates; long time delays between exposure 
and effect; the need to extrapolate data to predict the health consequences 
of human exposures; difficulties in determining appropriate mathematical 
models for extrapolation; simultaneous exposures to a variety of different 
agents (making it difficult to determine the effects of a single agent); and 




In assessing the information, Health Canada scientists will be called on to “make 
inferences, assumptions, and judgments”
662
 in order to characterize the risks. 
 
Estimating the risk of uncertainties is in no way systematic or quantitative. While 
the PSEAT does discuss listing the undetermined information flowing from submitted 
data, it does not generally ask reviewers to produce a qualitative measure of unknown 
health risks, or as the DMF suggests, a subjective “summary of the uncertainties that have 
been noted throughout the risk assessment process, and explaining the potential impact of 
the uncertainties on the risk estimates in a non-technical manner”.
663
  Moving from a 
precautionary approach based on an SEQ standard would involve the introduction of 
qualitative measures of uncertainty. 
                                                 
661








A whole science has emerged for the estimation and identification of these 
uncertainties (Uncertainty Analysis),
664
 yet ultimately it remains a speculative exercise, 
one that is more often than not predicated on existing patterns (what is known) and 
assumes uniformity amongst unknown risks (what is unknown). This is a very clever 
trick of logic, since the ultimate truth of most unknown risks is that they will vary from 
an existing pattern, and it is for that reason that they cannot be foreseen or known prior to 
their occurrence. 
 
Generating these subjective estimations of uncertainty “can strongly be affected 
by the social, cultural and institutional context of a decision”.
665
 This qualitative 
identification of unknowns or uncertainties represents potentially the greatest weakness in 
all risk characterization.  The DMF itself acknowledges that “numerical estimations of 
risk can give the misimpression of precision, be easily misinterpreted and be misused in 




The existing approach to drug review has been precautionary where there is 
excessive uncertainty relating to safety, efficacy, or quality, or as the DMF asserts, it 
“treats the concept of precaution as pervasive”.
667
  This has meant that in those cases 
where judgment of uncertainties is not comprehensive, there has been a “need to take 
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timely and appropriately preventative action, even in the absence of a full scientific 
demonstration of cause and effect”.
668
 Previously, regulators had tended to be 
conservative in their request for proof of the SEQ standard, and asked for the burden to 
be on manufacturers to prove through demonstrated scientific research any uncertainties 
related to a product‟s SEQ.
669
  Yet this approach to uncertainty and the licensing of a new 
drug seems to be changing, as the preamble to Bill C-51 asserts: “a lack of full scientific 
certainty is not to be used as a reason for postponing measures that prevent adverse 
effects on human health if those effects could be serious or irreversible”.
670
 Quantitatively 
addressing pressing issues of uncertainty may no longer be the key elements in a drug 
assessor‟s risk-benefit analysis; a host of qualitative and subjective data may come to 
dominate a drug‟s risk and benefits. 
 
(iv) Defining Benefits 
 
Defining the benefits of a new drug can be more problematic than defining the 
risks of a given product.  Any new drug has a host of potential benefits that include the 
obvious therapeutic merit, but as discussed in previous chapters, they may also include 
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innovation that results from the drug patent and the meeting of patient demands. Even the 
DMF is rather unclear as to what would be considered a health benefit, but asserts that 
they include both “direct health benefits (e.g. relief of symptoms), or indirect health 
benefits (e.g. economic, social, or cultural impacts)”.
671
  The PSEAT
672
 indicates that the 
following considerations should be taken into account when weighing a drug‟s direct 
benefit: 
1. strength of evidence to support proposed dose in target population  
2. strength of efficacy in subpopulations  
3. information outside the submitted dossier (e.g. expert advice, medical 




These benefits will also largely be a qualitative assessment and undertaken only “when it 
is difficult or impossible for consumers to judge the benefits associated with exposure to 




Quixotically, according to the DMF, this assessment “should be done using a 
societal perspective”
675
 and “technical specialists [in this case, economists] play the lead 
role in benefit assessment and in making risk-benefit comparisons”.
676
 Scientists are 
expected to provide evidence for technical issues and “provide guidance in the use of risk 
assessment results in risk-benefit comparisons and flag additional risk information 
needs”.
677
 For new drug reviews, this means analyses of “the adequacy of the data and 
methods used for the analyses, as well as whether the analyses have addressed the 
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  Yet as the DMF notes, benefit must be characterized and “may 
include direct health benefits (e.g. relief of disease symptoms), or indirect health benefit 




The DMF identifies the following steps in benefit identification: 
1. identify the type(s) of benefits to be examined; 
2. identify the measures to be used; 
3. collect and analyze the benefit information; 
4. determine how to deal with uncertainty; and 
5. summarize the benefit information.680 
The first step in the process involves “identifying the types of benefits examined”.
681
 
While we have tended to limit benefits to the traditional SEQ standard, as noted above, 
there is nothing to preclude additional factors such as economic, social, and cultural 
impacts.  These may in turn be measured not only through a drug‟s therapeutic merit, but 
also “effectiveness, efficiency, quality of life, dollar values”.
682
 In relation to government 
activity as a whole, the net benefit of action has been characterized as:  
the potential positive and negative economic, environmental, and social 
impacts on Canadians, business, and government of the proposed regulation 
and its feasible alternatives; and how the positive and negative impacts may 





While PLF has articulated that the new life-cycle model will only include health 
                                                 
678















,  the government‟s own approach to risk assessment has tended to 





 At the end of the process, the benefit assessment resolves itself down to a 
subjective exercise of identifying and accessing the uncertainties related to benefits.  In 
the cases of most new drugs, the benefits are fairly well characterized in the clinical data 
that is provided with the NDS.  Likewise, there is often extensive pressure from patient 
groups, industry, and interested researchers that backs the significant financial 
investments that have guided a pharmaceutical drug out of the pipeline.
686
 There is a 
tendency to see the uncertainties of benefits as far more certain, rather than to project 
danger to the unknowns of potential risks. As noted in the previous chapter, there is a 
policy trend to include increasingly opaque monetized benefits such as “innovation” and 
economic spin resulting from patented activities. 
 
(d) Good Risk-Benefit Analysis – Bad Risk-Benefit Analysis 
 
Overall, risk-benefit analysis has great potential to assist in assessing new drugs, 
yet it must be applied cautiously. As Avorn has noted: 
It‟s easy to see how a quantitative method that claims to be both objective 
and fair could seem to provide a neat road map out of the conceptual 
swamp of subjective clinical judgment. A by-the-number approach to 
balancing risks and benefits can seem particularly attractive as a 
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Risk assessments are not objective, scientific methodology; they are “literally, uncertain 
knowledge claims – impressionistic guesses, informed estimation, and probabilistic 
predictions about a future that cannot fully be known”.
688
 Yet they have the appearance of 
objectivity and can shield policy-makers‟ decisions with objectivity. It is not surprising 
then, that, as Avorn notes: 
the task of assigning values to clinical conditions often embodies a set of 
hidden assumptions – about methods, about values – that can sometimes 





The SEQ standard cannot be abandoned in favour of non-clinical measures of benefit, or 
underestimations of risk. The more that risk-benefit analysis moves away from 
quantitative measures (SEQ) into qualitative or speculative measures (uncertainty), the 
more it can become “automatic and self validating”
690
 of policy decisions. 
 
 In order to ensure that risk-benefit analysis does not become meaningless, it must 
be careful to temper its own biases and be based in some form of empirical data and 
measurement.  Looking to the environmental realm, Frank Ackerman has identified a 
number of methodological errors which plague poor risk-benefit analysis, including the 
tendency to focus on monetized values of risk and benefit, the failure of uncertainty to 
take account of real world problems, the failure to take into account long-term risks, and 
the tendency to ignore alternatives and constrained variables in favour of a known and 
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 To limit these biases, any cost-benefit analysis must take into account multiple 
criteria for the analysis, look at a holistic evaluation of costs and benefits, and 
acknowledge the limits of uncertainty with the use of precaution where uncertainty is 
prevalent.
692
 For the Progressive Licensing model‟s conception of risk-benefit analysis to 
work, it too must ensure that it relies upon accurate quantitative data, acknowledging in 
those cases where uncertainty is prevalent that a risk-benefit analysis may not be 
decisive, and limit the variables that are considered at drug approval to those directly 
related to clinical merit and ultimate effect on the population. 
 
 One of the initial hurdles in this regard will be ensuring that risks are 
appropriately characterized and quantified with scientific information.  One of the most 
recent trends at the Health Protection and Food Branch of Health Canada is towards a 
Risk Based Approach, or “regulation proportional to risk”.
693
 The basic idea is that under 
an RBA, regulators:  
will take into consideration such elements as the risks associated with 
various product classes and the availability of supporting evidence for 




This is reflected in the proposed new wording to Bill C-51, which states that “information 
required to demonstrate that a therapeutic product‟s benefits outweigh its risks depends 
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on the nature of the product and its intended use”.
695
 If the RBA makes assumptions 
about the relative safety of products or classes of products in the absence of scientific 
evidence, then there is potential for distortion of those scientific standards brought to bear 
on a product‟s review.  
 
 A second hurdle will be ensuring that benefits are not over-estimated as meeting 
an urgent unmet medical need, i.e. flexible departure.  In the United States, such benefits 
resulted in „fast-track‟ legislation, allowing the FDA to: 
expedite the review of [a] drug if it is intended for the treatment of a serious or 
life-threatening condition and it demonstrates the potential to address unmet 




The definition of what constitutes „a serious or life-threatening condition‟ and „unmet 
medical need‟ has gradually led to an expansive definition that most drugs meet.
697
  This 
law has allowed for the erosion of the minimal standards proving drug usefulness.
698
 In 
most cases, drugs can be approved after only the first or second stage of clinical trials. 
The result is that the “market [has been] flooded with poorly tested drugs of unknown 
efficacy”.
699
   
 
 A final hurdle will involve making sure those measures of risk and benefit do not 
become too encompassing and lose sight of the SEQ standard. A trend in health risk 
assessment has been to monetize the values assigned to health risks and benefits; in the 
case of risks, to develop measures of the financial cost of adverse drug reactions (through 
                                                 
695
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individual life valuations), and in the case of benefits, to factor in the market value (and 
multiplier effect via innovation) of new drugs to the economy as a whole, as if they were 
any consumer product.
700
 If these variables become criteria in new drug approvals, they 
will dilute the ultimate safety goal underlying new drug evaluations.  Assigning a value to 
individual lives (presently around $6 million)
701
 allows for assessment of the cost of life 
against the value of a drug‟s being on the market (often worth billions).
702
 If such factors 
dominate risk-benefit assessment for new drugs or drugs already on the market, 
regulatory intervention would become meaningless and Health Canada would be 




  The other major element of the new progressive licensing model is 
pharmacovigilence.  Found at the centre of the proposed model, it is designed to 
supplement the knowledge and information gained by the initial risk assessment with 
real-world information gained once a product has been released.  As has been indicated 
by Health Canada: 
The central concept of Progressive Licensing is that, over time, there is a 
progression in knowledge about a drug. The emphasis of the new 
framework is to identify opportunities within this progression over the full 





Achieving this goal means the establishment of more effective methods for the continual 
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monitoring and evaluation of licensed drug safety. Planning for post-market surveillance 
would become an essential part of the pre-market evaluation of a drug. As the Progressive 
Licensing Concept Paper suggests: 
Planning for the conduct of post-market activities...would become a 
required part of the pre-market filing, so that expectations for identifying 





According to the progressive licensing model, the pre-market filing would then “arguably 
better mirror the actual considerations for licensing a drug ... [including ensuring] a 
sufficient life-cycle management plan has been filed by the manufacturer to allow for 




The extent to which this life-cycle management plan will affect the ultimate 
decision to license a product (the product‟s risk-benefit analysis) is crucial to how the 
traditional model of SEQ will be affected by pharmacovigilence. Presently there are two 
emerging international models for how to incorporate risk mitigation management into 
product approvals.  Under the emerging U.S. model, risk mitigation planning (Risk 
Evaluation and Minimization Strategies) is actively used as a benefit-risk consideration to 
allow the licensing of products earlier than would be possible under previous SEQ 
models.
706
  The more conservative EU model requires Risk Management Plans, but these 
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become a supplemental element that is grafted onto the existing standard of drug safety 
and efficacy approval.
707
 The ultimate utility and implication that pharmacovigilence has 
for the new progressive licensing model will largely depend upon which of these two 
models Canada adopts.  
 
In the following section I will discuss the nature of pharmacovigilence and the 
competing models of pharmacovigilence that exist in the United States and European 
Union. This will enable an analysis of how these models are likely to impact upon the 
proposed new drug regime and suggest which directions may be most appropriate for 
Canada to adopt under its new progressive licensing regime. 
 
(a) What is Pharmacovigilence? 
 
At its most basic, pharmacovigilence has been defined by the WHO as “the 
science and activities relating to the detection, assessment, understanding and prevention 
of adverse effects or any other drug-related problem”.
708
  Basically, it includes any 
activities undertaken to monitor the safety and efficacy of a drug post-market. Yet with 
time, pharmacovigilence has come to mean much more than mere post-market 
surveillance for adverse drugs events. Pre-approval clinical testing “may be sufficient to 
determine efficacy, [but it] may not be sufficient to detect safety problems, particularly 
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With time, pharmacovigilence has also become an umbrella term for the entire 
field of activities, often called pharmaco-epidemiology, that can be put in place pre- and 
post-market to monitor, mitigate, and evaluate the real-world safety and efficacy of drug 
products.
710
  It has evolved from a system of adverse event reporting and risk 
communications to a system based on a whole host of tools including risk management 
plans, risk mitigation plans, secondary markers, and others. Pharmacovigilence planning 
therefore becomes any “proactive approach to identifying risks associated with a product 
prior to market authorization, as well as to planning for or implementing means to 




In 2007 the Institutes of Medicine (IOM) in the United States produced a report 
assessing the overall drug review process in the United States.
712
 One of the key findings 
was that the present model, based primarily on post-market research, was inadequate to 
reflect the real safety and efficacy profile of products. Post-market reviews were designed 
to assess a product‟s efficacy rather than safety.
713
  Many details about a drug‟s safety and 
patterns of real-world use will only become apparent once a product is on the market, 
including details such as its effect in combination with other products, how it affects 
specific sub-populations, the effects of longer-term exposure, the product‟s relative 
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effectiveness in customary practice or use, and low-frequency effects that can only be 
detected in large populations.
714
 All of these observations identify the need to modify the 
present one point in time regulatory review for “improvements in post-market 
surveillance and [expanded] authority to require additional post-market trials or 




(b) The Emergence of Pharmacovigilence 
 
In 1972, the WHO identified the need for greater “post-market” surveillance of 
pharmaceuticals, and international cooperation in the sharing of information related to 
post-market safety and efficacy data.
716
  In the report International Drug Monitoring: The 
Role of National Centers, the WHO recommended “the development of systems for 
detecting adverse reactions at both the national and international levels”.
717
   
 
Over the next few decades, a patchwork of national methods for the detection, 
reporting, and sharing of information based primarily on adverse events reports 
developed.
718
  The system which began to emerge was one that required “health care 
professionals (and consumers in a few countries) to spontaneously report [adverse events] 
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G. A. Faich, W. Castle & Z. Bankowski, “International Reporting on Adverse Drug Reactions: The 






  These methods were hardly uniform, often poorly monitored and 




The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 
produced six working group reports dealing with the post-market surveillance of 
pharmaceuticals. Beginning with the 1990 report on International Reporting of Adverse 
Drug Reaction,
721
 there were increased calls for the harmonization and standardization of 
AERs. Progressively the CIOMS reports have provided standards for the recognition, 
reporting, and sharing of post-market adverse event data, including the 2001 CIOMS V  
report Current Challenges in Pharmacovigilence: Pragmatic Approaches
722
 which dealt 
with pharmacovigilence, and the 2005 CIOMS VI document Management of Safety 
Information from Clinical Trials.
723
 Adopted to varying degrees by different international 
regimes around the world, the CIOMS reports were crucial for the ICH and the 




Much of this work on post-market drug safety surveillance and setting up the 
parameters for market drug evaluation began to coalesce in the ICH guidance E2E: 
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 Overall, the ICH E2E document and CIOMS reports 
have led to market product evaluations that shift “toward earlier, proactive considerations 
of risks and potential benefits of drugs in the pre- and peri-approval stages of drug 




In 2003 the ICH produced guidance document E2E on pharmacovigilence 
planning.
727
 E2E highlights specific processes that should be put in place for a 
pharmacovigilence plan and “describes a method for summarizing the important 
identified risks of a drug, important missing information, including the potential at-risk 
populations and situations where the product is likely to be used that have not been 
studied pre-approval”.
728
  This planning can then allow for the “benefit-risk balance [to] 
be improved by reducing risk to patients”
729
 and “enable information feedback to the 
users of medicines in a timely manner”.
730
 E2E provides some broad guidelines for 
establishment of safety specification, the structure of pharmacovigilence plans, and 
acceptable pharmacovigilence methods. These include passive surveillance, stimulated 
reporting, active surveillance, comparative observational studies, targeted clinical 
investigations, and descriptive studies.
731
 Each of these methods is a mechanism for 
either increased collection of targeted safety data, or conducting additional post-market 
surveillance studies. 
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(c) Two Paths for Pharmacovigilence 
 
Pharmacovigilence has two potential implications for new drug approvals.  The 
first is the establishment of tools to ensure the ongoing monitoring of drug safety and 
efficacy (the life-cycle model).  The second is the establishment of mechanisms that 
enable the mitigation of AERs should they occur. The first would be established by a 
detailed plan of post-marketing surveillance measures, and in some cases, the 
establishment of specific conditions for monitoring SEQ at the time of licensing. The 
second, mitigation, can either be established by measures (conditions of use) put in place 
on newly licensed products, or by the establishment of risk mitigation strategies to deal 
with uncertainties.  
 
In effect, pharmacovigilence adds a new variable to the SEQ standard: a 
pharmacovigilence standard (SEQ and P). The real question becomes how this additional 
variable will influence the newly introduced risk-benefit analysis. Assuming that a risk-
benefit analysis is still largely concerned with establishing a drug‟s safety, efficacy, and 
quality, how will the presence of pharmacovigilence plans or pharmacovigilence 
mitigation strategies affect the risk-benefit profile of a new drug or a promising new 
therapy under flexible departure?  As one author has noted, “more emphasis on post-
market safety [may] recalibrate the risk, benefit and uncertainties of therapeutic product 
development”.
732
  This represents a shift from reliance on pre-market SEQ data to 
reliance on prospective data generated on SEQ once a product is on the market.  
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The current mechanism for licensing products with post-market conditions is the 
Notice of Compliance with Conditions (NOCc).  As noted in Chapter 1, an NOC can be 
issued “to provide earlier market access to potentially life-saving drugs”.
733
 Specifically, 
pursuant to sections C.08.004 and C.08.005 of the FDR, an NOC can be issued for: 
promising new drug therapies intended for the treatment, prevention or 
diagnosis of serious, life-threatening or severely debilitating diseases or 
conditions for which a) there is no alternative therapy available on the 
Canadian market or, b) where the new product represents a significant 




In these cases NOCc allows for the approval of drugs that “have demonstrated promising 
clinical effectiveness in clinical trials”.
735
 Under these conditions, authorization to market 





Increasingly, NOCc is being used as a mechanism for new drug approvals by 
Health Canada.
737
 A recent study which reviewed the conditions of licensing for all new 
drugs over a seven year period (2001-2008) found that “NOC submissions, which have 
either the same or less evidentiary requirements as standard submissions with post-
market obligations, increased steeply”.
738
 Specifically, it was found that there has been a 
gradual shift away from sponsors applying for priority review in favour of NOCc. Yet as 
analogous studies from the United States suggest, there have been concerns that once 
they receive marketing, drug manufacturers will fail to meet their post-market 
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 This is exacerbated by the fact that the Food Drug Act
740
 and Food and 
Drug Regulations
741
 as they are currently drafted do not allow for the enforcement of 





The present NOCc mechanism is clearly inadequate and pharmacovigilence as 
articulated under progressive licensing would allow for the marketing of drugs with very 
prescriptive and enforceable conditions.  This can potentially allow for useful therapies 
which would otherwise not reach the market to become available under very narrow 
conditions of use, but it can also mean that drugs which have not been sufficiently proven 
to be safe and effective could also reach the market with inadequate clinical research. The 
ultimate question becomes how to apply pharmacovigilence in relation to the SEQ 
standards.  Will pharmacovigilence be used as an additional variable in the risk-benefit 
assessment of new drugs (SEQ+P) or will it be used to mitigate this standard for all 
promising new therapies (SEQ/P)? In effect, will pharmacovigilence planning be an 
additional safety variable considered in regulatory approval, or will it become a tool to 
reduce the pre-market clinical safety data required for approval? 
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(i) The EMEA and US-FDA Experiences with Pharmacovigilence 
 
 There are two major regulatory jurisdictions that have already adopted 
pharmacovigilence measures which can illustrate the outcomes of these two approaches: 
the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (US-FDA). Both are early adopters of pharmacovigilence, but each has 
taken a very different approach to how it influences drug approvals. The lessons learned 
from these two approaches should ultimately inform how Progressive Licensing decides 
to implement pharmacovigilence in Canada. 
 
The EMEA is responsible for “the protection and promotion of public and animal 
health, through the evaluation and supervision of medicines for human and veterinary 
use”
743
 for all countries within the EU. The EMEA‟s core mandate is to ease regulatory 
burdens and duplication between EU countries; “once granted by the European 
Commission, a centralized (or “Community”) marketing authorization is valid in all 
European Union States”.
744
 This has meant a trend toward application of uniform 
standards that can be used by each domestic drug regulatory authority.  
 
The EMEA has two documents which lay out the legal requirements for 
pharmacovigilence within the EU. The first is EC Regulation 726/2004, “laying down 
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for 
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human and veterinary use”.
745
  In particular, the guidelines set out the procedures that are 
to be implemented by the EMEA in assessing new drugs for market authorization. The 
EMEA‟s responsibility is to: 
Article 57(1)(c) “ensure the safe and effective use of these products, in 
particular by evaluation, coordination of the implemented pharmacovigilence 
obligations and the monitoring of such implementation” 
Article 57(1)(i) “coordinating the verification of compliance with the 
principles of good manufacturing practices, good laboratory practices, good 
clinical practices and the verification of compliance with pharmacovigilence 
obligations”.746 
 
Basically, under the EMEA the responsibility is to ensure that manufacturers have a 
system of pharmacovigilence in place supplementing safety and efficacy, and to ensure 
that manufacturers are meeting these obligations. The drug manufacturer‟s responsibility 
is outlined under Volume 9 A: Guidelines on Pharmacovigilence 2.1.1 and 2.15
747
 where 
it is indicated that “a detailed description of pharmacovigilence planning must be 
included in market authorizations”
748
; packages and  manufacturers must guarantee that 




The EMEA adopts a perspective that pharmacovigilence or pharmacovigilence 
planning should supplement the SEQ standard (SEQ+P) and not dilute the standard.  As 
one author has noted: 
for the European Union, a pharmacovigilence system is not a risk 
managements system. Details of the pharmacovigilence system must be 
                                                 
745
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supplied with the application for all new market authorizations, while the 




EU Risk Management Plans (EU-RMPs) are required when there is a variation to a 
product‟s approved status, (i.e. a new active substance, additional risks are identified, a 
significant change in conditions of use, a request from a competent authority within the 
EU, or the EMEA identified a safety risk). What pharmacovigilence in the EU is not, is a 
mechanism to allow for earlier market authorization or authorization of products which 
have EU-RMPs to be licensed with less SEQ data. 
 
(ii) The United States Food and Drug Administration (US-FDA) 
 
 In contrast, the US-FDA has used pharmacoviglence, and in particular mitigation 
plans, as a tool to allow for the licensing of products with reduced SEQ clinical evidence. 
As with most international norms, the U.S. has decided to adapt rather than adopt the 
pharmacovigilence methods identified in ICH E2E751 and the CIOMS752 reports. Directly 
in response to criticisms raised against the FDA and its post-market safety monitoring,753 
the U.S. Congress introduced formal pharmacovigilence activities.754 
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 The most recent developments in U.S. drug law are the result of almost two 
decades of drug reform. In 1992, Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
755
 
(PDUFA) that allowed the FDA to charge drug companies user fees for approvals.  
PDUFA is subject to renewal every five years, and has meant that the US-FDA has a 
regular window for updating its legislation and operating mandate. 
 
  In 1997, at the first of these renewals, Congress passed the FDA Modernization 
Act (FDAMA).
756  
FDAMA reoriented the FDA‟s role to “not only prevent the 
distribution of unsafe products, but also to review and approve new drugs in a timely 
manner”.
757
  Under FDAMA, approval times were shortened, the definition of „urgent 
unmet need‟ was broadened to include „serious and life threatening need‟, and outside 
panels could be contracted to assess drugs on behalf of the FDA.
758
  The resulting fast-
track legislation allowed the FDA to: 
expedite the review of [a] drug if it is intended for the treatment of a serious or 
life-threatening condition and it demonstrates the potential to address unmet 




Unfortunately, the definition of a serious or life-threatening condition and unmet medical 
need has gradually been stretched to include most new drugs.
760 
Vioxx was approved 
using this fast-track legislation. 
 
In 2007 Congress once again renewed the mandate of PDUFA with the 
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Food and Drug Administration Amendment Act
761
 (FDAAA). The FDAAA 
introduced a host of changes related to the market authorization and conditions of 
use of newly approved drugs. One of the largest changes was to Title IX - 
Enhanced Authorities Regarding Postmarked Safety of Drugs.
762
 Much like the 
intended C-51, Title IX gave the US-FDA much greater powers to enforce the 
imposition of post-market conditions and post-market clinical research.
763
 For a 
new drug application, the US-FDA may “require a responsible drug manufacturer 
to conduct a post-approval clinical trial or trials of the drug, on the basis of 




While not explicitly mentioning pharmacovigilence, under s.905 of the FDAAA 
the FDA can now impose active “post-market risk identification, analysis, and timelines 
for reporting”.
765
 Specifically, this can include the “development of post-market risk 
identification and analysis methods and analysis systems, advanced analysis of drug 
safety data, and additional clinical trials”.
766
 Unfortunately, the way in which most post-
marketing commitments are established by the US-FDA is not through a general post-
marketing obligation to conduct pharmacovigilence activities.  Instead conditions can 
only be imposed where “the report and the active post-market risk identification and 
analysis system [provided by the drug manufacturer] will not be sufficient to meet [post-
market monitoring]”.
767
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The form this risk identification and analysis system takes is that of a Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). The US-FDA will ask for REMS where it 
“determines that a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy is necessary to ensure that the 
benefits of the drug outweigh the risks of the drug”.
768
 The REMS will contain ongoing 
obligations for “risk evaluation and [a] mitigation strategy”.
769
 The basic idea is that not 
only does the REMS serve as a plan for post-market safety and effectiveness evaluation, 
but that it also identifies a plan for minimizing the impact of unknown risks.  
 
The existence of REMS then allows for an abbreviated submission for treatments 
that address serious or life-threatening conditions and unmet medical needs.
770 Planning 
for the minimization of these risks then allows for the shifting of the risk-benefit analysis 
for these drugs. In effect, the existence of post-marketing risk mitigation strategies and 
monitoring activities allows for the reduction of SEQ data provided post-market. A recent 
report to Congress has found that the majority of post-market commitments made in 




The unfortunate result is that the U.S. has begun the marketing of “promising 
therapies” on reduced pre-market safety data.
772
  Often drugs which show some effects at 
Phase 2 clinical trials will be licensed with a promise to conduct Phase 3 trials once the 






Ibid., s. 501(1)(3). 
771





product is on the market.
773
 In this case, the promise of pharmacovigilence is used to 





(a) Taking the Measure of the Life-Cycle Model 
 
The changes that underlie the life-cycle model hold great promise to resolve 
many of the problems with current drug regulation in Canada. As has been noted by 
Lemmens and Bouchard, “the current regulatory process focuses too much on short-term 
efficacy and safety of drug products [and] there is little control on what happens after a 
drug is approved”.
774
 Pharmacovigilence should, in theory, increase the requirement for 
post-market surveillance of new drugs, while risk-benefit analysis could introduce a more 
balanced appraisal of new drugs. This new regulatory life-cycle, as envisioned in the 
2006 Progressive Licensing Framework
775
 (PLF) and Bill C-51,
776
  increases the 
requirements for ongoing reporting of safety data, gives regulators more powers to 
enforce post-market conditions and withdraw products, increases the flexibility of the 
regulator to assess scientific data, and increases the mechanisms for marketing needed 
new therapies. Yet, this model is also not without its potential pitfalls.  
 
Many authors have been critical of the way in which PLF was developed. As the 
                                                 
773
IOM report, supra note 706. 
774
T.  Lemmens & R. A. Bouchard, “Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in Canada” in J. Downie, T. Caulfield 
& C. M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3
rd
 ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 
at 311 [Lemmens & Bouchard]. 
775
PL Concept Paper, supra note 58.  
776
Bill C-51, supra note 544. 
 
 198 
editor-in-chief of the Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ) notes, “two voices 
dominated the change process: the pharmaceutical industry and Health Canada”.
777
  He 
goes on to argue: 
These voices, albeit important, are not the only stakeholders; their focus is 
far too narrow and potentially self-serving. Canada‟s health professionals, 




Joel Lexchin has been even more critical, going so far as to state that: 
democratic values such as openness, safety, and objective information are 
being ignored as Health Canada consciously opts instead for a drug 




The present regulatory and operational reforms underway at Health Canada, including the 
Blueprint for Renewal and Progressive Licensing, stem from the move toward „smart 
regulation‟. Underlying smart regulation is the concept of: 
using the regulatory system to generate social and [health] benefits while 
enhancing the conditions for a competitive and involved economy that will 





This has meant that most new and existing regulatory activity has come to reflect an 
agenda promoting: 
international competitiveness, risk management approaches, alternative 
instruments such as voluntary codes and regulatory compliance measures 




This agenda has also become ingrained in guidance (the Cabinet Directive on 
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 and a policy of reducing the overall regulatory intervention 




What this means for programs such as PLF is that they may, even unintentionally, 
be driven by a set of assumptions related to reduced regulatory intervention and increased 
autonomy of the regulated (in this case, the pharmaceutical industry). As Lemmens and 
Bouchard have noted, the question becomes “whose definition of health, safety, security 
and values are to guide the government in constructing and implementing its reform 
project?”
784
  If the project is not executed appropriately, the government “risks no longer 
being a protector of public health but a cheerleader for economic growth at the risk of 
public health”.
785
 While PLF has many of the needed elements of an improved regulatory 
system, it also contains many elements that on closer examination could be considered as 
diminishing of the overall scrutiny and SEQ standards imposed on new drugs. 
 
(b) The Downside to Progressive Licensing 
 
One of the most cited criticisms and flaws in the PLF model and 
pharmacovigilence as a whole is the potential for shifting the regulatory oversight of new 
drugs from a pre-market review of SEQ to one based largely on post-market surveillance. 
Or as the editor of CMAJ has noted, “in exchange [for] the requirements to continuously 
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evaluate drugs post-market [the] threshold for approval of selected new drugs is lower”.
 
786
  As Bouchard has noted: 
The thrust of this critique is that the focus of PLF will be on industrial 
development rather than public protection, including a continued 
preference for access, faster review times, private IPR rights, and minimal 
post-marketing obligations.
787
   
 
Health Canada has repeatedly asserted that this is not the intention of the PLF.
788
 Yet as 
has been noted in a recent empirical analysis of all approvals by TPD from 2001 to 2008, 
there has already been a slow shift at TPD towards “earlier access to drugs that occupy 
the „extraordinary need‟ niche with emphasis on post-market surveillance”.
 789
 There is 
already a trend toward relaxing the standards for „promising new therapies‟ that places 
the burden for proving safety and efficacy of a new drug on a post-market consuming 
public.  
 
 There are two dangers in moving the demonstration of SEQ to post-market 
surveillance. The first is that ADRs (post-market safety events) are notoriously 
underreported and Health Canada has, as yet, to demonstrate that it can effectively 
receive, analyze, and disseminate adverse event information to patients and practitioners. 
Worldwide ADR reporting systems consistently only capture 1 to 10 per cent of all 
reactions
790
[and] that figure may be considerably lower”.
791
 As one author has noted, 
much of PLF is pegged upon the quality of data that will be generated by 
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implies that this will not compromise safety, because a new and enhanced 
post market surveillance system will identify problems quickly and 
effectively. This is speculative and is not supported by evidence or by 




At the time of drafting this thesis, Health Canada had as yet to produce a clear 
articulation of what a Canadian pharmacovigilence system would look like or encompass. 
Without a clear picture of how pharmacovigilence will manifest in Canada, it becomes 
difficult to gauge how effective its implementation would be. The PLF, which was 
already almost codified by Bill C-51, is dependent on this new post-market measurement. 
 
No legislation should be passed without clearly identifying how 
pharmacovigilence will be dealt with and defining how it will be dealt with in 
regulations. There is a persistent danger that the good intentions of the legislative drafters 
and legislative review team will be lost if the parameters of pharmacovigilence and its 
effects on risk-benefit analysis are not spelled out well in advance. Based on the EU and 
U.S. models, pharmacovigilence (or at least pharmacovigilence planning) must 
supplement the traditional SEQ model, not become the deciding factor in a risk-benefit 
analysis. 
 
The second is that repeatedly in the U.S. and Canada, industry has been shown to 
be slow – if not outright dilatory – to meet imposed conditions of post-market 
surveillance.
 
 Once a manufacturer has a product on the market, past patterns have 
suggested that there is little incentive to complete imposed conditions. A recent U.S. 
                                                 
792
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congressional report on the meeting of post-market conditions imposed under the US-
PDUFA has found that less than 10 per cent (out of over a thousand issued 2002-2005) 
have yet to be met.
793
 Similarly, in Canada a review of post-market conditions imposed 
on drugs issued an NOCc has demonstrated that the vast majority of conditions 
associated with these products still remain unmet.
794
 Reviewing the 38 NOCcs issued as 
of January 2008, Lexchin found little evidence that the majority of application sponsors 
had acted on the conditions imposed on licensing, including one NOCc issued in August 
2009 which had as yet to meet its imposed conditions.  Any new model must impose 
obligations and severe consequences, including revocation of a drug‟s license, for failure 
to meet post-market commitments under very clearly defined timelines. 
 
Another potential pitfall for PLF is how poorly it defines what will qualify as a 
drug for flexible departure. Presently, Health Canada has defined flexible departure as: 
Deviation from the standard baseline requirement for evidence supporting 
a drug‟s efficacy and safety that is necessary for the drug to attain initial 
market authorization. There must be a compelling reason justifying such a 




There is little clarity provided as to what would constitute a compelling reason, but PLF 
has defined „extraordinary need‟ as “urgent medical need resulting from significant threat 
to human health, either individual or population-wide”.
796
 In the U.S., the definition of a 
product that meets an urgent or unmet need has been interpreted by the courts and the 
FDA very broadly. This has meant that virtually all products can apply to be approved 
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using an expedited process;
797
 Vioxx was approved this way.
798
  In order to ensure that 
flexible departure does not become the norm for all new drugs, better parameters for 
when it could be used and the understanding that it should be used as an exception must 
be clearly integrated into the Progressive Licensing model. 
 
A final difficulty for PLF is the degree to which it will be shifting the monitoring 
and assessment of SEQ to industry. Pharmacovigilence, regardless of the final form it 
takes, is a type of self-regulation whereby industry is given a larger role in defining its 
self-monitoring standards and overseeing the implementation of those standards.  Instead 
of directly imposing or supervising SEQ, what Health Canada will actually oversee is that 
the regulated has a plan to oversee SEQ. As Lemmens has noted: 
this represents a sea change in priority-setting in terms of shifting the 
focus of government from a conscious and active „gate keeping‟ or 
fiduciary function in balancing public and private interest to a more 




There is a danger that “over time regulators tend to become advocates for the industry 
they are supposed to regulate, as a result of conflict avoidance and influence from 
industry”.
800
  Over time it is likely that industry will push for an expanded role for 
pharmacovigilence and an expanded role in self-monitoring.  This drift towards increased 
self-regulation means that over time it will become more difficult for regulators to impose 
the conditions and standards that industry uses to self-monitor. 
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(c) General Statement 
 
In the present chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that a policy shift has occurred 
in relation to pharmaceutical regulatory models. Proposed regulatory models are shifting 
away from a point in time approval of new drugs based on SEQ, to a model that assesses 
a drug‟s overall risk-benefit profile at the time of approval and continues to monitor the 
product‟s safety over its life-cycle. Stemming from the Blueprint for Renewal
801
 and 
Canadian Consumer Safety Action Plan,
802
 this policy has been embodied in the 
proposed Progressive Licensing model, which has a focus on ongoing safety monitoring, 
flexible departure for urgently needed new drugs, and pharmacovigilence. Much of the 
intent of this model was incorporated within the proposed Progressive Licensing model 
and Bill C-51
803
 that expanded regulator powers.  Yet the form and implementation of 
these changes, including regulations and a clear new model for drug approvals, still 
remain largely to be determined and communicated by Health Canada.  
 
Key to this new model of drug regulation are the ideas of risk-benefit analysis and 
pharmacovigilence. Yet as I have argued above, each of these regulatory tools is not 
without potential problems.  Risk-benefit analysis must be applied judiciously and cannot 
be allowed to supplant existing SEQ standards or be based on benefits that have little to 
do with health. Pharmacovigilence also must ensure that it is not merely used as a 
mechanism to allow for the establishment of post-marketing surveillance plans in 
exchange for reducing pre-market SEQ data. To this effect, any new legislation must 
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include clear language ensuring the supremacy of the SEQ standard being met as a 
dominant element in any risk-benefit analysis, and that pharmacovigilence be only an 
additional element required for drug approvals in addition to the demonstration of SEQ. 
 
Designing a new drug regulatory regime is no easy process, as Lexchin has noted: 
Absolute drug safety can never be achieved. The task of regulatory 
authorities such as Health Canada is to identify as many as possible of 
these problems before drugs are released onto the market; then to continue 
to monitor drugs‟ safer approval to ensure that any new safety issues are 
documented, and finally to be sure that this information is disseminated in 
an effective manner so that practitioners prescribe and patients use 




The PLF model shows great promise for ensuring increased post-market surveillance of 
new drugs but it is also not without its potential pitfalls. Regulators must be cautious as 
they move forward in structuring a new drug regulatory model that consciously accounts 
for some of the dangers identified above, and focuses on health and safety rather than 
innovation and the pharmaceutical industry‟s needs.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The medieval philosopher Paracelsus once stated that “all medicines are 
poisonous… the right dose differentiates a poison from a remedy”.
805
 All medications 
contain the seed for great harm and great good.  For the most part, we are better off for 
the existence of  prescription pharmaceuticals. One author notes: 
Tens of million of people are alive today who would be dead without their 
medicines, and  tens of millions more have far less life-crushing disabilities 
because of prescriptions their doctors have written.  Some others - though 
mercifully a much smaller number - become disabled or die when a drug‟s 




The benefits from pharmaceuticals are enormous, but this must be tempered with a 
realization that their uses must be justified through the provision of adequate and realistic 
data on SEQ. 
 
 As was noted earlier in this thesis, we place a lot of faith in science to give our 
decisions the weight of empiricism.  Yet in those cases where science is used as a tool in 
regulatory decision-making, it must be employed correctly. If methodologies or sound 
scientific design are allowed to degrade as a result of low regulatory standards or poor 
policy, the research observations that flow from these studies become weak and their 
ability to demonstrate a drug‟s safety or effectiveness become meaningless.  
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 If those scientific standards degrade or are subject to misinformation, if the 
primary policy considerations of regulators cease to be related to the health of Canadians, 
and if those mechanisms in place guiding decisions lose their objectivity, then the 
ultimate loser is the health of the Canadian public. Scientific observation is not infallible 
or ethically neutral.   
 
It took a development in humanist understanding to alter ancient medical models, 
which eventually led to a desire to research the value of new drugs. Science cannot 
operate on its own without guidance that sets limits on what it should be asking and how. 
Science does not provide us with the capacity for formulating ethical or moral decisions. 
Without some form of codified guidance for practices and priorities, science can become 
distorted, exploitative, and even destructive. It must be the product of deliberation and the 
establishment of values through human consideration. In regulatory decisions that have 
ethical implications, such as drug development and approval, establishing limits on how 





 On November 9, 2007, Merck settled the U.S. Vioxx class action suit with nearly 
27, 000 plaintiffs who had alleged damages and a pay-out of 4.85 billion dollars.
807
  The 
drug was pulled from the market in 2004, yet Merck had been aware of the dangers 
associated with the drug as far back as 2001. Throughout the litigation Merck pursued a 
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“try every case” philosophy and “backed its public litigation posture by paying millions 
of dollars in legal fees and other trial expenses, while running an extensive advertising 
campaign touting Merck‟s contributions to public health”.
808
  This enabled Merck to 
settle for far less than was expected, and in fact to make a profit on its overall marketing 
of Vioxx.  
 
 Vioxx was a complete regulatory failure.  The mechanisms in place to assess the 
safety and efficacy of this new drug failed to prevent the product from getting on the 
market, failed to ensure that the drug manufacturer was providing all relevant scientific 
evidence and conducting the appropriate research, and ultimately failed to ensure the 
product was monitored and removed from the market once the dangers were suspected. 
(Merck voluntarily removed the product.) The results of Vioxx‟s failure rest to a large 
extent with the regulation failing to impose on drug manufacturers an obligation to relay 
all known dangers, and partially with the regulators for fast-tracking the drug‟s release 
and not monitoring the effects of the drug once it was on the market.  
 
 Yet Vioxx represents only the most recent and infamous failure of the regulatory 
regime. As we have seen, all drug regulation can be seen as occurring on a pendulum 
which swings from access to safety. It is characterized by a severe public health event 
which is swiftly followed by increased regulatory oversight, new standards of safety, and 
with time, the slow movement away from broader health concerns, until the next event.  
This has occurred repeatedly; in the late 1800s with the adulteration of a simple lozenge 
that led to initial manufacturing standards, in the 1900s with the sulfimide disaster that 
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led to initial safety standards and finally the thalidomide disaster in the 1960s that led to 
efficacy standards being ingrained in the modern clinical trial. From this we get the SEQ 
standard.  The current push towards post-market surveillance (or pharmacovigilence) is 
arguably itself the product of the Vioxx debacle.  
 
 If Vioxx had been marketed under a different drug regulatory regime it is still 
conceivable that it would have been marketed without accounting for its long-term 
dangers.  Under one potential reality, Merck would have merely been required to provide 
a risk management plan and proposal for long-term safety monitoring, which may or may 
not have been followed up (SEQ mitigated with PvP).  Under another, it would have been 
required to provide a detailed long-term safety monitoring plan, met that plan, and that 
may have identified the dangers inherent in its long-term use (SEQ with added PvP).  
Regardless, present safety standards are inadequate to have imposed the needed rigour on 
the science used in the clinical trials and post market studies.  As the present regulatory 
model develops it must ensure that it moves in a direction that holds improving the health 
of Canadians as its primary policy goal. 
 




 Law and policy are critical in the formulation and administration of the drug 
regime.
809
  They provide certainty to applicants and guide those seeking drug approvals. 
Manufacturers will modify their behavior to meet the requirements of regulators. Where 
guidance is weak or allows for too much leeway, those employing the system are apt to 





exploit weaknesses. Applicants will seek to limit costs, reduce interaction with the 
regulatory body, and seek the most effective (timely and simple) way to ensure that their 
product is approved. The law establishing the approval process and the policies 
determining how it is enforced send a tacit message about a regulator‟s priorities and 
intentions.  As noted earlier:  
by defining the specific incentives, opportunities, and constraints within 
which private sector groups operate and assert their interests, institutions 
change the rules of politics and hence the context in which political power is 
determined.
810
   
 
We must be cognizant of the role that law and policy play in creating these realities for 
good or bad when assessing the validity of regulatory and legislative structures. For new 
drugs this means that science, policy, and law walk hand in hand in structuring the 
system that guides new drugs to the market.  
 
 Prescription drugs in Canada are big business. It is estimated that 25.4 billion 
dollars will be spent on prescription drugs over 2009-10 in Canada, with 11.4 billion of 
this being spent by privately-funded health-care programs.
811
 Drugs represent the second 
largest cost to the public health-care system after hospitals and Canadians pay more on 
average (per capita $832 CAD) for prescription drugs than any other OECD country.
812
 
In the past decade, expenditures have more than doubled, from $12 billion to $25 
billion.
813
 The regulation and oversight of this system affect all Canadians and the overall 
quality and functioning of our health-care system.  
                                                 
810
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 As the regulator, Health Canada plays an important role in overseeing and guiding 
the quality of the pharmaceuticals that are available in Canada.  Yet as this thesis has 
demonstrated, there are significant gaps in the law overseeing the generation of scientific 
information. It is essential that in the review of new health products the regulator take 
into account as a primary policy consideration that these products be safe, efficacious, 
and of high quality.  Only then should other considerations such as the product‟s market 
value, the potential for innovation, and the speed of drug review be considered.  
 
Whither the Regulator 
 
 
 Each year all government departments are required to produce a report of their 
planned activities and performance on those activities called a Report on Plans and 
Priorities (RPP).  The RPP serves to “describe departmental priorities, expected results 
and the associated resource requirements [to inform] parliamentarians and Canadians of 
departmental plans”.
814
 Basically, the RPP serves as the outline for a department‟s plans, 
priorities, and intended activities over the coming next three years. In the 2002 RPP, 
Health Canada defined its role as “guardian/risk mitigator and information provider 
through the generation of shared knowledge”.
815
 In Health Canada‟s 2009-10 RPP, it 
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identified its core responsibilities as “a regulator, service provider, funder”
816
 and newly 




In the 2009-10 RPP, Health Canada has reaffirmed its intention to “update the 
regulatory system to address new realities in science and technology and the global 
economy”.
818
 While there is no specific plan to re-introduce Bill C-51, Health Canada 
continues working on a new regulatory system largely based on the Canadian Consumer 
Safety Action Plan:  
The Department will build on the initial thrust of the Action Plan and 
undertake a number of initiatives in each of the three pillars: active 
prevention to address as many potential problems as possible before they 
occur; targeted oversight so the government can keep a closer watch over 
products that pose a higher risk; and rapid response to enable government 




These three new pillars for any drug regulatory system can rightly be observed as a shift 
to limited regulatory oversight pre-market against a priori identified risks in favour of 
responding when unforeseen risks occur.  
 
This shift is core to how the government of Canada has begun to perceive its role as 
a provider of health services, from active participant to more of a third party facilitator of 
drug marketing.  While it still regulates several product lines, it now conceives of this 
role as working to “generate and share knowledge and information on which personal 
                                                 
816
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decision-making, regulations and standards, and innovation in health rely”.
820
 This 
reflects what was announced by TPD in its own Business Transformation Strategy, to: 
speed up the regulatory process for drug approvals, to move forward with a 
smart regulation strategy to accelerate reforms in key areas to promote 
health and sustainability, to contribute to innovation and economic growth, 




As Lexchin suggest, this new role is one where the regulator‟s “main function is to 
facilitate industry‟s efforts to develop new products and to approve them as quickly as 




There is much promise in the model envisioned in Bill C-51 and Progressive 
Licensing, but there are also dangers. Under the life-cycle model greater monitoring and 
real-world information on drugs use would be generated, yet it remains unclear whether 
this will be at the expense of allowing products to be marketed with lower evidential 
(SEQ) standards, and based on a host of non-scientific policy risks or benefits. The 
question becomes, what will be the form of this new regulatory and legislative regime? 
As has been echoed throughout this thesis, when science is used it must be employed 
correctly. Creating a regime that in any way exchanges safety of the drug-consuming 
public for unproven measures of predictive safety based on risk modeling is fraught with 
peril. 
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Ultimately it is up to Health Canada and the government to decide how they will 
formulate this new regime.  At its core government needs to compel better research and 
data provision by industry and strengthen the power of the regulator to enforce post-
market research.  Yet it must be cautious that in so doing it does not adopt a model that 
has greater policy and regulatory gaps.  The new regime must be crafted to incorporate 
updated legal requirements for manufacturers and clinical researchers, but also fully 
articulate in law and regulation the new mechanisms (pharmacovigilence and risk-benefit 
analysis) that it proposed to adopt. If these mechanisms become an afterthought of the 
legislative and regulatory drafting, it is likely that they will not manifest as effective 
regulatory tools, and in the end lead to new drug failures.  
 
We are left with the question: If Health Canada does not oversee the safety, 
efficacy and quality of these products, then who does? While imperfect, the present 
regime, and that envisioned by Progressive Licensing, represents an essential layer of 
protection for the drug consuming public. What is truly needed is a commitment from 
Health Canada and the Government to create a robust, adaptable, and evidence based 
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